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or the unbearable lopsidedness of being 
2001 was a good year in Australia as far as opposition to 'racism' 
is concerned, and 2002 is looking better. While not claiming to have 
investigated the matter empirically, my impression is that in 2001 
a record number of Australians declared themselves to be opposed 
to the use of the terms 'racist' and 'racism'. Everywhere I turned, 
people were courageously stating things like 'I am not racist', 
'That's not racism', 'I did not mention race, I am talking about 
culture' or 'People will say I am racist but I am not.' And, of course, 
to the delight of the connoisseurs, the famous 'I am not racist, but 
... 'was everywhere. Anti-racist culture is flourishing. We're clearly 
over the tirnid years of Hansonism. 
It is true that in 2001 a considerable number of Indigenous 
people and Arab and Muslim Australians felt demeaned, 
inferiorised and excluded from the rest of society ('Asians' were 
breathing with relief in 2001-at least they'd have time to replenish 
before the next round). But does being demeaned, inferiorised, 
treated insensitively and excluded mean you are being subjected to 
racism? It's no longer easy to answer this question, for it is no longer 
up to the victims to decide if a person is racist. Racists declare 
themselves to be so. And the fact that no one in Australia has done 
so just shows the depth of anti-racism in this country. So strongly 
do the anti-racists feel that if you refer to one of them as racist 
without their agreeing, they are likely to sue you. I have tried to get 
some people I think are racists to sign a contract agreeing that they 
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are racists before I use the term to refer to them, but I have not 
succeeded so far: it is clear that they are deadset anti-racists. 
Strangely, many of the people who have been accused by some 
misguided third world-looking minority or another of being racist 
have been key figures iri the promotion of Australia's 'anti-racism' 
culture. They might have occasionally demeaned, inferiorised, 
treated insensitively or excluded people they have pictured as 
belonging to a tribe other than theirs, but obviously I cannot apply 
the slur 'racist' to them when they have such an established record 
of hating the very sight of the word. 
This is especially so since in 2001 it was internationally 
established, at the United Nations conference on racism, that most 
colonised and previously colonised third world-looking people 
don't know much about racism. They've shown themselves to be 
notoriously oversensitive and unreliable when it comes to this 
subject, and are very likely to misunderstand what is actually 
happening to them. To make things worse, those living in colonial 
and post-colonial slums and ghettos - the Palestinians, for instance 
- expressed their hatred of their colonisers. What's more, the 
Palestinians do so in a totally vulgar and unsophisticated way. 
Clearly unaware of where such vulgarity might lead, other third 
world-looking people expressed sympathy with the Palestinians 
instead of being rightly outraged at the massive suffering inflicted 
on the Palestinians' sensitive and civilised colonisers. 
Luckily, countries such as the US, Canada, the European states 
and Australia used the magnificent historical record of their 
emergence as nations to enlighten everyone and explain that this 
hatred of the coloniser was the only real racism there is. It is now 
well known - and it was widely reported in the press - that by 
stopping this hatred of the coloniser being officially accepted and 
expressed by other delegates at the conference, they actually 'saved 
the conference'. 
Having done so much for anti-racism at that conference and 
everywhere else around the world, some people in Australia are 
rightly 'offended' when they are accused of racism. For instance, 
the Prime Minister has publicly declared himself 'offended' on 
many occasions; he even went as far as being 'outraged' once when 
faced with the term 'racism'. More offended by it than by the sight 
of the dehumanising concentration camps he has used to cage third 
world-looking asylum seekers. In fact, in Australia today those 
offended by the term 'racist' almost outnumber those offended 
by racists. 
PREFACE XI 
Another measure of the depth of this 'anti-racism' is the degree 
of heroism shown by the people who are struggling in its front line. 
These courageous people might appear to be in power, they might 
appear to have pages of newspapers and endless radio and 
television time at their disposal, but every now and then the 
repressive conditions under which they are operating reveal 
themselves in the way they speak. They all say something along 
the lines of: 'I know they will get me, but I am going to say it ... ' 
Even the Prime Minister says it. 'They', in case you've been kept in 
the dark, is the formidably powerful ultra-left revolutionary 
council of political correctness. This council, all appearances 
notwithstanding, and as every ordinary mainstream, paranoid-and-
allowed-to-be-relaxed-and-comfortable-with-his/her-paranoia 
Australian will tell you, is clearly still ruling the country. So one 
can appreciate the effort it takes the John Howards and Alan 
Joneses of the country to heroically squeeze their points of view 
across to the public despite the incredibly repressive measures being 
used against them by the revolutionary council. And let us not 
forget that these 'heroes' all volunteered to do so. Which goes to 
show you that you cannot repress Australian values. 
One version of Marx's theory of ideology, based on the concept 
of the camera obscura, is that capitalism creates an 'appearance' -
a level of experience - that is an 'upside down' version of reality. 
This idea has long been academically discredited. But it clearly 
needs to make a comeback to make sense of the lopsided reality 
which increasingly engulfs us. 
As this book goes to press I find myself right in the midst of such 
a reality. 
In the aftermath of the April 2002 Israeli reoccupation and 
vandalisation of the West Bank, I initiated, with my colleague 
John Docker, a petition calling for a boycott of Israeli academic 
institutions. A petition, one would think, is a basic and peaceful 
means of democratic expression. But not so for the editor of 
The Australian (well known for standing up for the oppressed 
across the world), who captured its incredible violence by 
editorialising that the petition 'verges on book burning'. On the 
other side of this camera obscura reality stood the Israelis' 
medieval-like rampage in occupied Palestine, where books and 
documents were actually burning. Obviously, that kind of burning 
was too subtle for the editor of The Australian to smell. 
But there is more. This was a petition that was initiated and 
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precisely to avoid any sense of 'communal chauvinism'. It was a 
petition that had been laboured over for many days to ensure that 
it was not open to claims of being anti-Semitic, and that was then 
signed by some of the most important Australian academics to have 
researched and written on racism in Australia. Here, the venerable 
editor of The Australian, and a minister of the government that 
brought us the Tampa crisis and the concentration camps and 
destroyed the process of reconciliation with Australia's Indigenous 
people while tabooing the use of the term 'racism' to refer to any 
of this, finally broke the taboo, in the face of the horrendous assault 
on, and exceptional inferiorisation of, other fellow human beings 
that the petition represented, and called it ... yes ... you guessed it 
... racist! I guess even anti-racism can reach its limits of tolerance. 
Along with other academics, I had long dismissed Marx's 
camera obscura theory. I didn't know that a time would come 
where I'd be living what it described with all its nightmarish 
qualities. Sorry, Marx, I take it all back. 
This book is about the currently pervasive paranoid nationalist 
culture of neo-liberal capitalism that underlies this lopsided reality. 
It emphasises the importance of a 'caring' social environment, and 
underlines the corrosive effects of its absence on the quality of our 
daily lives. So I want to begin by thanking the many friends and 
colleagues who, in the last couple of years, have provided me with 
a warm and supportive environment. In particular, I want to thank 
those whose active engagement with various versions of the texts 
present in this book has been of particular importance to me: 
Ien Ang, Jeremy Beckett, Gillian Collishaw, John Docker, Abbas 
El-Zein, Sneja Gunew, Michael Jackson, Samir Khalaf, Vivienne 
Kondos, George Morgan, Meaghan Morris, Dirk Moses, Stephen 
Muecke, Greg Noble, Beth Povinelli, Scott Poynting, Elspeth 
Probyn, Gina Rizakos, Ken Wark, Hal Wooten and Anna Yeatman. 
I am especially thankful to Greg Noble who also contributed with 
a thorough editing of the whole manuscript. Mary Zournazi's 
interest in my initial ideas on hope was important in helping me 
make them more coherent and analytically operational. I'd like 
to also thank my colleagues in the Department of Anthropology 
at the University of Sydney, who have provided me with an 
exceptionally rich and supportive work environment. A special 
thanks to Sebastian Job for some excellent research assistance with 
the material on hope, and for often successfully supervising his 
supervisor. Another special thanks for Tony Moore, Antoinette 
Wilson and Megan Alsop from Pluto Press for their encouragement 
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and their enthusiasm for the publishing of this book, and towards 
my work in general. Last but not least, I want to register my debt 
to the late Pierre Bourdieu. His rsona and intellectual ~neros1 
had no e~en though t 1s work is not an empirical 
investigation in the Bourdieu-ian tradition, his shadow looms large 
over it, as will be obvious to the reader. 
In my previous book, White Nation, I was lucky to be research-
ing a phenomenon that was part of my everyday life, politically 
'hot' and academically interesting. Writing the results of such 
research allowed me to experience a political and theoretical 
effervescence that was exceptionally rewarding and exciting. My 
current Australian Research Council-funded ethnographic 
research - on migrants issuing from three Lebanese villages - is 
only tangentially related to the issues raised in White Nation. It is 
also less immediately 'political', and is not really articulated to my 
everyday political concerns in life, or at least not in the same way. 
However, White Nation incurably reinforced the fully 'engaged' 
academic in me, and I found myself extrapolating from the themes 
and theories I was developing in my new research and using them 
to reflect and write about the crucial events that mark my everyday 
life in Australia. Thus the concepts deployed in this book, such as 
hope, caring, and the gift of social life, were all developed pri-
marily to make sense of the mode of living of the Lebanese 
migrants whose lives I am researching around the world. I almost 
unconsciously found myself deploying them to analyse the 
situation in Australia. So even though only a couple of the chapters 
dealing with migrants are directly related to my research project, 
I feel it important to thank the Australian Research Council for 
so generously financing my research and making the writing of this 
book possible. 
Some of the chapters in the book have appeared in a different 
form in a number of national and international journals. Chapter 
1 began its life as an article in the Australian Financial Review; 
parts of Chapter 3 appeared in the journal Society and Space; a 
different version of Chapter 4 was written for the Journal of 
International Migration and Integration; Chapter 5 appeared in 
Arena magazine; Chapter 6 appeared in the multilingual journal 
Traces; a slightly different version of Chapter 8 was specifically 
written for the University of Chicago journal Public Culture; and 
Chapter 9 appeared in Meanjin. My thanks to all those who 
encouraged me to write and publish the above articles. 
My mother May, and my sisters Nada and Amale and their 
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families, and my mother-in-law Lesley Alcorso, continuously 
provide me with a living experience of a life where solidarity, love, 
affection and hospitality are always there, though not needing to 
be demonstrated with excessive verbosity. 
Finally, I continue to be exceptionally lucky to have the support 
of my partner Caroline Alcorso and my daughters Dominique and 
Aliya. They have endured my absence from the household more 
often than I should have made them, or would have liked them to. 
Caroline has given me more moral, intellectual and domestic 
support than I can ever possibly repay. 
INTRODUCTION 
The chapters that make up this book can be usefully seen as the 
meeting ground of three lines of inquiry: my current comparative 
ethnographic research into what I've called the Lebanese migrants' 
'struggles for viability' in a number of locations around the world, 
my attempts to deal with some of the political and theoretical issues 
generated by White Nation, and my attempts to make sense of the 
Australian social and political reality (or lack of it) created by the 
rule of John Howard's Liberal National Party. The critical notion 
of 'caring' that is either explicitly or implicitly present throughout 
these essays is articulated to all of the above. 
Caring is one of the categories I have developed in my analysis 
of migrant settlement, initially to complement the formal notion 
of citizenship and add an affective dimension to the question of 
belonging. There is the question of nostalgia and 'caring' about the 
original 'homeland': how much do migrants really 'care' about 
where they originally come from? But there is also the question of 
the migrant's participation in the political processes of the host 
society. The latter is often an object of popular debate in. host 
nations. In the public arguments generated around this issue, the 
portrayal of migrants fluctuates. They can be portrayed as people 
who are too 'home'-oriented 1 and thus not participating enough, 
or as phantasmally imagined people who are participating too 
much - so much that they are feared to be 'taking over'. Generally, 
the question of participation is used in these debates to demonstrate 
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that migrants are at best instrumentally interested in the institutions 
of the host society, but are not affectively attached to them. 
Despite often reproducing racist stereotypes of migrants, these 
views nevertheless also contain a lucid everyday differentiation 
between participation as a formal/instrumental process and 
participation as an affective relation to society, an indicator of how 
much one 'cares'. Indeed, one of the popular phobic fantasies that 
is animated by this differentiation is the 'anti-political class' idea 
that the nation is controlled by those who can technically 
participate too well but who do not 'care'2 at the expense of those 
who care but who are technically unable to participate. Here, 
caring is perceived as an important emotional investment in the 
nation, and thus an intense form of participation, but a form that 
is not recognised by politicians. 
I The academic works dealing with political participation often fail to incorporate this public intuition.: In these works, discussions 
of participation remain dominated by political scientists and 
sociologists working with the formal categories of 'rights' and 
'responsibilities' associated with their analysis of citizenship. 
The question of affective belonging and participation is generally 
left out. 
But if caring signals an affective investment in the nation, what 
kind of investment is implied by it? There are different kinds of 
caring, manifesting different modes of investment. This is where 
the concept has been useful in thinking through some of the 
questions raised by White Nation. In that book, I began my analysis 
with a critique of the culture of the 'White worrier', the White 
person who is always worrying about something: about migrants, 
about single mothers on the dole, etc. I argued that such people 
were trying to reassert a sense of governmental power over the 
nation through their worrying. While most people who have read 
this analysis have been in general agreement with it, many have 
asked something along the lines of: 'If people can't worry about 
the nation, what else do you propose?' I often answered that it 
wasn't up to me as a researcher to prescribe different ways of 
belonging to the nation. My role, I suggested, was limited to stating 
the negative effects of the paranoid mode of belonging implied by 
'worrying'. But the question of what a 'healthy' mode of relating 
to the nation can be remained in the back of my mind. 
And as my analysis of 'participation as care' in relation to 
migrants was developing, I gradually began to see that caring might 
well be the alternative to worrying that I and others were looking 
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for. People might use the language of 'caring' and 'worrying' in an 
undifferentiated way, but I think that worrying, as a kind of 
affective investment in the nation, is radically different from what 
I believe caring implies. Worrying is, as I implicitly argued in White 
Nation, a narcissistic affect. You worry about the nation when you 
feel threatened- ultimately, you are only worrying about yourself. 
Caring about the nation, as I will argue in this book, is a more inter-
subjective affect. While one always cares primarily about oneself, 
caring also implies keeping others within one's perspective of care. 
Most importantly, caring does not have the paranoid, defensive 
connotations that worrying has. 
The most important thesis developed in this work is that 
societies are mechanisms for the distribution of hope, and that the 
kind of affective attachment (worrying or caring) that a society 
creates among its citizens is intimately connected to its capacity to 
distribute hope. The caring society is essentially an embracing 
society that generates hope among its citizens and induces them to 
care for it. The defensive society, such as the one we have in 
Australia today, suffers from a scarcity of hope and creates citizens 
who see threats everywhere. It generates worrying citizens and a 
paranoid nationalism. This brings us to the final problematic 
around which the issue of caring has been thought about and 
articulated: the institutionalisation of a culture of worrying at the 
expense of a culture of caring under the rule of John Howard's 
Liberal Party. 
The first five chapters of this book deal directly with these issues: 
hope, worrying, and paranoid nationalism. In Chapter 1 I examine 
the relationship between the rise of neo-liberal economic policy and 
the shrinking capacity of the nation-state to distribute hope, at the 
same time trying to explain the Australian chapter of the West's 
generalised unwillingness and inability to offer hope to, and show 
sympathy with the plight of, the third world-looking refugee 
claimants knocking on its doors. 
In Chapter 2 I examine how 'caring' as an affective mode of 
attachment to the nation is predicated on the nation's capacity to 
distribute hopefulness. While worrying is generally produced by 
an external threat to an object we care fo~ with paranoid na- ~ 
tionalism, worrying is the product of an insecure attachment to a 
nation that is no longer capable of nurturing its citizens. 
In Chapter 3 I examine the dual and gendered nature of the 
national imaginary as embodied in the concepts of motherland and 
fatherland. I define how the relationship between the two is 
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classically imagined. I then examine the specific imaginary of 
paranoid nationalism. I emphasise that within this nationalism, the 
motherland is increasingly an unrealistic hope that needs to be 
protected from reality. In this situation the nation, instead of being 
a reality that needs to be protected, becomes a fantasy that needs 
to be protected from reality - this is what generates the paranoid 
border disorder specific to paranoid nationalism. 
In Chapter 4 I examine the historical basis of John Howard's 
paranoid nationalism. I argue that Howard's rule involves the 
recentring of an always existing but until now marginalised 
subculture of colonial White paranoia. The chapter traces the 
historical origins of this White paranoia and the social and political 
conditions that allowed Howard to reactivate it politically. 
In Chapter 5 I examine Howard's brand of 'Australian funda-
mentalism' and the resulting culture of 'political narcissism' that 
his institutionalisation of a paranoid form of nationalism has 
helped foster. John Howard came to power with a promise to make 
people 'relaxed and comfortable'. As it turned out, he equates 
relaxation and comfort with a kind of 'It's OK to be paranoid in 
our hopeless society' view. He arrived with a promise to 
reintroduce ethical conduct into political life, but has made use of 
this culture of paranoia to justify either his involvement or the 
involvement of those close to him in some of the most unethical 
forms of political behaviour Australia has ever witnessed 
(especially in relation to the handling of refugee claimants). 
No politician has been as opposed by the churches and the 
organisations catering for the disadvantaged and the poor or 
by human rights organisations as Howard has been. For a man 
who insisted on trying to include a reference to God in the 
Australian Constitution this is particularly ironic. He should be 
remembered as - among other things - the man who wanted to 
introduce God into the constitution and take Him out of our 
daily lives. 
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between migrant and 
Indigenous politics. It affirms the position argued by many - that 
there can be no ethical belonging to Australia without an ethical 
relationship to Australia's history of colonisation. However, the 
chapter argues against reducing this ethical position to the often-
posited choice between a politics of recognition of genocide and a 
politics of 'valorisation' of Australia's achievements (a black versus 
white armband view of history). I argue that reducing the 
alternatives to a question of recognition or non-recognition is 
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reducing Australian history to a question of White remembering. 
It is true that only White worriers see the recognition of the 
shameful aspects of the past as a threat to their identification with 
the good parts. This is because they relate to those good parts 
defensively and claustrophobically; they don't see them as tools for 
hoping and imagining better national futures. But the alternative 
is not White caring: a recognition of the past as shameful. This, I 
argue, remains a coloniser's take on history. There is a set of 
Aboriginal histories where the alternatives are also memories of 
heroic resistance or memories of shameful defeats. Such memories 
cannot be integrated into the histories of 'recognition of the 
colonial past', for they are markers of the unbridgeable split that 
colonialism produces between the culture of the colonised and the 
culture of the coloniser. An ethical coming to terms with this split 
requires a lot more than recognition of a shameful past: it requires 
a symbolic tipping of the balance between coloniser and colonised. 
As such, it requires a becoming Indigenous, what American 
radicals call becoming a 'race traitor', on the part of non-
Indigenous Australians. 
While Howard exemplifies the uncaring side of White politics, 
this does not mean that multicultural or ethnic politics are 
necessarily on the side of caring. In Chapter 7 I look at the decline 
of working class-centred concerns within Australian multi-
culturalism. This, I argue, opens the way for the complete articu-
lation of a middle-class multicultural aesthetics to the process 
of globalisation. I also examine the way this process relates to 
the politics of anti-racism. In particular, I analyse the conflation 
of anti-racism with an aestheticised moral politics of good 
migrants versus bad White people. Against such a moral 
politics, I conclude by pointing to some of 'the bad things that 
migrants do'. 
In Chapter 8 I move to a completely different concern: the way 
Palestinian suicide bombers have been portrayed in the West. I 
delineate what a social scientific study of suicide bombing entails 
and analyse the reasons behind the urge to not only condemn 
suicide bombing but also to condemn any attempt at understanding 
the social causes of such a phenomenon. I argue that this latter 
response is part of a generalised Western culture that fears the 
humanity of the 'bad other' because it puts it in touch with its 
own 'badness'. 
In the final chapter I examine the way care emerges out of a form 
of gift exchange between the self and others, and between the self 
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and society. I show how caring citizens and a caring society go hand 
in hand. I conclude by asserting the importance of defending the 
ethical ideals of a caring society against neo-liberal economic 
policy. 
CHAPTER 1 
Transcendental capitalism and 
the roots of paranoid nationalism 
Introduction 
The majority of the polls published in the media are clear: 
Westerners, on the whole, are suffering from compassion fatigue 
in the face of the increasing number of asylum seekers heading 
towards their shores. In Australia, at the very least, 5~er cent 
of all people support conservative Prime Minister John Howard's 
'tough' stand on the asylum seekers issue. Some say it is up to 70 
per cent. While the Prime Minister's capacity to 'be in touch with 
the views of ordinary people' is celebrated by some, it is 
interesting to note that the 'non-ordinary people', the minority 
opposing this stand, see themselves as a moral opposition. They 
oppose in the name of things like 'compassion' and 'hospitality' • 
rather than in the name of a left/right political divide. This has 
become a pattern in the last ten years or so. Whether dealing with 
issues of poverty, or indigenous rights, or the conditions in the 
asylum seekers' detention centres, a small-"!" liberal, largely but 
not solely middle-class population, supported by churches and 
human rights organisations, increasingly perceives itself as the 
outraged defender, the last bastion of a decent and ethical society. 
Now that the 'moral majority' is in power it has been shown to 
be clearly less moral than it initially claimed; instead, we have a 
'moral minority' in opposition. It argues that with the increased 
worldwide implementation of a dogmatic neo-liberal social 
and economic policy, by left and right governments alike, 
7 
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ethics and morality have been thrown out the window. 
Interestingly, conservative intellectuals, who in Australia are 
more often than not newspaper commentators who have mas-
tered a slightly comical neo-tough journalistic style of the 'hey 
softie, let me tell you about what reality is really all about' variety, 
seem to agree, despite themselves, with the liberals. They argue 
that there is no place for ethics and morality in a world where 
people, such as the incredibly rapacious asylum seekers, can 
viciously 'exploit our compassion and generosity'. Consequently, 
the disagreement is not about the lack of ethics and morality 
in social life. Everyone agrees on that. The question is how 
should one react in the face of such an ethical vacuum. The small-
"!" liberals see themselves as courageously fighting to maintain a 
glimmer of ethical life within society. The incredibly pragmatic 
neo-tough conservatives condemn the soft liberals for being 
naive. Considering themselves very 'ordinary' despite their high-
profile middle-class jobs (and in a way they are often right on this 
point), these conservative populists like to portray themselves, like 
John Howard, the Prime Minister they support, as incredibly in 
touch with 'ordinary' people (it is rumoured that they actually 
imagine themselves to have encountered such people in the streets 
from time to time). As such, they are particularly down on the 
small-"!; liberals, whom they see as being from privileged class 
backgr~mds and unable to see the relationship between their 
pompous airs of tolerance, compassion and hospitality and their 
comfortable lifestyles. 
But it is not clear why the assertion that a certain ethical point 
of view is the product of middle-class comfort makes such a view 
less ethical. It is more ethical to be hospitable to needy people than 
not to be. It is more ethical not to be racist (that is, to consider a 
group of people as less 'human' in one way or another than you 
are) than to be one. It is also more ethical to be a racist and 
acknowledge it than to be one and deny it. The list is a long one ... 
It is more ethical to acknowledge that the West is reaping the 
benefits of the colonisation and decimation of innumerable 
indigenous societies than not to do so. And it is more ethical 
not to marginalise and vilify a whole ethnicised or racialised 
'community' under the excuse of fighting crime than to do so. 1 No 
amount of ordinary neo-tough huffing and puffing against 
imaginary threats of political correctness can change this. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that small-"!" liberals often translate 
the social conditions that allow them to hold certain superior 
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ethical views into a kind of innate moral superiority. They see 
ethics as a matter of will. And they see the voters falling for the 
paranoid 'zero-tolerance against crime and asylum seekers' 
packages of the competing political parties as not wanting- rather 
than not being able - to offer marginalised others the kind of 
hope they ought to be offered as fellow human beings. For there is 
no doubt that this is, at least partly, what we are talking about 
when it comes to discussing hospitality towards asylum seekers, 
or compensation for the colonised indigenous people of the 
world, or compassion towards the chronically unemployed: the 
availability, the circulation and the exchange of hope. 
Compassion, hospitality and the recognition of oppression are 
all about giving hope to marginalised people. But to be able to give 
hope one has to have it. This is why the conservatives, populist as 
they are, are right in this respect. Those who are unable to give 
hope to others, who see in every Indigenous person or refugee 
someone aiming to snatch whatever bit of hope for a decent life 
they have, are not immoral people as such. They are just people 
who have very little hope to spare or to share. And so the 
conservative supporters of neo-liberalism might feel triumphant for 
being in touch with the great popular majorities who are unwilling 
to be hospitable to the asylum seekers. But only idiotic neo-tough 
ones find reasons to celebrate this. For such a situation, more than 
anything else, begs a rather sad question: why is it that the great 
majority of the population of the Western world are left with so 
little hope for themselves today, let alone for sharing with others? 
National capitalism and the distribution of hope within society 
To think about and with hope as a social category is both an ex-
ceptionally exhilarating and an exceptionally frustrating exercise. 
It is exhilarating because, as I hope to show (even if briefly) here, 
thinking about human subjects as 'hoping subjects', and thinking 
about societies as mechanisms for the generation and distribution 
of hopefulness and social opportunities, allows us a fresh and 
enriching angle from which to examine and understand our social 
nature and the nature of society. Furthermore, once one has hope 
within one's field of vision, one discovers the astounding degree to 
which the constellations of feelings, discourses and practices 
articulated to hope permeate social life. But perhaps because of this, 
to think about hope is also exceptionally frustrating, in that it 
sometimes seems as if one is examining something as vague as 'life', 
given the multitude of meanings and significations associated 
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with it. Not only is the language of hope associated with aspirations 
as different as 'hoping for an ice-cream' and 'hoping for world 
peace'; there is also a considerable difference between hoping as 
an affective practice, something that one does, and hope as an 
affect, something that one has. There is also a considerable 
difference between hope as a momentary feeling and hopefulness 
as an enduring state of being. As Farran et al. point out: 'Hope has 
often been described as an elusive, mysterious, and "soft" concept. 
Part of this elusiveness is due to the fact that the term is used as a 
verb, a noun and an adjective .. .' Furthermore, they argue, after 
Averill et al.: 2 'The concept of hope is also elusive because it can 
be expressed as a way of feeling (affectively), as a way of thinking 
(cognitively), and a way of behaving or relating (behaviourly).'3 
What makes hope even more difficult is that it is associated 
with many other concepts that have approximately similar 
significations, and these both clarify and blur what it actually 
means. For instance, optimism, fear, desire, wishing, wanting, 
dreaming, waiting and confidence are among many other terms all 
associated with hope and hoping. Nevertheless, despite the 
plurality of meanings, attitudes and practices that constitute the 
discourse of hope, there is still something important that unifies 
them: all those terms express in one way or another modes in which 
human beings relate to their future. 
In his Principles of Hope, Ernest Bloch goes further, saying that 
hope means that people are essentially determined 'by the future'. 4 
Here 'the future' is not so much a 'science fiction' construction as 
the future that one can already detect in the unfolding of the 
present. It invites a more complex conception of the present. It is, 
as Erich Fromm has put it, a 'vision of the present in a state of 
pregnancy'.5 The nature of our hope depends on our relation to 
this state of pregnancy. While the social sciences, and particularly 
the analysis of nationalism, pay particular attention to people's 
relation to the past, it is interesting to note that not many perceive 
the importance of our relation to the future. As Kenneth Nunn, 
from a general psychological perspective, has rightlY' pointed out: 
'The construction of the perceived future has not been elevated to 
a faculty of brain function in the same way as the construction 
of the perceived past, namely, memory. Despite this, anticipation, 
planning, foresight and the executive functions are pivotal to 
human adaptation.'6 
Another difficult aspect of hope is that there can be different 
views as to its moral worth. There is, of course, the classical dark 
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version of hope - the Pandora tale. Pandora, whom the God Zeus 
sent to bring misery to all humans for having accessed the heavenly 
fire, arrived with a box containing all the ills of the world. When 
the box was opened, all those ills spread into the world, except 
hope, which remained in 'our possession' (in the box). Hope here 
is the worst of all human ills: if it wasn't for hope, our subjection 
to a miserable life full of those ills that escaped into the world 
would lead us to suicide. It is only because we continue to have 
hope that we continue to suffer and endure the ills. As Friedrich 
Nietzsche put it, 'hope is the worst of all evils, for it protracts the 
torment of man'.7 Here hope is perceived as the force that keeps 
us going in life. In that sense, it is not defined any differently from 
more positive conceptions of hope; it is the depressed version of 
life as full of ills that makes hoping in it such a miserable affair. 
More analytically pertinent is the sociological difference between 
'realistic' and 'unrealistic' hopes, which captures the extent to 
which hope is grounded in 'the pregnancy of the present' as 
opposed to being totally detached from reality. As the psycho-
analyst Anna Pontamianou argues: 
As the vehicle of a state of trusting expectation, or even conviction, 
that what is expected can or must come to pass, the feeling of hope 
is a psychic strategy. On the one hand, this strategy remains attached 
to reality testing, because it acknowledges when our hopes are but 
lures and illusions, whereas, on the other, it tends to short-circuit 
the reality principle, which, of course, hands down the verdict that 
our internal wishes do not necessarily correspond to what can be 
found in the external world. At any rate, by introducing fulfilment 
of the wish as probably and sometimes even as practically assured, 
our hopes keep alive in the mind the image of a good object to come, 
able and willing to respond to our demands. 8 
This possible disjuncture between wishes and reality has led to 
a range of moral evaluations of hope throughout history. For most 
of the philosophers who see hope negatively, hope is considered a 
variant of a commonsense conception of 'religious hope', the hope 
to end up in heaven. This has often been seen as a hope that 
detaches people from their social reality and makes them less 
committed to act to change their circumstances. It raises the issue 
of the relationship between hope and passivity/activity. The l 
negative views of hope, here, are often along the line of Karl Marx's -¥-
characterisation of reilgi.on (and presumably religious hope) as 'the ...-/\. 
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~ opium of the people'. This kind of hope breeds passivity. Fromm /1 also criticises passivity-inducing hope and exemplifies it as the man 
in Franz Kafka's The Trial, who is waiting for permission to enter 
heaven's door but never takes the initiative to enter. 9 Here hope is 
seen not only as working against reality but also against the 
knowledge of reality which can lead to its (hope's) demise. It breeds 
anti-intellectualism. This antagonism between hope and knowledge 
is represented best in Jean Anouilh's Antigone, where the heroine 
screams: 'We are of the tribe that asks questions, and we ask them 
to the bitter end - until no tiniest chance of hope remains to be 
strangled by our hands. We are of the tribe that hates your filthy 
hope, your docile, female hope.' 10 
Pontamianou has usefully characterised the difference between 
the hope that induces an active engagement with reality and the 
hope that breads passivity and disengagement by using the 
Nietzsche-inspired differentiation between 'hope for life' and 'hope 
against life' .11 As we examine the social distribution of hope, it is 
always useful to remember that society not only distributes hope 
unequally; it also distributes different kinds of hope. The 
importance of this difference will be examined in Chapter 3. In the 
analysis of the unequal distribution of social hope below, I will be 
referring mainly to a hope that is 'for life', a hope that allows people 
to invest themselves in social reality. 
National capitalism and the distribution of hope within society 
In a lecture presented in London, Slavoj Zizek, the Slovenian 
philosopher and psychoanalyst, 12 reflected on the inability of the 
British left to dent Margaret Thatcher's electoral appeal among the 
working classes with their usual strategy- emphasising the massive 
inequalities her policies were generating. For Zizek, the opposition, 
in its preoccupation with inequalities in the distribution of wealth 
and the distribution of goods and services, left out of its sight the 
very area where Thatcher's strength resided: her capacity to 
distribute 'fantasy'. 'Fantasy', in Zizek's 'Lacanese', is the set of 
subliminal beliefs that individuals hold that makes them feel that 
their life has a purpose, that they have a meaningful future. Fantasy, 
here, covers important elements of what has been referred to above 
as hope. 
What Zizek's point implies is that social hope, as a perception 
within society of a better future already potentially existing in the 
pregnancy of the present, is capable of overriding the determining 
powers of the inequalities experienced within this present. This 
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capacity for hope clearly works well with capitalism. Not least 
because the yet-to-come of life offers exactly the kind of space in 
empirical reality that is most open for ideological intervention. 
Thatcher, for example, distributed hope: first through a racist 
ideological strategy that emphasised the causal power of the British 
character, and second through highlighting the viability of the small 
shopkeepers' dreams of rising above their situation and experi-
encing upward social mobility. Her message was simple and clear: 
if you 'possessed' the 'British character', you possessed the capacity 
to experience upward social mobility even if, in the present, you 
were at the bottom of the heap. The British character did not give 
you immediate equality and the good life, but it enabled you to 
hope for a future good life. You could look at your Pakistani 
neighbours, living in the same conditions you were living in, and 
say: 'Sure we're in the same hole, but I've got the British character, 
so I can at least hope to get out of this hole, while these black 
bastards are hopelessly stuck where they are.' 
Here lies the magic of national identification and the capacity 
to utter the national 'we'. 'I' as an individu 1 can live most of my 
life watching sports on TV, but as an ustralian. I can still claim I 
with confidence that~ 'I' as an individual 
can be n e ess at paying cricket (as indeed I am), but that doesn't 
stop_me from tellin an English colleague (on a good day!) that 
'we thrashed you last night' (as indeed I do). 'I' can be uneducated 
ana yet can confidently claim that ' we are highly educated 
compared to the people of Afghanistan'. The national 'we' magi-
cally enables the 'I' of the national to do things it can never hope 
to be able to do as an individual 'I'. As importantly, the 'we' is also 
transformed into an aspiration. The child uttering 'we are good at 
football' sets himself or herself on the road of 'trying to be good 
at football'. The imagined 'we', in a kind of noblesse oblige, 
actually becomes causal in influencing the capacity of the person 
who is trying to be what 'we' all are. Through this magical quality 
all collective national identities work as a mechanism for the 
distribution of hope. 
But capitalist society does not produce and distribute hope only 
through the mechanism of national identification. It also does so 
through its ability to maintain an experience of the possib!lit~ of 
upward social mobility. First we have to note how capitalism 
hegemonises the ideological content of hope so it becomes almost 
universally equated with dreams of better-paid jobs, better life-
styles, more commodities, .etc. 13 But second, and as importantly, 
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despite the fact that capitalism on the whole works towards the 
inter-generational reproduction of class locations, there are always 
enough stories circulating of people who have 'moved on' (thanks 
to hard work, or to education, or even to a lottery ticket!) to allow 
for the belief in the possibility of upward social mobility. The power 
of these hopes is such that most people will live their lives believing 
in the possibility of upward social mobility without actually 
experiencing it. 
This capacity to distribute hope in the midst of massive social 
inequality has been the secret of the nation-state's enduring ability 
to sustain capitalist accumulation. Jules Michelet, the 18th century 
observer and historian of the rise of nationalism, relates to us nicely, 
in his famous description of the 'birth of a Frenchman', how the 
nation worked as an apparatus for the distribution of hope. No 
sooner was the person born as a 'Frenchman', he informs us, than 
he was immediately 'recognised' and 'accounted for' as a person. 
Through his inclusion as part of a national society, the nation-state 
provided him with a recognition of his moral worth, and he could 
immediately 'claim his dignity as a man'. At the same time, 
Michelet stresses, the national subject is made to feel in 'control 
over the national territory'; no sooner is he born than he is 'put ... 
in possession of his native land'. But most importantly, the sense 
of being included, being accounted for and being in control all add 
up to what is in a sense the finality of the process: the national's 
capacity to receive what Michelet called 'his share of hope'. 
We should remember that in the history of the West, access to a 
share of 'dignity and hope' was not always open to the lower 
classes. The rising bourgeoisie of Europe inherited from the court 
aristocracies of earlier times a perception of peasants and poor city 
people as a lower breed of humanity. The lower classes were 'racial-
ised' as innately inferior beings considered biologically ill-equipped 
to access human forms of 'civilisation' - which included, 
particularly, 'human dignity and hope'. 'Human' society within 
each emerging nation at that time did not coincide with the 
boundaries of the nation-states. Its borders were the borders of 
'civilised' bourgeois culture. Bob Miles, relying on Norbert Elias' 
classic work, The Civilising Process, 14 has examined the way 
racist modes of thinking originated in the West in categorising the 
working classes. 15 This has also been examined by Tzvetan 
Todorov, in his analysis of the French racist thinker Frederic Le 
Bon. Le Bon, in his Les Lois psychologiques de /'evolution des 
peuples (1894), exemplifies the way European thought racialised 
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the working classes and excluded them from the sphere of 
civilisation. He argues that 'The lower strata of European society 
are similar to primitive peoples', and that 'it is enough ... to let 
time intervene, to see the upper strata of society separate themselves 
intellectually from the lower strata by a distance as big as that 
which separates the White from the Black, or the Black from the 
monkey'. 16 
What Michelet's work describes to us is the important historical 
shift that began in the late 18th century and continued throughout 
the 19th century: the increasing inclusion of nationally delineated 
peasants and lower classes into the circle of what each nation 
defined as its own version of civilised human society. But this de-
racialisation and civilisation of the interior went hand in hand 
with the intensification of the colonial racialisation of the 
exterior. 17 Now skin colour, in the form of European Whiteness, 
was emphasised, more than ever before, as the most important 
basis for one's access to 'dignity and hope'. Michelet captures the 
birth of the ideal imaginary of the European nation-state proper: a 
state committed to distribute hope, to 'foster life' as Foucault has 
put it,18 within a society whose borders coincide with the borders 
of the nation itself. 
Through his emphasis on the relationship between dignity and 
hope, Michelet also illustrates another important way in which 
national society works as a mechanism for the distribution of hope. 
This is a mechanism that is not specific to capitalism but is an 
intrinsic quality of any society: the production and distribution 
of a meaningful and dignified social life. If hope is the way we 
construct a meaningful future for ourselves, as was established 
above (with the help of Ernst Bloch and Erich Fromm), such futures 
are only possible within society, because society is the distributor 
of social opportunities for self-realisation. We can call this hope 
societal hope. That society is a distributor of these forms of societal 
hope, these social routes by which individuals can define a mean-
ing for their lives, is a point implicitly but powerfully present 
throughout Pierre Bourdieu's work. 
Responding to a critique of the anthropological basis of his 
work which assimilates it to a utilitarian vision of human beings 
as always aiming to accumulate capital, 19 Bourdieu has argued: 'It 
is not true to say that everything that people do or say is aimed 
at maximizing their social profit; but one may say that they do 
it to perpetuate or to augment their social being.'20 Bourdieu is 
offering a conception of being that is inspired by Spinoza's ideas 
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of conatus and joy21 (as augmentation of being); this gives us a key 
to his general anthropology and sociology. In positing the idea 
that humans aim to accumulate being, Bourdieu is first of all 
undermining the holistic, and commonsense, phenomenological 
idea of 'being' as an either/or thing (epitomised by Shakespeare's 
'to be or not to be'). Indeed, for Bourdieu, being is not an either/or 
question, but a more or less one: some people have more being (a 
life that is more meaningful, satisfactory, fulfilling, etc) than others. 
To paraphrase him, we could say that there is no communism of 
being in society. Being is not equally distributed among the 
population. While some people inherit 'a lot of being', others have 
to scrape the bottom of the barrel to get even a bit of being. 
At the heart of Bourdieu's anthropology is the idea that people 
are not passive recipients of being; they struggle to accumulate it. 
At the heart of his sociology is that being, a meaningful life, is not, 
unlike what is posited by religious thought, something given 
prior to social life. Life has no intrinsic meaning. Rather, it is society 
that offers individuals the possibility of making something 
meaningful of their lives: 'doomed to death, that end which can-
not be taken as an end, man is a being without a reason for 
being. It is society, and society alone, which dispenses, to different 
degrees, the justifications and reasons for existing.'22 This is 
made particularly explicit in his philosophical work Pascalian 
Meditations. 'The social world,' he argues, 'gives what is rarest, 
recognition, consideration, in other words, quite simply, reasons 
for being. '23 
For Bourdieu, therefore, society is primarily a mechanism for 
the generation of meanings for life. It does so by offering people 
the opportunities to 'make a life for themselves', to invest and 
occupy and thus create and give social significance to their selves. 
This is what Bourdieu calls illusio: 24 the deep belief in the 
importance of our life pursuits, our future, and thus the deep belief 
in the importance of our social selves. The key to a 'decent' society 
is above all this capacity to distribute these opportunities for self-
realisation, which are none other than what we have been calling 
societal hope. 
It is, of course, quite clear that under capitalism, government 
has always given primacy to the interests of capitalist investors. 
But thanks to the nation-state's being a mechanism for the 
distribution of hope, the interests of investors were made com-
patible with a commitment to the construction of a viable society 
within national boundaries. Hospitality towards migrants and 
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refugees in this national system was also part of this dual economic/ 
social logic. They represented an extra source of (often cheap) 
labour, but their reception was also represented as a commitment 
to an ethic of the good society in general.25 The fact that they were 
received at all reflected something positive about the quality of life 
within the host society and legitimised it in the eyes of its nationals 
as capable of producing a surplus of hope. This was so even when 
this surplus was itself the product of the colonial plundering of 
resources and destruction of existing social structures - which 
undermined the hopes of millions of people in what became known ~ 
the Third World. The vacuum of hope left behind is still felt today 
within the societies of the colonised, in terms of the hopelessness 
found in some colonised indigenous societies and in terms of the 
migration generated by dysfunctional colonially produced nation-
states that are unable to provide a sufficient 'share of hope' to more 
than a small minority of their citizens. 
Until recently, the capacity of the great majority of migrants to 
settle in Western societies was dependent on the availability of a 
Western 'surplus of hope'. This surplus is the precondition of all 
forms of hospitality. But it is clear today that while the West is 
producing a surplus of many things, hope is not among them. As 
Bourdieu points out, while society is certainly defined through its 
capacity as a distributor of 'meanings of life', any society's actual 
capacity cannot be taken for granted at any time, and hope and 
meaningfulness are not always offered. Capitalist societies are 
characterised by a deep inequality in their distribution of hope, 
and when such inequality reaches an extreme, certain groups are 
not offered any hope at all. 'One of the most unequal of all 
distributions, and probably, in any case, the most cruel, is the 
distribution of symbolic capital, that is, of social importance and 
of reasons for living,' he tells us. For him 'there is no worse 
dispossession, no worse privation, perhaps, than that of the losers 
in the symbolic struggle for recognition, for access to a socially 
recognized social being, in a word, to humanity'. 26 Elsewhere, he 
speaks of 'social ageing' as a social situation where the possibilities 
that life has opened before us become fewer and fewer.27 By the 
same token, a situation where the possibilities of life are nil is akin 
to social death. For, as he puts it, 'The competition for a social life 
that will be known and recognized, which will free you from in-
significance, is a struggle to the death for symbolic life and death.'28 
This opposition to social death is perhaps what marks 
Bourdieu's 'radical phase' in the 1990s. As he saw it, capitalist 
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societies have always been marked by an unequal distribution of 
hope. Yet they have offered the ground for struggles towards more 
equitable distributions. What characterised neo-liberal economic 
policy in his eyes was not that it was shaped by a society marred 
by inequality, but that the very idea of society, of commitment to 
some form of distribution of hope, was disappearing. This has been 
perhaps the most fundamental change that global capitalism has 
introduced to Western and non-Western societies alike. In the era 
of global capitalism, the growth of the economy, the expansion of 
firms and rising profit margins no longer go hand in hand with the 
state's commitment to the distribution of hope within society. In 
fact, what we are witnessing is not just a decrease in the state's 
commitment to an ethical society but a decrease in its commitment 
to a national society tout court. Many social analysts today debate 
the decline of national sovereignty and national identity as a result 
of 'globalisation'. Yet the greatest casualty, and the one that has l 
most bearing on the quality of our lives, is neither the decline of 
sovereignty nor of identity as such, but the decline of society. This 
is hardly ever mentioned. When the society of the past saw the 
possibility of social death, the welfare state intervened to breathe 
in hope, for there was a perception that all society was at stake I 
wherever and whenever this possibility arose. Today, not only does 
the state not breathe in hope, it is becoming an active producer of 
social death, with social bodies rotting in spaces of chronic 
underemployment, poverty and neglect. We seem to be reverting 
to the neo-feudal times analysed by Norbert Elias,29 where the 
boundaries of civilisation, dignity and hope no longer coincide with 
the boundaries of the nation, but with the boundaries of upper-
class society, the social spaces inhabited by an internationally delin-
eated cosmopolitan class. Increasingly, each nation is developing 
its own 'third world', inhabited by the rejects of global capitalism. 
Transcendental capitalism and the shrinking configuration of 
hope 
It is well understood today that what characterises the global 
corporation most, and what sets it apart from its multinational and 
national predecessors, is the absence of a permanent national 
anchorage point that the corporation sees as its 'true home'. In the 
era of the dominance of colonial or international capitalist enter-
prise, capitalism had a specific and stable national base, partly 
because it was physically difficult to relocate the great majority of 
industries. This was so even when a company's operations had 
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spread to wherever it was able to exploit resources and labour. 
With the rise of the big multinational companies we began to see a 
shift. The multinational firm, as its name implied, was no longer 
associated with a single nation-state. It had core bases in many 
parts of the world, but wherever it was, it operated within a nation-
state framework. The most important political aspect of global 
capitalism is the end of this reliance on a nation-state framework 
of operation. 
In a way, global capitalism is simply the intensification of the 
tendencies of multinational capitalism towards capital accu-
mulation outside the traditional industrial sector. But there are 
also changes: now there is a clear dominance of the finance sector 
and a massive expansion of the services sector. These developments 
have been accompanied by the rise of a relatively new field of 
capital accumulation: the information sector. Partly because of 
the above changes, and partly because of the use of computer 
technology in some of the more traditional sectors, the global 
firm is now characterised by an almost complete loss of a 
specific national anchoring. It is not that, like the multinational 
corporation, it has anchors in many nation-states; rather, it 
hasn't any. Wherever it locates itself is considered a home, 
but on a conjunctural, non-permanent basis. Capitalism goes 
transcendental, so to speak. It simply hovers over the Earth looking 
for a suitable place to land and invest ... until it is time to fly again. 
It is here that a significant phenomenon emerges. The global/ 
transcendental corporation needs the state, but does not need 
the nation. National and sub-national (such as State or provincial) 
governments all over the world are transformed from being 
primarily the managers of a national society to being the managers 
of the aesthetics of investment space. Among the many questions 
that guide government policy, one becomes increasingly para-
mount: how are we to make ourselves attractive enough to entice 
this transcendental capital hovering above us to land in our nation? 
This involves a socio-economic aesthetic: how do we create a good 
work environment - a well-disposed labour force and suitable 
infrastructure? It also involves an architectural and touristic 
aesthetics: how do we create a pleasing living environment for the 
culturally diverse and mobile managers and workers associated 
with these global firms, so that they will desire to come and live 
among us for a while? 
The global aestheticised city is thus made beautiful to attract 
others rather than to make its local occupants feel at home within 
, 
x .. 
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it. Thus even the government's commitment to city space stops 
being a commitment to society. This global urban aesthetics comes 
with an authoritarian spatiality specific to it. More so than any of 
its predecessor cities, the global city has no room for marginals. 
How are we to rid ourselves of the homeless sleeping on the city's 
benches? How are we to rid ourselves of those underclasses, with 
their high proportion of indigenous people, third world-looking 
(i.e. yucky-looking) migrants and descendants of migrants, who are 
still cramming the non-gentrified parts of the city? Not so long ago, 
the state was committed, at least minimally, to propping up and 
distributing hope to such people in order to maintain them as part 
of society. Now, the ideological and ethical space for perceiving the 
poor as a social/human problem has shrunk. In the dominant 
modes of representation the poor become primarily like pimples, 
an 'aesthetic nuisance'. They are standing between 'us' and the yet-
to-land transcendental capital. They ought to be eradicated and 
removed from such a space. The aesthetics of globalisation is the 
aesthetics of zero tolerance. 
As the state retreats from its commitment to the general welfare 
of the marginal and the poor, these people are increasingly- at best 
- left to their own devices. At worst, they are actively portrayed as 
outside society. The criminalisation and labelling of ethnic cultures, 
where politicians and sections of the media encourage the general 
public to make a causal link between criminality, poverty and racial 
or ethnic identity, is one of the more unethical forms of such 
processes of exclusion. This is partly why globalisation has worked 
so well alongside the neo-liberal dismantling of the welfare state. 
The state's retreat from its commitment to seeing poverty as a 
socio-ethical problem goes hand in hand with its increasing 
criminalisation of poverty and deployment of penal sanctions.30 
Societal hope, which is, as I have argued, about one's sense of 
the possibilities that life can offer, is not necessarily related to an 
income level. Its enemy is a sense of entrapment, of having nowhere 
to go, not a sense of poverty. As the state withdraws from society 
and the existing configuration of hope begins shrinking, many 
people, even those with middle-class incomes - urban dwellers 
paradoxically stuck in insecure jobs, farmers working day and 
night without 'getting anywhere', small-business people struggling 
to keep their businesses going, and many more - have begun 
suffering various forms of hope scarcity. They join the already over-
marginalised populations of indigenous communities, homeless 
people, poor immigrant workers and the chronically unemployed. 
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But unlike these groups, the newly marginalised are not used to 
their state of marginality. They are not used to being denied a share 
of hope by society. So they don't know how to dig for new forms 
of hope. They live in a state of denial, still expecting that somehow, 
their nation and their 'national identity' will be a passport to hope 
for them. 'Deep down', they know that their national society is no 
longer 'servicing' them, but like a child whose mother has stopped 
feeding her, the very idea of such a reality is too hard to accept and 
to think. Struggling with it generates trauma. They become self-
centred, jealous of anyone perceived to be 'advancing' (being cared 
for by the nation) while they are stuck. They project the fear that 
is inherent in the fragility of their relationship with their own 
nation onto everything classified as alien. Increasingly, their 
attachment to such a non-feeding nation generates a specific 
paranoid form of nationalism. They become vindictive and bigoted, 
always ready to 'defend the nation', in the hope of re-accessing their 
lost hopes. They are not necessarily like this. Their new life 
condition brings out the worst in them, as it would in any of us. 
That is the story of many of those in the Western world who are 
anti-asylum seekers, who are running towards the right and 
extreme right ideologues who still promise a 'good nation'. 
Paranoid nationalists are the no-hopers produced by trans-
cendental capitalism and the policies of neo-liberal government. 
They are the 'refugees of the interior'. And it is ironic to see so many 
of them mobilised in defending 'the nation' against 'the refugees 
of the exterior'. Global rejects set against global rejects constructing 
what is perhaps the greatest phobic international order instituted 
since World War II. 
I 
CHAPTER 2 
On worrying: the lost art of the 
well-administered national cuddle 
Introduction 
Since the rise of paranoid nationalism in the last 15 years or so, 
its affective expression, 'worrying about one's nation', has 
become such a dominant cultural trend in most Western societies 
that it is sometimes uncritically equated with what it means to be 
attached to the nation. The culture of 'worrying' which was initially 
most pronounced among supporters of extreme-right, anti-
immigration movements, such as the Front National in France and 
Pauline Hanson's One Nation in Australia, has now become the 
dominant cultural form of expressing one's belonging to the nation. 
Nowhere has this generalised culture been as intense as it has been 
in the Australia of the Tampa crisis and the detention centres. This 
is perhaps because no other society has ideologically legitimi ed, 
even institutionalised, the culture of worrying to the extent that 
the conservative government of John Howard has (see Chapter 5). 
'Worrying' clearly denotes the prominence of a dimension of fear 
about the fate of the nation that is only minimally present in the 
affective practice of 'caring'. Thus the difference between the 
two can simply be the result of the presence or absence of a threat: 
our caring turns into worrying when something is threatening what 
we care for. Indeed this is often the case when worrying is a 
relatively fleeting sentiment associated with a specific threat to a 
specific relation, and where the threat is external to the caring 
relation. In such cases 'caring' emerges as the norm to which one 
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reverts after the disappearance of the threat and the worrying it 
has caused. 
The problem with cultures of national worrying is that they are 
not of such a fleeting nature. Of course national worriers do posit 
threats - threats that are located, either literally or symbolically, 
outside the national subject-national society relation - as the source 
of their worrying. Migration, illegal refugees, crime, paedophilia, 
'foreign investment', etc are often cited, and one can imagine 
why they can be a matter of concern for some people. These sorts 
of threats do not, however, explain what is beginning to look like 
a structural entrenchment of the culture of worrying. Indeed, 
worrying has become such an enduring mode of relating to the 
nation that if the nationalists ever ceased 'worrying about the 
nation' it would be hard to remember what the 'caring about the 
nation' one is supposed to return to means. That is, worrying today 
exerts a form of symbolic violence 1 over the field of national 
belonging. It eradicates the very possibility of thinking of an 
alternative mode of belonging. 
In this chapter, I aim to recover the significance of the relation 
of care that can exist between the nation and its citizens. I will 
argue that the cultures of worrying and caring about the nation 
do not reflect the existence or absence of a threat to the nation 
as much as they reflect the quality of the relation between the 
nation and its citizens. Extending the argument developed in the 
previous chapter, I will emphasise the way society works as a 
mechanism for the distribution of hope and examine the 
relationship between this distributional capacity and the prevalence 
of either caring or worrying. As I will show, understanding the 
ethics of care provides us with an important conceptual site from 
which we can capture the pathological nature of a nationalism 
consumed by worrying. 
On dispositional hopefulness 
In the previous chapter I argued that by being a mechanism for the 
distribution of social opportunities, society operates as a 
distributor of social hope among the population it encompasses. 
Given its location within society, I called this societal hope. Social 
hope, however, does not refer only to these societal routes for self-
realisation. As implied by a statement such as 'I am hopeful but 
the situation is hopeless', hope also refers to a disposition within 
individuals. Farran et al. differentiate between hope as a state and 
hope as a trait. They argue that: 
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As a state, it reflects the present feelings that persons have about a 
particular situation, it may fluctuate over time, and it can be 
influenced through growth or intervention. As a trait, hope 
functions as a more enduring attitude or approach to life, and is 
less subject to fluctuation in response to life's vicissitudes.2 
The dispositional hopefulness that concerns us here is, in Farran 
et al.'s language, more like a trait than a state. It is an enduring 
disposition rather than a fleeting feeling. But if hopefulness is a 
disposition, what does it dispose the body/the self to do? 
For most social and psychological researchers who have worked 
on this issue, hopefulness is above all a disposition to be confident 
in the face of the future, to be open to it and welcoming to what it 
will bring, even if one does not know for sure what it will bring.3 
Spinoza importantly points out that hope (unlike wishing, for 
example) is an ambivalent affect, always laced with fear. For him 
hope is like a combination of desire for and fear of the future in 
which the desire for the future is more dominant.4 
One can extract from Spinoza a conception of the hopeful 
disposition as nothing more than the will to live - come what may 
- that is inherent in the human body. It can be linked to Spinoza's 
theory of conatus, that 'each thing, in so far as it is in itself, 
endeavours to persevere in its own being'. 5 We can call this raw 
disposition to embrace life as it unfolds, conatic hope. It is a dis-
position denoting what Spinoza would call an 'appetite' for life.6 
It is well captured by the popular saying, 'Where there's life there's 
hope.' This kind of hopefulness emerges most clearly when humans 
are confronting desperate situations. This is why one finds it 
captured most powerfully in the literature analysing human beings' 
'fighting spirit' in the face of fatal illnesses7 or in concentration 
camps. 8 But this desire to confront life and live it, even if it is an 
intrinsic property of all human beings, cannot be separated from 
the effect of society on its development. Indeed, in some cases 
society ends up extinguishing it - this is the case with suicides. 
Galina Lindquist, an anthropologist doing her ethnographic 
work in contemporary Russia, describes how some small business 
people (such as her informant, Olga) rely on visits to urban 
magicians who give them enough 'hope' (in the form of 'cosmic 
advice', charms, spells, amulets, etc) to confront the deep un-
certainties of a market characterised by an acute absence of trust. 
For her, hopefulness is the ability to cope with what is beyond one's 
control and a belief in the possibility of a minimum sense of agency 
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despite all. In this sense, it is the perceived capacity to exercise some 
mastery over life, and it stands in opposition to helplessness.9 As 
Lindquist points out: 'Magical means are the very few left to a 
woman like Olga to exert power over others in this society, 
to exercise agency ... Olga is learning to have confidence in her 
own self.' 10 
Magic, then, gives Olga hope in the form of a capacity to 
confront the uncertainties of the market; she does not know what 
the future will bring but she has some 'magical' confidence that 
she is on the right path. Such hope 'sustains people like Olga and 
helps them to arise and continue after absorbing the hardest 
blows'. 11 Thus even though the social conditions of the Russian 
market are, so to speak, hopeless, magic allows Olga to reach a 
hopefulness that is within her regardless of what the social situation 
is like. Lindquist ends up defining hope as 'a stubborn confidence 
without any substantial ground, an ineradicable human faculty'. 12 · 
We can see that Lindquist, here, ends up with a definition of 
hope close to what we have called conatic hope. Though one 
senses a contradiction in this definition. For if this hope was, as 
Lindquist says, an 'ineradicable human faculty', why did Olga 
need a social means in the form of magic to find it within her? This 
does not so much negate the idea of a conatic hope as awaken us 
to the fact that even when we say that the disposition for 
hopefulness is inherent in all people, this does not mean that it is 
present in the same way in every single person. The intensity with 
which this inherent disposition of hopefulness is activated within 
an individual depends on the material and symbolic social 
conditions of its activation. 
So society is not only a mechanism for the distribution of societal 
hope; it also functions as a mechanism for the distribution of 
hopefulness, through the provision of certain social conditions 
which, once internalised by individuals, activate their conatic 
hopefulness and allow it to flourish. Olga's story, by emphasising 
their lack, already gives us a sense of what some of the social 
conditions that activate this hopefulness can be: they are the 
negation of the conditions whose presence magic is trying to 
compensate for. These are, according to Lindquist, 'lack of trust', 
'a society where the dangers of social interaction are pre-eminent', 
'where the mechanisms of security and control are dramatically 
reduced', and where there are no sanctions for breaching 
contractual relations. 13 Although Lindquist is speaking of the 
'market' in a strictly economic sense, I would like to suggest that 
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these conditions are equally important in defining more generally 
'the market of life'. A society that can induce and distribute a 
dispositional hopefulness, a lasting and enduring hopefulness, is 
precisely a society where the opposite of the conditions mentioned 
by Lindquist prevails. 
The distribution of hopefulness and the art of the 
well-administered cuddle: on caring and worrying 
In its examination of the dynamics of early childhood, psycho-
analysis has already shown us that the internalisation of 'good 
social relations' as a means of developing a healthy sense of 
hopefulness begins with the internalisation of a 'good mother-
child' relation. Within Kleinian psychoanalysis, for example, 
hope has been explicitly linked to the infant's internalisation of the 
good breast. As Anna Pontamianou argues, 'Hope is conditional 
upon the idea of a breast which it is possible to find, as opposed to 
non-breast, non-existence of breast, or destructive fragmentation 
of the other and of self.' 14 A well-internalised breast allows us to 
develop a capacity to wait for the object of our desire with 
minimum anxiety, even when this object does not show up when 
expected. That is, the internalisation of the good breast allows the 
development of exactly that capacity to 'face the uncertainties of 
the future' which, I suggested above, is an essential characteristic 
of hopefulness. 
Hopefulness, then, is a 'historically' acquired sense of security 
in facing what the future will bring - historical in the sense being 
the product of an internalisation of the history of one's relation to 
the breast and the objects of desire that come to replace it later in 
life. It is also an enduring disposition, in that it is not likely to be 
modified just by the odd occasions where the object doesn't ' turn 
up'. It is thus a confident belief that 'of course the good object will 
come, or of course my mother will feed me, even if I am a bit 
worried that she hasn't shown up yet (Spinoza's fear)'. This 'bit of 
worrying' takes over, however, when the history of the child's 
relationship to the breast is such that it leads to an insecure form 
of attachment, an attachment overshadowed by the fear of the bad 
breast. We can begin to see here the relationship between worrying 
and hope-deprivation. 
Clearly, there are elements in this foundational breast-child 
relation that offer us some key insights into the imaginary 
relationship between the national citizen and the 'breast of the 
motherland'. Above all, it allows us to appreciate how the social 
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hopefulness of the national subject is produced through an 
internalisation of the certainty that their national society will care 
for them. Worrying emerges when this certainty disappears, and 
when the national's answer to the question 'Will my society care 
for me?' is an insecure 'I don't know.' Then anxiety sets in. 
But despite these insights, it is clear that the Kleinian breast-
child relation is of limited value in understanding the national 
subject-national society relation; not least because, at this early 
stage in life, the passivity of the child in this relation makes it an 
unsuitable model for understanding the active role the national 
subject plays in relating to the nation. Taking a later stage in 
the parent-child relationship offers us a better understanding of 
the development of hopefulness within the nation, and of its 
complexities. 
One can note, when watching children who have only recently 
began to walk confidently play with others in a playground, how 
often such children go back to the parental lap for a 'reassuring 
cuddle' before resuming their play. More often than not this 
parental cuddle lasts a bit longer than the child desires. And one 
can see children, especially when they have 'returned to the lap' in 
the middle of some very involved game, battling to free themselves 
from a cuddle they initially sought but now find restraining. They 
wildly struggle to free themselves, screaming with all their body: 
'Hey, I've only come for a little reassuring cuddle. No need to 
suffocate me. I want to move on ... ' 
This situation emerges when the parent's desire to reassure the 
child is overcome by more narcissistic desires. In such a situation 
we have an interaction between two different desires: the desire of 
the child to make contact with a reassuring presence and the desire 
of the parent to treat the child as a cuddly and perhaps soothing 
possession. To begin with, each wants the other as an object that 
satisfies their own needs; to be just that and nothing more. The 
child wants the parent to be around but not so around as to restrict 
their movement. The parent wants the child to stay long enough 
for them to 'get a cuddle'. But this is only at the beginning. What is 
crucial is that with time, both parent and child start learning to 
seek what they themselves need and to try to give the other what 
the other needs. 
For the children, the cuddle they seek is an energising cuddle. It 
is a cuddle which replenishes their capacity to face the world (the 
game they are playing). Confident with the caring presence of the 
parental lap, they are ready to confront the uncertainties of the 
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future (as they present themselves in the playground). The cuddle 
represents the essence of the relation between caring and hope-
fulness. That is, the cuddle acts like Lindquist's magic. It activates 
conatic hopefulness in the child. The caring cuddle also represents 
the essence of what it means to be 'at home', and opens up for us 
the significance of the relationship between hopefulness and 
homeliness. 
Although one often finds in the literature on 'home' and 
'homeliness' an equation between 'home' and the mother, the 
mother's lap and/or particularly the mother's breast (see next 
chapter), there is an enduring assumption that home and the 
mother's breast represent security in the form of immobility as well 
as in the form of an enclosure. Such homeliness is perceived to 
stand in opposition to openness and movement, which are 
somehow associated with homelessness. As Paul Chilton and 
Mikhail Ilyin argue: 
The concept of 'security' seems in English to be understood by 
accessing base concepts of fixedness and being inside an enclosing 
space or a container. This basic cognitive schema is also an 
important component of the 'house' metaphor.15 
Yet this is at best an incomplete definition of both security and 
homeliness. Alone it provides an imaginary of claustrophobia 
rather than of homeliness and security. For what is security if it 
isn't the capacity to move confidently? And what is 'home' if not 
the ground that allows such a confident form of mobility, i.e. that 
allows us to contemplate the possibilities that the world offers 
confidently and move to take them on. A home has to be both 
closed enough to offer shelter and open enough to allow for this 
capacity to perceive what the world has to offer and to provide us 
with enough energy to go and seek it. This is why there is always a 
subliminal psychological value to the 'room with a view'. This also 
explains the homely ontology of glass and the reasons for its 
popularity in the construction of houses. Is it not the ideal medium 
for the embodiment of this double movement of closure and 
openness that is the essence of homeliness, providing a shelter from 
the outside without becoming a claustrophobic inability to see 
what the outside has to offer? 
It is precisely that double movement that the child seeks in the 
parental cuddle. It is a cuddle that manages to simultaneously 
embrace and protect and allow the child to contemplate the future 
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and move towards what it has to offer. Working towards ad-
ministering such a finely tuned cuddle is part of the essence of 
parental care in all walks of life. After their initial tendency to 
'suffocate' the child with a claustrophobic embrace, parents soon 
learn that their child needs different kinds of embraces at different 
times, and they then aim - according to their ability and their own 
history - to become both physical and metaphorical providers of 
this range of hope-inducing cuddles. 
The more parents are capable of providing such caring embraces 
to their children, the more likely the latter are to develop a sense 
of security which will make them less dependent on these cuddles 
and more capable of moving into the world confidently and 
securely, without needing a constant direct physical relation 
with their parental 'home'. They acquire something similar to what 
in attachment theory is called an 'internal secure base': 16 a sense of 
confidence and homeliness that is internalised as a place in 
the psyche, and which allows one to move away from parental 
care without losing the sense of homeliness it provides. As 
Jeremy Holmes puts it: 'the child no longer is wholly dependent 
on the physical presence of the care-giver but can be comforted 
by the thought of "mum-and-dad'', or "home'".17 The child de-
velops the capacity to move further and further away from the 
parents and to live more and more without needing an actual 
'cuddle', since the latter has now become internalised.18 
Another equally important effect of the caring embrace is that 
the child who has internalised such an embrace becomes more 
amenable to allowing himself or herself to become the object of 
parental desire: s/he becomes more disposed to allow the parent to 
get out of the cuddle what that parent wants to get out of it. Care 
essentially generates an inter-subjective and reciprocal ethics that 
is intrinsic to its nature: there is no caring without caring back. 
And the way one has been cared for shapes one's capacity to care 
for others. As Holmes puts it: 
As care-givers, to put ourselves in the other's shoes, we take a small 
fragment of our own experience and amplify it so that it fits with 
that of the person in our charge. In this way, our own experience as 
receivers of care is used when we become care-givers ourselves.19 
It is precisely this kind of caring relation that national societies 
are ideally imagined to have with their members. Nation-states are 
supposed to be capable of providing a nurturing and caring en-
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vironment and of having a considerable mastery in the art of border 
management. They are supposed to be able to operate between the 
two never-to-be-reached extremes: where openness becomes lack 
of protection and where protection becomes claustrophobia. 
Likewise, by being cared for, citizens 'care back' through their 
active and affective participation in the nation. It is this relation 
which the uncaring penal state of transcendental capitalism and 
its paranoid obsession with border controls is no longer allowing 
us to even think of as a mode of attachment to the nation. 
Worriers cannot care about their nation because they have not 
been and are not being cared for properly by it. Because of the 
insecure relationship they have with their own nation, they 
substitute a national belonging based on the defence of a good 
national life they cannot access (worrying) for a national belonging 
based on the enjoyment of such a good life (caring). The primary 
source of worrying, therefore, is internal to the relation. As Holmes 
argues: 'In insecure and especially disorganised attachment, the 
body becomes a vehicle for an introjected "alien" other from and 
with which the individual can neither peaceably separate nor 
harmoniously co-exist.'20 That is, the threatening object in the 
discourse of worrying is intrinsic rather than extrinsic to the 
national subject-national society relation. It is nothing but the 
manifestation of the national subject's relation to the motherland, 
the subliminal fear that 'she' is going to abandon us. It is in this 
sense that worrying is part and parcel of paranoid nationalism. 
Conclusion: all overboard 
During the 'children overboard' case, the government made 
people believe that asylum seekers were throwing their children 
overboard to gain access to Australian soil and the right of refuge. 
As this was later proven to be a lie, it was argued that it is 
xenophobia that allowed Australians to believe such stories. But 
is it really so? What kind of people believe that a parent (even an 
animal parent, let alone a human from another culture) could 
actually throw their child overboard? Perhaps only those who are 
unconsciously worried about being thrown overboard themselves 
by their own motherland? 
Introduction 
CHAPTER 3 
Border dis/order: the imaginary 
of paranoid nationalism 
In what way can we characterise one kind of nationalism as 
'paranoid' in comparison with other forms of nationalism? This is 
not an easy question, for in some ways all nationalisms, by their 
very nature, invite a defensive posture. What's a nation without 
borders to defend? And a nationalist might well self-destruct 
without the noble mission of defending the nation from some 
internal or external threat. But defensiveness is hardly paranoia . 
Every community that fosters social hope and distributes it among 
its members also needs to define and defend its geographic or 
symbolic borders. However, the fostering of hope and its defence 
have irreconcilable and contradictory sides, despite the necessity 
of both and their complementarity. At the border we do the things 
that we have to do to protect our society, and this might involve 
doing things that we might not like to see being done inside our 
society. Inside our social communal space, the fostering of hope is 
aimed at unleashing the forces of democracy, love, affection, 
friendship and the like. At the border, the protection of hope 
sometimes unleashes aggression, hatred and mistrust. 
The dilemma of the nation, and of every other community 
for that matter, is that there is always a danger that the aggressive 
politics of the border will affect the loving interior. This is why 
we like to push border politics out of our sight. We keep them 
where they belong: at the border. Which is somewhere between 
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our society and the societies of others. When aggressive, non-
democratic border politics needs to be practised among us, we 
prefer it to be done by a 'secret service' that keeps its actions as 
invisible as possible. The capacity to keep such politics invisible is 
often the mark of the 'rich nations' of the first world. In this, they 
are much like rich people who can afford to erect the most 
forbidding defences to protect their houses but prefer to have these 
defences as far away from the centre of inhabitance as possible. 
The fence protects the lifestyles pursued in the house, but if it is 
too near it can add a dimension of claustrophobia to this lifestyle 
and thus diminish its quality. 1 
The same contradiction exists between the defences we erect to 
protect our 'selves' and the forces of affect and love that constitute 
that self. As Jeremy Holmes argues, 'in classical psychoanalysis, 
defences are both necessary - it is useful not to be aware of 
potentially disruptive erotic and aggressive feelings - and an 
encumbrance - the effort of removing such thoughts from 
awareness restricts and compromises loving and self-assertive 
possibilities' .2 Managing the self is always a question of being 
able to maintain such defences while also maintaining the self's 
'loving assertive possibilities'. Likewise, managing the distribution 
of hope within a nation and maintaining the quality of life 
within it always involves a balancing act between internal and 
border politics. 
As I will argue below, paranoid nationalism sets in when such 
an act of management becomes impossible, when the aggressive 
politics of the border takes over the very interior it is supposed to 
be protecting. In this chapter I examine this state of 'border 
disorder' and the paranoid nationalist imaginary that accompanies 
it. I begin by analysing the way the dual politics of fostering hope/ 
defending hope reflects itself in an equally dual imaginary of the 
nation. I then examine how the conditions of hope scarcity 
generated by transnational capitalism, and analysed in the previ-
ous chapters, create the conditions for the over-dominance of the 
defensive national imaginary that constitutes the ideological 
backbone of paranoid nationalism. 
On motherlands and fatherlands 
The dual politics of the enjoyment and defence of the community 
noted above implies that nationalist discourse, like all communalist 
discourse, but with its own specificity, involves two modes of 
imagining the nation. On one hand, the nation is imagined as a 
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social/geographical space that one inhabits. On the other, it is 
imagined as a national will, the will of a unified national body (the 
national territory and its inhabitants) hovering above the territory, 
protecting and defending it. The first invites an imaginary of the 
nation as a container-like space and of the national subject as a 
bodily individual positioned in it (as in 'I live in Australia'), 
enjoying its goodness and the hope it has to offer. The second 
invites an imaginary of the nation as a surface, and of the national 
as a non-bodily entity that exists through the national collective 
and speaks as a 'we' while gazing from above at the whole nation, 
trying to regulate the good life within it, as in 'we Australians feel 
there are enough migrants coming into Australia.' 
In White Nation I analysed how this duality reflects a dual mode 
of belonging to the nation as it is present in the claim 'this is my 
nation.' I pointed out that such a claim had a double meaning. First, 
it meant 'I belong to the nation', what I called homely belonging, 
which reflects the spatial-container image and entails the en-
joyment of national life. Second, it meant 'the nation belongs to • 
me', what I called governmental belonging, which invites the 
hovering above the nation-as-a-possession image and entails the 
defence of national life. 3 
In the nationalist imagination, the above duality is always 
articulated to the gendered concepts of the motherland and the 
fatherland. Unlike in German, Italian, French or Arabic, versions 
of such specifically gendered language referring to the nation· are 
not publicly used in the English-speaking world. Nevertheless, 
intimations of gender are just as present in English-language 
nationalist discourse a they are anywhere else in the world.4 In 
Au tralia, there are no specific words u ed to refer to the imaginary 
of the fatherland. It is often contextually implicit in the national 
'we' (as in 'we decide who will enter our borders'). The 'we' here is 
given the 'masculine' qualities of will, decision-making, capacity 
for aggression, etc. The imaginary of the motherland, on the other 
hand, is often embodied in the language of 'home' (as in 'I still call 
Australia home'), where home embodies the caring community -
as R.E. Pahl has argued, this is 'a euphemism for the caring work 
done largely by women' .5 What facilitates a rapprochement 
between nation and home is that as most ethnographic work on 
national identification shows, national identity is always mediated 
by local experience of homely entities at the level of the family, 
village or neighbourhood.6 
The Heimat movement at the end of the 19th century in 
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Germany exemplifies both the mediation between the local and the 
national and the yearning for homely living embodied in nationalist 
discourse. Heimat, the secure and peaceful home ideal where 
serenity as well as plenitude rule, moved from being an idealisation 
of mere locality to an idealisation of nation. Or, more often, an 
idealisation of the nation through the idealisation of locality.7 
The articulation of this conception of the 'homely nation' to the 
gendered concept of 'motherland' is more often than not explicit. 
In the case of the German Heimat, for example, Celia Applegate 
argues that 'the identification of Heimat with femaleness is as 
fundamental as the gender of the German world itself- die Heimat 
- and takes a number (though not a variety) of forms'. 8 
That the conceptions of national mothering and homeliness 
are both rooted in the spatial images of the nation as container is 
itself symbolically important, for the container is an abstract 
projection of the imaginary womb: a place where one feels totally 
fulfilled, both in feeling a kind of 'total fit' and in feeling fully 
nurtured. (The dominant idea of the womb is that there are no bad 
breasts and good breasts there. One is forever located within 
the good breast, so to speak.) As Phil Cohen points out, the nation 
as motherland and as home is conceived as 'a space of absolute 
unity and solidarity associated with feelings of fusion and oceanic 
gratification', where 'our desires and needs have absolute priority' .9 
Examining a Russian nationalist poem abounding in images of 
plenitude, nurturing and bosoms, Cohen presents a standard 
psychoanalytic reading of the association between nation and 
mother. As he points out: 
Like many national anthems, this poem clearly states the association 
between home and mother/land. The infant's earliest feelings of 
symbiotic love and identification with the lost object are articulated 
directly into the nationalist sentiment. The link with 'native soil' is 
likened to an umbilical chord, and attachment to the homeland is 
captured in the figure of the baby at the mother's breast. 10 
But as Cohen also argues, just as it is a place where one can 
experience love and plenitude, the nation is also a place 'where 
some kind of order can be imposed in that small part of a chaotic 
world which the subject can directly own and control'. 11 It is 
here that the imaginary of the fatherland emerges. The national 
subjects unconsciously picture themselves inhabiting the imaginary 
of the fatherland by gaining the capacity to utter the transcendental 
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national 'we' and feeling legitimised to impose order 'from above'. 
Importantly, this transcendental 'we' does not only contain the 
imaginary of a national will directed towards the regulation of the 
national interior. It also delineates the imaginary of the nation as a 
collective will in the face of otherness outside the nation: the will 
of other nations or other non-national entities. 
It needs to be stressed here that 'the fatherland as the will of 
the collective body' is not merely about the nation as an organic 
unity, as opposed to the contractual unity posited in formulations 
that are in line with Emile Durkheim's, and then Ferdinand 
Tonnies', differentiation between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. 12 
In Gemeinschaft, the community, the communal body, is always 
defined in relation to its inhabitants; it is never considered in 
relation to other Gemeinschafts, which is what is being emphasised 
here. In the classical Gemeinschaft conception, the individual 
communal subjects that constitute the communal body do not 
lose their individuality. They remain distinct individual subjects 
even when they are part of the collectivity. In fact it is their 
relation to the collectivity that defines both themselves and the 
collectivity. In that sense, the notion of Gemeinschaft, though 
associated with the notion of communal body, is closer to the 
notion of the nation as home/motherland discussed above than it 
is to a conception of the community as unified subject. Indeed 
Frantz Pappenheim defines it by arguing that 'one finds oneself 
belonging to it as if one belongs to one's home' . 13 'One' is still 
present as a distinct subject despite the formation of 'it' to which 
'one' belongs. This 'one' disappears and melts away in the fatherly 
national body. 
To conceive of the nation as both a unified body and a unified 
will invites us to articulate the imaginary of the organic body to 
Rousseau's notion of general will. Rousseau conceives of his notion 
of general will as a process whereby: 'Each of us puts his person 
and all his power in common under the supreme direction of 
the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each 
member as an indivisible part of the whole.' As he goes on to 
explain in his classical formulation: 
In place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this 
act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of 
as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving 
from this act its unity, its common identity, its life, and its will. This 
public person, so formed by the union of all other persons, formerly 
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took the name of the city, and now takes that of Republic or body 
politics. 1 ~ 
However, to fully capture the nature of the fatherland imaginary 
we also need to move from seeing this general will as a will solely 
present to the individual subjects that constitute 'the republic' to 
seeing its inter-national dimension as an integral part of its make 
up: a general will always conscious of its presence before other 
wills. Indeed, within most national communal imagining, this 
general will is seen not only as acting on its members, which is of 
course crucial; it is also seen, from the moment of its birth, as an 
internationally recognised unit, as an international subject which 
allows the individuals that exist nationally in it to also exist and be 
recognised internationally through it. As argued above, unlike the 
subjects of the motherland, the subjects of the fatherland are not 
imagined as bodily subjects, for it is precisely the dissolution of all 
individual subjects into a collective transcendental subject that 
creates the fatherland. 
On the relation between motherlands and fatherlands 
Clearly, the imaginaries of the motherland and the fatherland 
can only be distinguished analytically as they are present together 
dialogically in all the nationalist discourses and the practices in 
which they are enmeshed. As Cohen indicates above, the nation as 
'the mother's breast' cannot exist without the nation as an ordered 
space with secure borders. The nation as community, home, or 
motherland without a fatherland to order it and protect it would 
not be a very satisfying nation to belong to. As Zygmut Bauman 
points out: 
The 'we' made of inclusion, acceptance and confirmation is the 
realm of gratifying safety cut out (though never securely enough) 
from the frightening wilderness of the outside populated by 'them'. 
The safety would not be felt unless the 'we' were trusted to possess 
the binding power of acceptance and the strength to protect those 
already accepted. Identity is experienced as secure if the powers that 
have certified it seem to prevail over the enemies construed in the 
process of their self-assertion. 'We' must be powerful, or it won't be 
gratifying. There is little pleasure in being included if- as Heine once 
remarked on one of the less effective protective walls, those of an 
ethnic ghetto - 'cowardice guards the gates from the inside, and 
stupidity from the outside.' 15 
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The fatherland's 'we' delineates first of all the we of the national 
will ensuring the motherliness of the interior. In the gratifying 
imagined homely community, the shadow of the father has to be 
constantly looming over the motherland, ensuring that it remains 
a peaceful provider of food, love and hope - that is, totally 
subjugated to the fatherland's laws. In this sense, the nationalist is 
the anti-Oedipus (not in Gilles Deleuze's sense) par excellence. 
Rather than wanting to kill his father to have access to his mother, 
he - and it is always symbolically a male here - is someone who 
needs his father to secure his access to the mother. He is someone 
who senses the relation of power underlying 'total mothering' and 
who would ask: can I be sure that my mother will continue to 
nurture me (that the breast of the motherland will be a good breast 
that feeds me) without the presence of my father (a strong 
communal body and national will)? 
Within the imaginary of the nation, there is no contradiction 
between the 'order and border politics' of the fatherland and the 
loving and nurturing nature of the motherland. Indeed the loving 
nurturing interior acquires its qualities because it is also a secure 
ordered place. Here we move to the unhomely unconscious (a 
social version of Freud's unheimlich) of the homely nation for the 
national subject. It is not that the national 'home' is a place of 
nurture, love, serenity and peace in opposition to a place of power 
and subjugation. It is a place of nurture, love, serenity and peace 
because it is a place of power and subjugation, a place where 
the will of the father is trying to ensure that everything is positioned 
in a way that suits the national subject. Essential for the homeli-
ness of the nation, however, is the misrecognition and the 
invisibility of the relations of subjugations in which it is grounded. 
That is, this foundational 'fatherly violence' is a public secret 
in Michael Taussig's sense - something that is well known but 
that should not be shown. 16 As Pierre Bourdieu has powerfully 
argued: 
As often happens in the family and within relations of philia in 
Aristotle's sense of the term ... violence is suspended in a pact of 
non-aggression. However, even in these cases, the refusal to wield 
domination can be part of a strategy of condescension or a way of 
taking violence to a higher degree of 'denegation' and dissimulation, 
a means of reinforcing the effect of misrecognition and thereby of 
symbolic violence. 17 
38 AGAINST PARANOID NATIONALISM 
The fatherland has to be hovering over the motherland, ensuring 
that it is a feeding mother, at all times. For in this imaginary, the 
motherland is not a working mother. She is completely under the 
patriarchal rule of the fatherland and is always there available to 
service her children. 18 The art of 'national fatherhood' is to know 
how to subjugate enough to allow the motherland to perform her 
role as if naturally. If the national subjects occupying the imagi-
nary space of the fatherland fail through their practices and 
institutions to provide the necessary order within the nation, the 
same subjects occupying the imaginary space of the motherland 
will perceive it as less nurturing and satisfying. And if the imaginary 
fatherland's subjects regulate and order life too much, the feeding 
becomes visibly forced and the motherland's subjects will again find 
it less nurturing and serene. 
The imaginary of paranoid nationalism 
As I have already argued in the introduction, there is a sense in 
which all nationalisms are inherently defensive. This is especially 
so when we keep in mind that the images of the motherland 
and the fatherland are always fantasies whose ideals are destined 
never to be reached. As in the conceptualisations of the nation 
popularised by Slavoj Zizek, 19 the nation is never motherly or 
fatherly enough. The perfection of this motherliness and fa-
therliness is precisely the goal nationalists set themselves to achieve 
- in so doing, they hope to give a meaning to their lives. In the 
nationalist imaginary there is always an otherness, in the form of 
persons (such as asylum seekers, migrants, criminals or youth) or 
situations (such as economic crisis or bad government), which 
makes the achievement of the eternally united and vigilant father-
land and the immensely gratifying motherland a forever-deferred 
finale. And such 'national threats and viruses' are always at hand: 
either within the national body (can we trust our youth, can we 
trust the present generation, can we trust the migrants to fight for 
this country?) or outside it (the terrorists are coming, so are all the 
asylum seekers of the world). Bauman quotes and comments on a 
passage from Elias Canetti's The Human Province I, which 
excellently typifies the feverish defensive gaze that characterises this 
search for national order: 
The paradox of order ('the ludicrous thing about order', in Canetti 's 
expression) is that it wants to be so total and all-embracing while it 
'depends on so little. A hair, literally a hair, lying where it shouldn't, 
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can separate order from disorder. Everything that does not belong 
where it is, is hostile. Even the tiniest thing is disturbing: a man of 
total order would have to scour his realm with a microscope, and 
even then a remnant of potential nervousness will remain in him'. 
ationalism breeds such an endemic nervousness in nations it 
spawns. It trains the nations in the art of vigilance that means a lot 
of restlessness and promises no tranquillity. 20 
But while one can capture an element of paranoia in such 
nationalism, it does not represent a pathological state, primarily 
because such a feverish defensiveness can coexist with a good-
enough-but-can-be-perfected image of the motherland. As we 
have seen above, what characterises a nationalism where the 
defensive functions are overwhelming is not that the relations of 
power and subjugation come to exist in the interior of the nation 
but when they can no longer be hidden. The 'good father' of the 
national imaginary has to protect and secure the availability 
(for the national subject) of the good breast of the motherland 
without undermining its 'goodness'. It is when this 'goodness' be-
comes not good enough, when the defensive function starts not 
only to coexist with a deterioration of the enjoyment function but 
to take over from it, that we know that paranoid nationalism has 
set in. 
There isn't, of course, a single variety of paranoid nationalism, 
but it is crucial not to conflate an excessively defensive nationalism 
with a paranoid nationalism. A society at war with a specific enemy 
can become an excessively defensive one, and the quality of life 
that 'the motherland' can provide can end up being affected, but 
this is not necessarily a situation of paranoid nationalism. As we 
have seen in the previous chapters, paranoid nationalism is not 
dependent on an external threat. It is the product of a deterioration 
of the relationship between the national subject and the motherland 
produced internally within the nation. 
Claude Lefort analyses a particular form of nationalist paranoia 
that was specific to the ex-socialist nations of Eastern Europe (what 
he calls 'totalitarianism'). What characterises this paranoia is a 
perception of a direct threat to the will of the united national body, 
what we have called the imaginary of the fatherland and what 
Lefort calls 'the People-as-One': 
At the foundation of totalitarianism lies the representation of the 
People-as-One ... In the so-called socialist world, there can be no 
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other division than that between the people and its enemies: a 
division between inside and outside, no internal division ... a 
division is being affirmed, on the level of fantasy, between the 
People-as-One and the Other. This Other is the other of the outside. 
It is a term to be taken literally: the Other is the representative of 
the forces deriving from the old society (kulaks, bourgeoisie) and 
the emissary of the foreigner, the imperialist world.21 
Here, as Lefort explains, nationalist thought imagines the 
presence of the other as a virus, something that weakens the 
performance of the total communal body, and, by the same token, 
threatens the very existence of the nation, for its existence is 
nothing but its capacity to perform. It becomes a matter of life and 
death. The virus has to be neutralised: in social terms, it has to be 
rendered powerless or, better still, exterminated. This is what Lefort 
has called a 'social prophylaxis', whereby: 
What is at stake is always the integrity of the body. It is as if the 
body had to assure itself of its own identity by expelling the waste 
matter, or as if it had to close in upon itself by withdrawing from 
the outside, by averting the threat of an intrusion by alien elements 
.. . The campaign against the enemy is feverish; fever is good, it is a 
signal, within society, that there is some evil to combat.22 
Lefort provides us here with an excellent description of national 
paranoia in a situation where the nation imagines the very existence 
of its national will as being under threat. Framing it in terms of the 
totalitarianism/democracy oppositions, however, weakens the 
analytical potential of his argument. Lefort argues that such a 
defensive culture and its particular form of otherness is peculiar to 
totalitarianism and that 'modern democracy is that regime in which 
such an image tends to vanish' .23 But in doing so he simply elevates 
the social conditions which lead to a partial eclipse of the national 
will problematic in Western democracies into a general nature. 
He ends up underestimating the extent to which the defensive 
imaginary of the fatherland is a component of Western nationalist 
discourse, just as it was in the discourse of existing socialism. For 
no sooner does a historical context arise whereby the national will 
is perceived to be under threat and is given precedence than the 
Western democratic nations' own 'totalitarian' tendencies become 
apparent and the logic of national protection takes over from the 
logic of national enjoyment. The fatherland, rather than protecting 
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the motherland, ends up suffocating it, just as it did in the countries 
Lefort was discussing. 
However, while sharing some of the general symptoms of para-
noid nationalism, the above situation is not the kind of national 
paranoia we are confronting in Australia today. In all the possible 
relations between motherland and fatherland alluded to above, it 
has been assumed that the motherland is always ready to deliver 
serenity, nurturing and hope when it is well ordered and well 
subjugated by the fatherland. It becomes deficient as a result of 
a malfunctioning fatherland function. But the problematic of 
paranoid nation11lism that concerns us is different. Here, the 
deficiency originates in the motherland. 
Indeed, in the situations we have examined in the previous two 
chapters it is not the defensiveness of society that leads to the 
deterioration of the way of life within it. The deterioration of the 
motherland function is the product of forces inherent in these 
societies: the nature of 'transcendental' capitalism and neo-liberal 
economic policy creates the conditions that help it flourish. Over-
defensiveness comes after the deterioration of the nurturing, hope-
distributing function of the motherland. It only contributes to that 
deterioration a posteriori. Here it is not the motherland that is 
shaped into an unhomely entity by an overbearing fatherland, but 
an unhomely motherland that creates for the fatherland a distinctly 
pathological problematic: how does one defend that which ought 
to be defended but is not worth defending? 
'A 5-year-old who has hurt his knee at school may put a brave 
face on it until the moment when his parents come to collect him, 
when he will suddenly burst into tears,'24 Holmes tells us. That is, 
when we are in touch with our homely 'secure base', when we feel 
hopeful and confident, we are able to let go our defences and exhibit 
our vulnerability. The tragedy of the nationalists we have been 
examining is that the insecurity they experience towards the nation 
does not allow them to ever let go of their defences. Not even when 
they are supposedly 'at home', in touch with their motherland. 
Perhaps what characterises this nationalism best is the psycho-
analytic concept of avoidance. 
Avoidant types are people who are too scared to fully trust 
and relate to their perceived source of security for fear it might 
hurt them. A child who has been hurt by his mother, for 
instance, cannot bring himself to believe that she can hurt him, 
and will refuse to give up the hope that she will not hurt him. 
As Holmes explains: 'the avoidant strategy means staying 
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near to a protective other, but not too near for fear of rejection or 
aggression'. 25 
The paranoid nationalism we have been examining is essentially 
an avoidant form of nationalism. Avoidant nationalists have been 
hurt by their national motherland but cannot bring themselves to 
stop believing that the motherland is there for them. They fear that 
their motherland can no longer nurture them, cuddle them and 
give them hope, but they cannot see any possibility of a substitute 
provider. They want their nation to give them a motherly embrace 
but they cannot bring themselves to come too near, for fear of 
rejection. On the one hand, they have already experienced the bad 
breast of the motherland, they know that their nation has been 
letting them down, but on the other, they want to maintain the 
hope that their motherland will provide them with the good 
national breast. 
That is, against the reality of a non-nurturing motherland the 
avoidant nationalist develops an attachment to an ideal mother-
land s/he hopes will eventuate in the future. It is here that the 
difference between realistic and unrealistic hopes that we have 
noted in Chapter 1 becomes of major importance. Just as society is 
capable of distributing a hope that is 'for life', it is also capable of 
distributing an unrealistic hope that is 'against life'. Unrealistic 
hope is a hope that is detached from the actual social reality of 
the subject and from the immediate future this reality carries 
within it. A psychoanalytic variant of this negative view is a 
conception of hope as deferral of desire. H. Boris argues that hope 
develops from the actual limited availability of the breast and a 
counter-imaginary of endless availability.26 The latter is an im-
aginary of how things ought to be. It is a 'hoping for the breast' 
that becomes distinguished from the "desire for the breast'. As 
Anna Pontamianou explains: 'When hope outweighs desire, 
anything that is potential or lies in the future is likely to loom large 
compared with the present. In this case waiting, or delay, takes 
precedence over the immediate securing of pleasure.'27 
Pontamianou's analysis of hope is part of her analysis of 
borderline patients 'who use hope as a means of preventing change 
and sustaining omnipotence'. Here is how she describes the retreat 
from 'life' in one of her patients: 'She felt secure only within the 
four walls of her house, where she would remain for hours on 
end without doing anything, without a thought in her head and 
devoid of interest.'28 Those patients, she explains, are 'fixated on 
waiting for a future that is always "to come"'.29 And, 'Whereas 
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hope is usually regarded as an affect that promotes development 
and change, here it is in the service of a series of fixations which 
transform its aims.'30 
In much the same way, the avoidant nationalist substitutes a 
fantasy of a future homely cuddly motherland for the actual 
threatening motherland. The more the nation moves into becoming 
the non-nurturing social reality of neo-liberal policy, the more this 
hope for a good motherland becomes unrealistic, with no 
connections to the immediate empirical reality of the subject. That 
1s, rather than the imaginary of the motherland being articulated 
to a reality that needs protecting, it becomes an increasingly hollow 
imaginary that needs to be protected from reality. It is here that 
the paranoid nature of the defensive mechanisms of this avoidant 
nationalism emerges. The defensive mechanisms of the fatherland 
are no longer directed towards ordering and protecting the 
nurturing motherland from internal and external threats; instead, 
their task is to defend a fantasy of the motherland against the 
reality of the motherland. From being the object of protection, 
everything that is part of the national's reality becomes the threat: 
the past as well as the future. The national subject develops a 
pathological narcissism as s/he becomes unable to cope with the 
view of the other, as it risks puncturing his or her increasingly 
hollow 'hoped-for-motherland'. Here in Australia, nothing 
characterises this hollow fantasy as well as John Howard's hope of 
a traditional 1950s-style Australian society. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Anthrax culture 
The question 'does the end justify the means?' and the many 
contradictory answers and considerations it invites is often 
presented to students of politics and philosophy, and even 'to 
schoolchildren, to exemplify the complexities involved in achieving 
one's aims in life. Most importantly, we learn that means and 
ends are related, that what we aim for in life can be affected by 
how we aim for it. 
One would have thought that the asylum seekers 'crisis' offers 
a classical example of this problem. The end: protecting our way 
of life from the threat that thousands of real or imaginary 
boat people ready to sail towards us clearly pose. The means: make 
the life of those who have already landed here against our will as 
difficult as possible so as to discourage all those others waiting in 
the wings from following suit. Somehow, the political leaders of 
the West have convinced themselves that the complexities of the 
relationship between means and ends do not exist, or do not apply, 
when it comes to asylum seekers. Protecting the good life justifies 
whatever we do to those who arrive on our shores uninvited. In 
their minds, end and means, the good life and the way one protects 
this good life, are not related. They see no relationship between 
internal politics and border politics, between domestic policy and 
foreign and immigration policy. The first is concerned with 
promoting the good life inside Australia and sharing it with 
whoever we legally allow within our border; the others are 
concerned with protecting this good life from being 'stolen' by non-
deserving others. 
In Australia, one of the few government appointees still 
committed to multiculturalism, Neville Roach, resigned in 2001 
in the wake of the Tampa affair and the deplorable conditions at 
the asylum seekers' detention centres. His warning that the 
handling of refugee claimants is 'tearing at our multicultural fabric' 
was more important in its ramifications than as the narrow 
statement about multiculturalism it was taken to be. As usual, 
White governmental interpreters fantasised that 'tearing at our 
multicultural fabric' meant 'affecting the marginal woggy part of 
our society', instead of understanding and accepting what it 
actually signified: 'tearing at the core of our culture'. Roach's 
statement was reality's wake-up call to the· government that one 
cannot ignore forever the complexities of the relationship between 
means and ends. The way the government is protecting our 
good life is affecting the quality of this good life, a good life 
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already impoverished by years of 'globalisation' and 'neo-liberal 
economic policy'. 
Our protective societal border politics have reached a point 
where they have become too aggressive and too vigilant for the 
loving interior. Instinctively, we know that the aggressiveness of 
border politics should not be allowed to seep back into the loving 
interior and ruin its quality. We also know that the nastiness 
allowed on the border is deeply connected to the goodness of the 
interior: we cannot defend our border in a totally racist and 
totalitarian way and then claim to - or pretend to - live within that 
border as a non-racist, democratic society. 
These are the rules of life. They do not only apply to relations 
between people. 
In my garden, I want to protect the goodness of the fruits and 
vegetables growing there. What I use to protect this goodness 
affects it. I can use a really efficient poison that will exterminate 
all possible threats coming from the outside, but I know that this 
would kill the very goodness I am protecting. I need to perform a 
balancing act. 
Australia's politicians seem have lost touch with the nature of 
this balancing act; they seem to see Australia as one of those 
societies unable to perform it. In Israel, for example, torturing a 
Palestinian is perceived as the acceptable price of protecting the 
goodness of the Israeli interior. It is argued that only ideali ts can 
celebrate Israel's democracy and internal goodness without 
recognising the country's need for a less than democratic and a less 
'good' border politics to protect the internal goodness. However, 
all Israelis, whether they support such border politics or not, will 
tell you that things do not end up being so neatly divided. When 
taken too far, the nastiness and tension that moves border politics 
ends up permeating the interior and affecting the quality of the 
good life they are supposedly protecting. What is equally important 
is that the very division between the inside and the border 
disappears. Everything becomes a border. 
The political culture of paranoia and fear that results from such 
a situation was most dramatically exemplified during the anthrax 
scare in the United States. We can perhaps make use of the term 
'anthrax culture' to refer more generally to the kind of political 
culture that emerges in any similar situations. Anthrax-culture 
prevails when a generalised culture of 'threat' permeates the whole 
society. The national interior becomes subverted; the citizens begin 
to perceive everything and everywhere as a threat, as a border; a 
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supposed Islamic threat on the border becomes an Islamic threat 
everywhere. Every breath of fresh air becomes imagined as a line 
behind which the enemy (always ready to infiltrate the nation) 
lurks. Slowly but surely, the love, affection and friendship that 
animate the interior are replaced by the aggression, suspicion and 
hatred that were supposedly deployed to protect them. 
Is the supposed threat of 'thousands of boat people' we are 
facing, even if real, worth the slow subversion of the quality of our 
way of life and the rooting of this anthrax culture within it? We 
must remember that our options are not between border protection 
and no border protection. In our national fruit and veggie garden, 
we have choices about the kind of poison we use to protect the 
goodness of our fruits and vegetables from outside threats without 
affecting that goodness. Unless of course they are rotting from 
the inside ... 
Introduction 
CHAPTER 4 
A brief history of 
White colonial paranoia1 
So far in this work I have been concerned with the nature of the 
current wave of paranoid nationalism in Australia and the rest of 
the Western world: a nationalism obsessed with border politics and 
where 'worrying' becomes the dominant mode of expressing one's 
attachment to the nation. I have argued that this paranoid 
nationalism is primarily the product of 'the decline of hope' in an 
era where the dynamics of capital accumulation no longer produces 
mere inequalities within society, but endangers the very idea of a 
national society. In Australia, however, these structural factors did 
not create a culture of paranoia out of thin air. As I will argue in 
this chapter, there is a history of White paranoia in Australian 
culture which has structured Australian nationalism from the time 
of its birth. Since the early post-World War II era, however, there 
have been economic and political forces which have increasingly 
worked to relegate this paranoia to the margins of Australian 
society. What marks the current period is the emergence of a 
counter political tendency which has reactivated this colonial 
paranoia, successfully repositioning it at the core of today's 
national culture. 
In the first part of the chapter I will give a very brief historical 
account of the emergence of White colonial paranoia and of the 
way it has shaped Australia's society and culture from the time of 
federation (independence) in 1901 until the rise of multicultural 
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policy in the early 1970s. I will then examine the period from the 
mid-seventies to the mid-eighties, when the tendency was 
marginalised due to the political consensus that formed around the 
introduction and consolidation of multicultural policy by 
successive Australian governments. 
The last part of the chapter examines the igniting of the debates 
on multiculturalism and indigenous land rights in the mid-eighties 
which signalled the re-emergence of White paranoia in the 
public sphere. As I will argue, to understand this process of re-
emergence we need to examine the economic, social and historical 
circumstances which made dominant sections of the capitalist class, 
their political agents and the media develop an interest in the 
reactivation of White colonial paranoia and in bringing it back to 
the fore as a potent political/cultural force. 2 
White colonial paranoia in Australia 
Since its emergence as a British colonial-settler society, Australia's 
national culture and identity have evolved in the shadow of 
contradictory colonial tendencies. On one hand, even more than is 
the case with other colonial-settler societies of the 'New World', 
such as the United States, Australia's 'first world' wealth and 
democratic institutions are built on the decimation of the 
continent's Indigenous population and on the social, political and 
economic dispossession of those who remain. Theoretically, this 
ought to minimise the presence and effects of the paranoiac colonial 
sensibility one finds in colonial-settler nations that are in constant 
fear of decolonisation. This sensibility is largely due to the 
continued existence of a colonised political will trying to reassert 
its sovereignty over all or part of the territory. This is the case in 
Israel today, for example, as it was the case in apartheid South 
Africa before decolonisation. But Australia's Indigenous people are 
no longer capable of engaging in any significant anti-colonial 
political practices of this kind - that is, although there are many 
Indigenous practices that can be seen as 'anti-colonial' ,3 there is no 
serious Indigenous movement aiming to regain sovereignty over 
Australian ter.ritory. And given the country's relative wealth and 
its stable democracy, one expects Australia to share with the United 
States the 'colonial fait accompli' confidence that permeates the 
latter's national culture. But this is not the case. 
While traces of such a confidence were and still are present, a 
form of White colonial paranoia has remained part of Australian 
culture long after the Indigenous population had been decimated. 
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'Paranoia' denotes here a pathological form of fear based on a 
conception of the self as excessively fragile , and constantly 
threatened. It also describes a tendency to perceive a threat where 
none exists or, if one exists, to inflate its capacity to harm the self. 
Th~ core element of Australia 's colonial paranoia is a fear of loss 
of Europeanness or Whiteness and of the lifestyle and privileges 
that are seen to emanate directly from that. It is a combination of 
the fragility of White European colonial identity in general and the 
Australian situation in particular. 
Claude Levi-Strauss, in his famous UNESCO article on race, 
points out that: 
for huge portions of the human species, and during tens of millennia, 
the notion [of humanity] seems to have been totally lacking. 
Mankind stops at the frontiers of the tribe, of the linguistic group, 
and sometimes even of the village, to the extent that a great many 
of the peoples called primitive call themselves by a name which 
means 'men' ... thus implying that the other tribes, groups and 
villages have no part in human virtues or even human nature.4 
In a not too dissimilar way, and despite the existence of a general 
category of 'humanity' derived from Christianity, the European 
tribes of colonial capitalism constructed themselves as the ideal 
type of what it means to be a 'human being'. What the history of 
the rise of European colonialism shows is how this 'being the best 
type of human being' became associated with being White 
European. In Chapter 1 we examined part of the process through 
which the European working classes stopped being constructed as 
essentially inferior and were given access to humanity and to 
'dignity and hope' within the nation. As Alistair Bonnett has 
shown, this process also involved a historical 'bleaching' of these 
same working classes. It was a continual process of historical 
change that led the British working classes from being perceived 
as on a par 'with monkeys' to the point where Lord Milner, at 
the battle of the Somme in 1918, is supposed to have said, 'I 
never knew that the working classes had such white skins.'5 
, As Bonnett has also shown, while historical accounts of non-
. European Whites were quite abundant in the pre-colonial era, the 
emergence of European Whiteness involved the slow work of 'de-
whitening' everything that was non-European so that 'the category 
"white European" became both a tautology and a group beyond 
compare.'6 This is the history of the construction of Whiteness into 
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a racial category. It involved both a European monopolisation of 
'civilised humanity' and a parallel monopolisation of Whiteness as 
its marker. Finally, the two are combined in what is the quin-
tessential colonial racist logic: Question: why are Europeans 
civilised and superior? Answer: Because they are White. This is how 
Whiteness became a valorised racial causal category. But this is also 
where an anxiety specific to colonial Whiteness emerged. 
At the basis of this anxiety is the simple fact that when we speak 
of the racist social and historical construction of Whiteness, we 
are not implying that every single European individual had the 
same degree of Whiteness constructed for them. What was socially 
constructed at a macro level was a general aspirational model 
specific to various social and historical conditions. Clearly, some 
White Europeans were capable of living up to the 'civilised ideals' 
of White Europeanness with greater success than others - here 
class remained as important a marker as ever. Whiteness was the 
means of accessing the ideal, but it gave no promise of achieving 
total identification with it. It only meant that one could hope 
and aspire towards such an ideal. It is in this_ sense that racial 
Whiteness operated, as we have seen in Chapter 1, as a mechanism 
for the distribution of hope. But not everyone hoped with equal 
confidence. The members of the upper classes claimed a natural 
aristocratic access to high civilisation. The working classes, on 
the other hand, were generally less secure in their possession of 
Whiteness; it was often a promise of a 'better life' without that 
actual better life ever materialising. So the working classes were 
the ones who most needed the reinforcement of hope provided by 
colonial racism. Like the phallus in Freud's theory, 'it' (Whiteness) 
was a symbolic possession that created an expectation that great 
things could be achieved. At the same time, 'it', as a supposed 
causal power, was so fragile and uncertain and dependent on an 
inter-subjective desire for it that it created a structural anxiety and 
a constant fear of 'not really having it' or of 'losing it': a castration 
complex, a constant fear of losing what gives life a sense of 
'distinction'. 
Likewise, the more the European working classes were deprived 
of material access to the 'White' civilised lifestyle, the more they 
relied on their symbolic access to Whiteness and the future promise 
of civilised life it embodied. Whiteness, like the paranoid 
nationalism I examined in the previous chapters, became the trigger 
of unrealistic hopes. Such hopes, as I have argued, by being 'against 
life', become the generators of anxiety, since they have to be 
·, 
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protected from empirical reality, because empirical reality works 
to negate them. It is in this sense that the colonial Whiteness of the 
European working classes embodied a structural tendency towards 
paranoia: can I ever live up to the standards of my Whiteness and 
become as civilised as it promises it should make me? Will my 
Whiteness deliver its promises? White colonial paranoia was 
structured by an unconscious fear that the answers to these 
questions are simply: no. This Whiteness lives under the constant 
threat of not realising the potential it supposedly embodies because 
it is subverted by the reality of class. As such, it is always ready 
to project onto external factors the threatening impulse that is 
inherent to it. It is this structural tendency, with its class specificity, 
that the Australian settlers brought with them to the continent. 
\ 
This class-based anxiety about living up to Whiteness continues to 
mark Australia even today. One would think that the successful 
colonisation of the continent and the creation of a society which 
for more than one hundred years has provided its White 
inhabitants with a decent 'civilised lifestyle' would be enough to 
bury this colonial paranoia. But it hasn't been enough. This is 
where we come to the specificity of Australian colonialism. 
First, it should be noted that whatever traces of colonial 
confidence existed in Australia are built on genocidal practices, and 
so remain haunted by these constitutive deeds. The fact that no 
post-colonial pact has ever been reached (no treaty with the 
Indigenous people yet exists, for example) has left Australian 
culture with a continuous sense of unfinished business, and has 
opened the way for a continual struggle by the remaining Indi-
genous population for some form of moral redress as well as 
material compensation. Thus despite their relative weakness and 
the fact that they are hardly ever concerned with challenging White 
political sovereignty, the struggles of Indigenous Australians act 
as a constant reminder of the uglier aspects of the colonial past -
even for those most determined to forget them or deny their 
continuing relevance. 
Another factor which has bred colonial uncertainty is an 
Australia-specific sensitivity to and awareness of the impossibility 
of fully colonising the natural environment. The relatively 
'undomesticable' nature of the Australian outback and the aware-
ness of a constantly present and sometimes mystically defined 
'undomesticable remainder' even within domesticated spaces7 have 
given Australia's colonial culture a sense of its own fragility which 
seems to be missing from the confident 'frontier' culture that marks 
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US colonial history. Awareness of one's fragility is usually 
considered 'healthier' psychologically than denial of it, and it could 
be argued that this awareness has helped shape some of the better 
aspects of traditional Australian culture, including its trademark 
self-deprecating sense of humour. However, when it is added to the 
nationalist drive to 'domesticate everything', it transforms into the 
anxiety vis a vis undomesticated 'cultural otherness' which has 
marked the Australian psyche from the very beginning. 
Finally, as is well known, because of its distance from the 
'mother country' and because of its geographic location, Australia's 
early settlers, or at least those who had the power to shape the 
identity and culture of the settlements, constructed Australia as an 
isolated White British colony in the heart of a non-European (read 
also uncivilised) Asia-Pacific region. Here Australia shares with 
countries such as White South Africa and Israel a fear of being 
'swamped' by what is perceived as a surrounding hostile and 
uncivilised otherness. 'From the far east and the far west alike we 
behold menaces and contagion ... ' stated the Australian leader 
Alfred Deakin in 1898.8 This is not just a fear that the 'uncivilised 
other' can end up taking over the country through military 
invasion. It is also a fear that through the pressure of sheer 
numbers, the uncivilised others slowly end up penetrating the place 
and their different cultural forms and norms slowly end up 
'polluting' colonial society and identity. The coloniser is here 
expressing his fear of losing the 'civilised' cultural identity that 
propelled the colonial project and gave rise to the nation in the first 
place. However, it should be remembered, as Albert Memmi 
explained long ago, that behind all this is an often unconscious fear 
of losing the social and economic privileges gained from one's 
structural position as a coloniser.9 
Around the time of Federation, when Australia was moving 
towards becoming an independent nation, many Australians 
worried that by weakening the country's links with Britain their 
fears of being 'swamped' by Asians would become a reality. The 
phallic fear of losing one's 'Whiteness' (and the privileges that came 
with it) was as prevalent as the hopes unleashed by the newly 
inaugurated era. It meant that Australia was peculiarly - and 
characteristically, as history has shown - timid for a nation about 
to 'gain' its independence. This timidity gave birth to the foun-
dational White Australia Policy. On one hand, this policy reflected 
the hopes of the 'founding fathers' that Australian society would 
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remain an expression of a constitutive Whiteness and an example 
of what the White British race could achieve. On the other hand, 
the policy expressed the fear that this constitutive Whiteness was 
under threat and needed to be protected by a stringent racial policy 
that worked to maintain the White racial character of the nation. 
This basically meant having a domestic policy geared towards 
the continuing extermination of the culture of the colonised 
Indigenous people and an immigration policy geared towards 
excluding non-Whites from Australia and from Australian 
citizenship. 10 Ideologically, then, White paranoia was structured by 
the following discursive logic: 
1 British civilisation is the highest of all civilisations in terms 
of ideals and achievements. While, as already mentioned, 
European colonialism had monopolised Whiteness and 
civilisation in general, there was fierce national competition 
between European countries as to which national European 
Whiteness (French, English, etc) embodied the highest 
ideals of civilisation. 
2 British civilisation is a racially determined civilisation. That 
is, as defined within the logic of developmental racism, 
White British racial identity is causal. Its 'possession' allows 
certain people to create and/or be committed to societies 
which express the high values of British civilisation. 
3 Those who are not White are by definition unable to 
appreciate or to commit themselves to, let alone create, 
societies which uphold the British values of democracy, 
freedom, etc. The sheer presence of non-Whites ends up 
either deliberately or accidentally undermining those values 
and the culture based on them. 
4 Being all located in poor countries, non-Whites are generally 
not used to high standards of living and are happy to accept 
low wages. Thus by migrating to the West they undermine 
civilised culture and the civilised high standard of living of 
White workers. 11 
5 The more a White society is penetrated by non-White 
elements the less it is capable of expressing the values of 
White civilisation, therefore it is imperative to maintain a 
White society that is as racially pure as possible. 
The White Australia Policy did not just keep Australia homo-
geneously White; it actually worked at making it even more 
homogeneous than it was at the time of Federation. According to 
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historian Andrew Markus, the demographer 'Charles Price has 
estimated that in 1891, [Australia] was 87 per cent Anglo-Celtic 
and 6 per cent north European. Eastern and southern Europeans 
combined came to less than 1 per cent, Asians 1.9 percent, and 
Aborigines 3.4 per cent. By 1947 ... the Anglo-Celtic component 
had increased to 90 per cent, the northern European was 
unchanged, and the combined total for Aborigines and Asians had 
fallen to 1.1 per cent.' 12 As the history of Australia for most of the 
first half of the century was a history of rising living standards, the 
White Australia Policy worked to actually further ingrain - in a 
population already predisposed to believe it- the racial causal logic 
that links White racial identity and high civilised standards of 
living. 
From the White Australia Policy to multiculturalism: the 
repression of colonial paranoia 
The White Australia Policy prevailed well into the 1960s. However, 
from World War II onward it was slowly eroding, both as a 
population/immigration policy and as a racial conceptualisation 
of society. From an ideological point of view, Markus points out 
that as the sixties approached, it was becoming increasingly un-
acceptable internationally to retain the racial tenets of the White 
Australia Policy. 13 They were now decried as forms of racist 
ideology. From an immigration point of view, fears of declining 
population and acceptance of the need to look for sources of large-
scale migration other than Britain had been being expressed by 
academi~s from as early as the 1930s. 14 These fears began to be 
shared with the rest of the population when they were given public 
prominence during and in the aftermath of World War II. This was 
a time when the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Australia 
highlighted the need to 'populate or perish' .15 Notwithstanding the 
above, the most important support for an increase in the rate 
of immigration came from Australia's industrialists, who were at 
the time facing a shortage of labour that could threaten their 
expanding industries. 
After World War II Australia committed itself to a 1 per cent 
immigration-based annual population growth. Given that im-
migrants from Britain were not enough to sustain such a rate, the 
Australian government began accepting relatively large numbers 
of non-British migrants. While to begin with it accepted the 
displaced persons from Northern and Eastern Europe, there were 
not enough of them, and it soon had to recruit its immigrants from 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF WHITE COLONIAL PARANOIA 55 
the 'darker shade of White' regions of southern Europe and the 
Mediterranean. Despite the fact that the immigration program 
continued to give overwhelming preference to British migrants, 
and to finance recruitment campaigns in Britain, this change in 
direction was bound to worry a population whose sensibilities 
continued to be shaped by the White Australia Policy and its 
structural White paranoia. This population was now torn between 
the phobic war fantasy 'populate or perish' and the racial non-
White immigration fantasy 'populate and perish'. 
The government's policy of 'assimilation', launched in the wake 
of the new immigration program, was in many ways directed 
towards soothing this paranoia more than towards being a 
settlement program for the new immigrants. 'Assimilation' carried 
a clear message to the White population: migrants will not perturb 
or change Australia's Anglo-Celtic culture. It is the migrants 
who have to change to fit into it. For the incoming migrants, 
'assimilation' was more a general ideological directive to assimilate 
than a set of 'assimilationist institutions' provided to produce a 
desired outcome. 
Despite all this, the new non-White immigration and the 
ideological nature of assimilation dented the racial structure of 
White paranoia described above. It dented it first through the 
settlement of the 'not so White' Greeks, southern Italians and 
Lebanese, whose mere presence in Australia's cities signalled a 
major change in Australia's urban 'visual' culture - the everyday 
faces one met in the street were no longer as homogeneously white, 
although they were never entirely so anyway. Racial Whiteness was 
also dented in a more fundamental way through the puncturing of 
the causal racial logic that underlay it. It was not possible to 
maintain the belief that Australia's British culture and civilisation 
were a direct result of racial Whiteness and still argue that non-
Whites could be made to assimilate into this culture. This is why 
assimilation created a fundamental split around the way this 
paranoia expressed itself. One part of the population adapted to 
assimilation by moving from a racial to a cultural formulation of 
their fears. 
The changes were minor but important ones. Australia's colonial 
civilisation was increasingly perceived as 'European' rather than 
strictly British. This was done more through an emphasis on the 
European aspects of Britishness than through an opposition 
between the two. It was still, though, a civilised culture threatened 
by uncivilised barbarians. The threat, however, was no longer 
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purely racial. It was increasingly perceived as cultural. This became 
the ruling ideology on both sides of the political divide. Thus, in 
1959, the Minister for Immigration saw himself as enacting a 
policy that would attract 'the types of peoples ... who can most 
readily be absorbed, so that we can mould Australia into an Anglo-
European community embodying the old and the new' .16 
Because certain 'races', such as 'Asians', were still fundamentally 
perceived as unassimilable and thus dangerous, there was now a 
further division - between assimilable non-Whites and non-
assimilable ones. Thus the threat to Australia's White culture was 
no longer non-Whites as such but non-assimilable non-Whites. It 
was this developing shift of emphasis from race to culture that 
made assimilation and the White Australia Policy ideologically 
compatible in government circles and among those who supported 
the policy. 
Because all the dominant political, economic and ideological 
forces embraced this shift, those who still clung to a totally racial 
conception of Whiteness and a more strictly British conception of 
Australian civilisation, though they remained a sizeable section of 
the population, found themselves for the first time on the margins 
of the debates that shaped Australian identity. So much so that 
assimilation was introduced with very little public debate. As Mark 
Lopez points out: 
There was a relative consensus of approval for the program among 
policy-making elites in the public service, major socialising 
institutions (mass media, education system), and all levels of 
government. This dramatically reduced the scope for political debate 
to substantially challenge the policy, despite the existence of 
widespread popular opposition to most aspects of the policy except 
British immigration. 17 
This was an important shift. For the first time, there was no se-
rious political force in Australia willing to or capable of propping 
up the racial expressions of White paranoia and give them 
a privileged position in public space or take them as the basis 
for formulating policy. It was a shift that became a feature of 
Australia's immigration and settlement politics well into the 1980s. 
Like taxation, immigration and settlement policy became thought 
of as something that ought to be worked out by politicians, 
preferably through bipartisan politics. It was not to be decided 
through public debates, as it was clear where such debates would 
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lead. If governments were to tax according to the will of the 
people, taxation would be minimal, and this would be against the 
interests of the nation. It would be likewise with immigration, it 
was believed. 
What characterises this period, then, is not the disappearance 
of the racial strand of White paranoia but rather its increased 
marginalisation. While it remained alive in some parts of the 
tabloid media and in places such as the RSL (Returned Services 
League) clubs, the business/quality media/political class consensus 
that formed around immigration and settlement policy meant 
that no political force was willing to take up that racial approach 
and use it for their political advantage. This consensus, which saw 
itself as reflecting the more enlightened and adaptable part of the 
population, was powerful enough to survive the slow abolition 
of the White Australia Policy, which by the mid-sixties was almost 
universally recognised as 'offensive' .18 But perhaps the better proof 
of its power and durability was its survival through the shift from 
an assimilationist to a multicultural settlement policy, and its 
capacity to carry large sections of the population with it through 
that change with minimum public debate. 
Since World War II and the rise of assimilation, Australia's 
settlement policy had been a response to the effects of its im-
migration program. By the late 1960s the effects of the postwar 
immigration period were being felt, and as Australia's immigration 
program was beginning to recruit even 'darker shades of White', 
it was becoming clear that assimilation did not just 'happen'. 
That is, postwar migrants - the Lebanese, the Greeks, the Italians 
and the Yugoslavs, and even the 'Whiter' ones, such as the East 
European Jews, the Poles and the Germans - had not simply 
become 'Australians'. They did not shed their previous cultural 
practices and they did not become indistinguishable from the 
population of British origin. At least not as quickly as expected. 
Moving in Australia's cities, one could witness the formation of 
ethnic streets and enclaves. 19 
The government responded by abandoning assimilation and 
shifting to an 'integrationist' settlement policy. The latter, like 
assimilation, was heavily directed at soothing the cultural paranoia 
(still alive and well) of the White people who had found as-
similation acceptable. 'Integration', it was argued, meant that it 
was unreasonable to ask newly arrived migrants to become 'like 
us'. They will always maintain their cultural practices and habits. 
Their sons and daughters, however, were the ones who had to 
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be worked on, to ensure that they became fully Australians. 
Integration was a way of saying that assimilation took more time 
than expected, and it was an request to the White population not 
to 'panic' in the face of the now visible non-British ethnic presence 
in public spaces. 
However, integration also prefigured multiculturalism in that it 
was the first state/bureaucratic recognition that Australia was no 
longer a homogeneous White European society; it did now contain 
non-English speaking communities (the non-assimilated first 
generation) whose needs required special government policies. 
Ultimately, the fantasy of a White European Australia as an ideal 
that Australia yearned to maintain continued to be the basis of all 
government policies - and the conceptions of Australia that went 
with them - .witi! 1973, when the newly elected left-wing Labor 
government of Gough Whitlam, the first Labor government in 
23 years, began to advance the first timid conceptions of a 
multicultural Australia. 20 
The specificity of Australian multiculturalism 
Since it has become associated with the processes of globalisation 
today, the word 'multiculturalism' has undergone a paradoxical 
homogenisation of its meanings and its social significance, 
a homogenisation primarily based on its American meaning: 
cultural pluralism and identity politics. That is mostly what it 
means in Australia today, but this has not been always the case. 
When it was introduced into Australian society, 'multiculturalism' 
defined a number of social and political realities. It is impossible 
to understand the debates around it without examining the 
transformations it has undergone. 
Australian multiculturalism embodied a set of differences 
reflecting the complex realities in which it was grounded and 
the diverse social forces that had an interest in advancing it.21 
Firstly, multiculturalism was perceived as both a descriptive and 
prescriptive concept. Descriptively, many insisted, multiculturalism 
was not a government choice; 'multiculturalism' merely described 
the inescapable fact that Australia's immigration program, which 
had become even more diversified throughout the 1960s, had 
created a society with more than a hundred different minority 
ethnic cultures that existed with but also transformed - and were 
in turn transformed by - Australia's Anglo-Celtic culture . 
Prescriptively, multiculturalism was the set of policies adopted by 
the state to govern this inescapable reality. These policies involved 
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not just accepting that cultural difference exists and must be catered 
for, but also celebrating it as a positive aspect of society that ought 
to be promoted. 
Second, and closely related to the above, was the difference 
between multiculturalism as a mode of governing ethnic cultures 
and multiculturalism as national identity. This was and still is a 
subtle difference. The difference is perceived as that between 
multiculturalism as a marginal reality in a mainly Anglo-Celtic 
society and multiculturalism displacing Anglo-Celtic culture to 
become the identity of the nation. In the first, the culture of the 
ethnic minorities is imagined as contained, and having little effect 
on a still largely 'European Australian' mainstream culture. In the 
second, the migrant cultures are seen to be actually hybridising with 
the European Australian culture, creating a new multicultural 
mainstream. 
Third, there were the differences between multiculturalism as 
welfare and multiculturalism as a structural socio-economic 
policy. Both these multiculturalisms were less about culture and 
more about access to the institutions of Australian society. Both 
were concerned with the fact that most non-English speaking 
background migrants to Australia were positioned in the most 
economically unfavourable positions in society.22 But while the first 
was mainly concerned with facilitating access to the state, in the 
form of interpreting services or in the provision of state help to 
ethnic communities via specific grants, the second had a more 
radical conception of the role of the welfare state: it saw it as a 
tool for dealing with the structural class inequalities produced 
around ethnicity. 
Fourth, there were the differences between multiculturalism as 
social policy described above and multiculturalism as cultural 
policy. This was what Brian Bullivant nicely called the difference 
between life chances and lifestyle multiculturalism.23 While the first 
was concerned with socio-economic issues, the second was the 
closest to the forms of cultural pluralism that are most identified 
with multiculturalism today. It was more concerned with cultural 
traditions and practices. Its core element was the shedding of the 
ethnocentric claim that Anglo-Celtic culture was the most desirable 
culture to aim for and the accepting of a cultural relativism which 
recognised that no culture was superior to another, that all had 
enriching elements that could be incorporated into Australian 
society. This version of multiculturalism was crucial for the ethnic 
(non-Anglo-Celtic) middle class, who, to compete against the 
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traditional Anglo-Celtic middle class, needed a recognition of the 
worth of their cultural traditions and backgrounds more than they 
needed welfare and English programs.24 
'Life chances multiculturalism' had only a fragile beginning 
during the years of the Whitlam government (1972-75). The 
general onslaught on whatever claims the Australian welfare state 
had to being a tool for dealing with structural inequality began 
in 1975, with the conservative government of Malcolm Fraser, 
and has been continued by every government thereafter. Indeed, 
as Castles et al. point out, the Fraser government promoted 
multiculturalism (in its cultural pluralism and managing cultural 
diversity sense) in order to promote a culturalist version of 
Australian society ahead of a class one. It was: 'a key strategy in a 
conservative restructuring of the welfare state whose main purpose 
was the demolition of Whitlam-style social democracy' .25 
Along with the rise of Asian immigration, the greatest taboo of 
the White Australia Policy, it is the movement - within a period of 
less than ten years - from a descriptive multiculturalism perceived 
primarily as a form of welfare and of cultural government to a 
multiculturalism that is more prescriptive and perceived to be 
primarily about national identity which signalled the re-entering 
of White Paranoia in both its cultural and racial garbs into the 
sphere of public debate. 
The rise of identity multiculturalism and the resurfacing of 
White paranoia 
The most important ideological shift between the conservative 
Liberal/Country Party government of Malcolm Fraser (1975-83) 
and the right-wing Labor government of Bob Hawke (1983-91) is 
the move away from multiculturalism as cultural government and 
towards multiculturalism as national identity. The difference 
between the two, mentioned above, can be restated as the dif-
ference between saying, 'We are an Anglo-Celtic society with a 
number of diverse non-Anglo-Celtic cultures that we (the Anglo-
Celtics) strive to manage' and saying, 'We are an Anglo-Celtic 
multicultural society because we have been transformed by the 
existing diversity of culture.' 
The first formulation clearly embodied a multiculturalism 
that was not radically incompatible with the old conception of a 
White Australia. Australia was still primarily a White nation, and 
its Whiteness remained unaffected by the existence of ethnic 
minorities. It just happened that it had a multicultural program to 
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manage its diverse ethnic minorities. It was just like having an 
Indigenous program to manage the Indigenous minority; it did not 
make Australia more or less of an Indigenous nation. This version 
of multiculturalism, with its images of 'contained ethnicity', 
managed to carry with it some parts of the population steeped in 
the White paranoia of the assimilationist period - these people had 
been confident enough, especially because of the favourable 
economic conditions at the time, to accept the change. 
The second formulation, however, was a far more radical break 
with the Australian identity of the past. It entailed an Australia that 
was still Anglo-Celtic, but one that had been fundamentally 
transformed by its immigration program. So much so that it now 
had a different identity. Here multiculturalism was not a kind of 
feature on the side in an Australia that was still an Anglo-Celtic 
society. It involved a new conception of Australia, in which 
multiculturalism represented a kind of higher type of Anglo-
Celtic civilisation. This version appealed to the growing number 
of increasingly well-travelled and cosmopolitan middle-class 
Australians who wanted to shed the image of Australia as a racist 
colonial backwater and appear in a more symbolically competitive 
light in the eyes of nationals of other places. In emphasising 'a 
unified nation of diverse cultures' it also provided a national 
ideological counterpart to the corporatist economic ideology of 
unifying 'labour and capital' being advocated by the Hawke 
government. But it was also a version of Australia that alienated 
many White Australians who had found multiculturalism as 
cultural management acceptable; it revived in them the old 
paranoid fears of cultural extinction. They found this too radical a 
step to take, and from that moment on they began to move closer 
to the till now historically marginalised section of the population 
who were still holding on to a racially defined White Australia. 
Many other factors worked during the late 1980s and early 
1990s to further intensify White paranoia. First, the eighties saw 
worsening economic conditions for large sections of traditionally 
better-off Australians (such as farmers and small business people). 
Second, now that immigration policy was freed of the ideological 
shackles of the White Australia Policy and its remnants, 
Australia was witnessing its biggest flow of Asian migration 
since the goldrushes of the 19th century. Like the Eastern and 
Southern Europeans before them, but even more noticeably so, 
given their 'visibility' to the Western colonial eye, they were seen 
to form non-Anglo-Celtic enclaves in the cities and the suburbs 
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where they settled. And despite both the move towards 
multiculturalism and the successive waves of non-White migration, 
the 'Asian' still played the role of a kind of primordial threat in 
the White Australian psyche. All this anxiety was exacerbated by 
the Labor government's moves towards the creation of an 
Australian republic; this severing of Australia's last symbolic ties 
with the British monarchy brought back to life fears similar to 
those that had arisen at the time of Federation. This was especially 
so since the move towards becoming a republic was accompanied 
by an 'Australia in Asia' campaign whose basis was the idea that 
Australia's future lay in its being a part of Asia. Finally, there was 
the government's drive towards settling the 'colonial question' by 
granting the Indigenous people some form of 'land rights' which 
later culminated in the Mabo26 judgement. This revived, among the 
most vulnerable Whites, irrational fears of territorial decolo-
nisation, such as losing their homes to Indigenous people who 
were going to 'grab the land back'. It was this climate of economic 
uncertainty and reinvigorated internal and external traditional 
threats that sent White paranoia into overdrive and laid the 
foundations for the long era of 'debating multiculturalism' that 
then began. 
Debating multiculturalism in the shadow of White decline27 
Before examining the general content of Australia's multicultural 
debates, we need to briefly ask the question: what is this social 
phenomenon called 'public debate'? 
One important question raised by the notion of public debate 
is: who has the power to express an opinion?28 Clearly not everyone 
has the power and knowledge necessary to access the media. This 
is influenced not only by class but also, and most importantly in 
this case, by variables that often relate to ethnicity - in this case, 
something as basic as fluency in English or as peculiar as the 
capacity to talk over the phone knowing that what you are saying 
is being publicly broadcast. This has often meant that multicultural 
debates in Australia are often about migrants rather than with 
them. But the capacity to express an opinion is meaningless, of 
course, without the existence of a mediatic predisposition to re-
present it. But even that is not enough. 
As pointed out above, the appearance of White paranoid views 
in tabloid newspapers and on some radio stations has always been 
a part of Australian culture. At the same time, articles by right-
wing cultural pluralist supporters of multiculturalism replied to in 
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follow-up articles by leftist advocates of a structural/egalitarian 
multiculturalism in the 'quality press' have also existed throughout 
the history of multiculturalism. Neither in themselves creates a 
generalised feeling of there being a public debate. The latter only 
happens when a sense of communication among different media -
not just within each one of them - begins to happen. Thus readers 
of quality newspapers might never listen to talkback radio, but 
suddenly their newspaper starts reporting the views expressed by 
talkback radio listeners and publishing letters to the editor 
supporting or disagreeing with those views. These letters are taken 
up in turn by the radio station and by commercial television. 
Inevitably, politicians and other well-known people are asked- or 
volunteer - to join in the fray. Their views are more likely to be 
prominently reported than relegated to an obscure newspaper's 
middle pages and, in turn, they foster more debate. A full media 
circuit of ideas and counter-ideas begins to take place: this is when 
a sense of a 'debate' occurs. 
So for a debate to occur there must exist in the media a gen-
eralised culture and a predisposition (among editors and reporters) 
to make an issue out of what is to be debated. In the Australian 
context that means remembering that journalists, despite the 
supposed ethos of 'objectivity' that prevails among them, were not 
immune to the resurfacing of feelings associated with White 
paranoia. As a group of predominantly White workers, they too 
were crisscrossed by the cultural currents that affected other White 
workers. The rise of feelings of White paranoia in the general 
Australian population, particularly in the White middle class, was 
always likely to be accompanied by similar trends among 
journalists. As soon as the rate of Asian migration increased, and 
this group had a higher rate of middle-class migration than any 
wave of migrants before it,29 some middle-class White Australians 
swung straight into the traditional working-class mode of 
perceiving non-Anglo Australians as competition. This fear was 
compounded by the fact that many of the sons and daughters of 
the mainly Qeasant/working-class Southern European migrants 
were moving into middle-class jobs as well.30 
But even the existence of this journalistic disposition to make 
an issue of multiculturalism is not enough to explain the return of 
White paranoia to centre stage. As I argued in the previous section, 
its marginalisation from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s was a 
result of the agreement between quality newspapers, business and 
politicians not to activate it either politically or as a subject of 
64 AGAINST PARANOID NATIONALISM 
debate. It was the falling apart of this consensus, more than 
anything, that allowed White paranoia to re-enter the sphere of 
'public debate'. 
Labor's economic strategy of opening the economy to the 
processes of globalisation through massive deregulation and their 
political strategy (described above) generated an unusual amount 
of opposition. First, important sections of the mining industry, a 
central sector in Australia's economy and associated with many 
other business interests, including media interests, adopted a strong 
oppositional stance towards the government's commitment to 
grant Indigenous people some form of 'land rights'. This also 
happened at a time when the 'wet' supporters of multiculturalism 
within the conservative Liberal Party were losing to the 'dry' side 
of the party, led by John Howard, one of the few ideologically 
driven monoculturalists in Australian politics. All of this led to a 
break in the long consensus around multiculturalism and around 
the isolation of the White paranoid tendency from public space. 
Suddenly, the latter's ideological tenets were being muttered by 
politicians as if they'd never been said before, and their mutterings, 
as well as the muttering of those who had not been heard for a 
long time, began to reappear in prominent positions in the media . 
Thus when the first full-scale 'multicultural debate' took 
Australia by storm, ignited by the reporting of an address made in 
March 1984 by well-known populist historian Geoffrey Blainey, 
what created the storm was not that what Blainey said was new. 
He and many others before him had expressed their opposition to 
multiculturalism and Asian migration well before that date. It was, 
as many analysts have suggested, the fact that a speech given in a 
country town was put in the most prominent of positions in the 
media, plus the willingness to continue putting the views expressed 
around it in similarly prominent positions, that signalled the 
coming of the new era. Hardly a year has passed since without 
Australians engaging in or at least witnessing a 'multicultural 
debate' that is highly predictable in form and content and that 
begins with some expression of White paranoia. 
The first ideological cornerstone of the resurfacing paranoia is 
the sense of White decline I analysed extensively in White Nation: 
a sense that being 'White Australian' no longer yields the national 
privileges or opportunities or promises that are perceived to have 
existed in a previous era. This sense of decline is built on two core 
ideological constructions: first, a conception of the self as 
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(this lends a deep legitimacy to one's grievances), and second, a 
heightened perception of 'minorities', migrants and Indigenous 
people as a threat to one's own wellbeing. 
An important outcome of such a construction is a crisis of 
identification with the nation-state based on the perception of a 
bias towards 'minorities' and migrants on one hand and global 
business interests on the other. This is made most explicit in the 
claim that is the trademark of the discourse of decline: that the 
'ordinary' people of the White dominant culture are suffering from 
reverse discrimination. 
Underlying this paranoia is the idea that government (mainly 
the Labor Party), along with the multicultural lobby, the 
Indigenous lobby and 'elitist intellectuals',31 are all working at 
undermining Australia's core culture, which the White decliner 
strongly asserts its existence as if it is under attack. The problem is 
that when you go through the history of multiculturalism and of 
the debates around multiculturalism, it is very hard to find anyone, 
except some intellectuals with no significant social or symbolic 
power, arguing that Australia doesn't have or doesn't need a core 
culture. On the contrary, all multiculturalists have gone out of their 
way to assert that cultural pluralism is not a negation of the need 
for a core culture. What some multiculturalists have argued is that 
Australia's core culture is no longer Anglo-Celtic in a traditional 
sense. This was the basic idea of the 'multiculturalism as national 
identity' advocated by Bob Hawke (and Paul Keating after him). It 
is as if what White paranoia is expressing is fear that the new 
multicultural order threatens the old assimilationist dream of an 
unquestionably European Australian culture, but given the 
censorship that now disallows use of such ethnocentric language, 
this fear is expressed in terms of the loss of any core culture. 
Here we come to an interesting dimension of White paranoia. 
In his well-documented history of the origins of multiculturalism, 
Mark Lopez points to something important about assimilationist 
ideology. Originally, he argues, it was a strategy for the preser-
vation of a predominantly Anglo-Celtic society. But as Australian 
society changed demographically, culturally and socially, hanging 
on to the idea of assimilation involved the rather radical pro-
position of changing society back to what it had been.32 Unless, of 
course, one managed to convince oneself that nothing had changed 
and it was just a case of too many people not fitting into an Anglo-
Celtic society that still existed. If one is to maintain such 
assimilationist beliefs today, one still has to sustain this fantasy, 
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even though that society has clearly disappeared. So the very idea 
of debating assimilation, whether on the for or the against side, 
works to produce the fantasy of a society that no longer exists. The 
debate helps shield the assimilationists from the reality they need 
to avoid if they are to maintain their fantasy constructions: that 
they are the ones who have not assimilated to a changing society. 
This is precisely the closed-circuit logic that the White paranoid 
fantasy needs if it is to be able to reproduce itself. 
This is why debates around this subject are structured in an 
exceptionally predictable way, as I have already pointed out. They 
always consist of people expressing forms of White paranoia and 
others trying to present either statistical or historical evidence or 
logical arguments to prove that there is no basis for the paranoid 
views expressed. More often than not, because of the closed circle 
logic in which it is grounded, the counter argument leads to a 
reinforcement of the paranoid view, which feeds on a sense that 
'things are so bad because so many people can't even see what is 
happening' and end up creating images of 'dark conspiracies' that 
everyone has fallen victim to except for the paranoid ones 
themselves. 
So perhaps 'debate' is a misnomer as far as multiculturalism is 
concerned. What actually happens is more like a parallel pres-
entation of differing points of view. Because forms of social 
paranoia refuse inter-subjectivity and have to feed narcissistically 
on their own 'truth' to survive, they are not something one argues 
with, especially when they are positioned prominently within the 
public sphere. One either works at relegating them to the marginal 
spheres of society where they belong, or exploits them politically 
to reach one's political goal. This was the road chosen by John 
Howard's conservative side of politics. 
Osama is coming to get you! Debating Australian 
multiculturalism after September 11 
Given the nature of the White paranoia that has shaped Australia's 
debates about multiculturalism, these debates have always centred 
around the construction of an 'un-integrated other' and the 
subsequent debating of the necessity, possibility and desirability of 
their integration. Australia's historically favourite 'other' has 
always been 'the Asians'. The White Australia Policy was designed 
with 'Asians' in mind, and in 1996 Pauline Hanson was still being 
swamped by 'Asians'. In the last couple of years, however, probably 
to the relief of 'Asians', White paranoia has shifted its gaze towards 
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a more global threat: 'Muslims' and 'Islam'. 
The emergence of the Muslim as the Australian 'other' did not 
really begin until the Gulf War, although Australian culture shares 
with other Western cultures the 'orientalist' legacy of colonialism. 
Since the late 1990s the Muslims have become the main recipients 
of the 'problems with multiculturalism' discourses. 
The debate began to seriously heat up around the topic of 
'ethnicity and crime', due to a police/media construction of a 
'Lebanese ethnic gangs' problem in Lebanese Muslim suburbs 
(these are usually suburbs where up to 20 per cent of the population 
is of Arabic-speaking background). The debate became particularly 
intensified with reports of 'Lebanese gangs' target-raping Anglo-
Australian girls. This led to a 'they're raping our daughters'-type 
debate in which all Lebanese/Arabs/Muslims became the new 
threat to Australia's Western civilisation. 
Adding fuel to the 'Muslim question' was the debate around 
Australia's treatment of asylum seekers, who are mainly Muslim. 
This was highlighted by the Tampa affair, in which Afghan asylum 
seekers rescued by a Norwegian ship were refused the right to have 
their claims for refugee status assessed on Australian soil. To win 
the ideological battle against those claiming that the government 
was acting inhumanely, the Minister of Immigration and the Prime 
Minister began to actively promote the idea that the asylum seekers 
might be criminals and that they were doing unspeakable things to 
their children, such as starving them and throwing them into the 
sea, in order to win the right to seek asylum here. This led to the 
usual endless sessions of debate in which paranoia ruled and 
everyone on the other side was a member of the treacherous club 
of intellectual elites. 
September 11 sealed the position of the Muslim as the un-
questionable other in Australia today. If one listens to - and believes 
- the now regularly reported musings of the White paranoid mind, 
Muslims are capable of doing everything that Asians did and more 
(such as committing terrorist acts). Muslims are moved by a single 
essence, and whenever one of them does something good he or 
she is unusual. Whenever one of them does something bad, he or 
she is proof that all of them are bound to do it sooner or later. This 
is unlike 'us', of course: when one of us does something bad, he or 
she is a bad apple, and when one of us does something we are proud 
of, he or she is the proof that we are all great. 
According to this logic, Muslims are a community of people 
always predisposed towards crime, rape, illegal entry to Australia 
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and terrorism. And, interestingly, Australia declared itself a 
possible victim of terrorism, even though it is most probable that 
not many terrorists training with Osama bin Laden would know it 
exists! Amazingly, the names of the prominent people and 
journalists now expressing expert opinions on Lebanese and Arab 
culture in the pages of the newspapers are the same ones who 
thrilled us with their expertise on the Asian threat sometime during 
the last 15 years or so. Suddenly, they are exhibiting their genius 
again, with virtuoso knowledge of the threatening nature of Islamic 
culture. This is unlike the 'elitist intellectuals', who are obviously 
struggling to keep up with reality. They are shown to not know 
much and are now regularly accused of the revived McCarthyist 
crime of being 'anti-American'. 
CHAPTER 5 
The rise of Australian fundamentalism: 
reflections on the rule of Ayatollah Johnny 
Introduction 
To say that John Howard is on the extreme right of the Liberal 
Party, or that he represents a conservative cultural backlash against 
what he and his supporters perceive as the excesses of support for 
multiculturalism and for Indigenous rights exhibited by his 
predecessor, would hardly be controversial. But to talk about 
'fundamentalism' would easily lead to one being accused of being 
too rhetorical and getting too carried away, or simply of just 
exaggerating in order to score political points. I don't mind some 
political point scoring. However, in this chapter, I'd like to initiate 
the beginning of an analytical claim that there are important 
elements of John Howard's politics that can be characterised as 
fundamentalist and, just as importantly, that his fundamentalism 
is beginning to mark our political culture in a significantly negative 
way. 
In the Western world, the concept of 'fundamentalism' is too 
easily linked with the 'irrational' and despotic movements whose 
highly dramatic visuals filled the newspapers and televisions of the 
late 20th century. To speak of fundamentalism is to almost 
inevitably conjure up images of politicised religious groupings with 
affectively charged members marching down the streets bent on 
reintroducing pre-modern cultural forms into our postmodernity. 
The 'Muslim fundamentalist mob' has pride of place in this 
imaginary. But there is also room for wild 'Orthodox Jewish 
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settlers' and marginal groupings of Western religious zealots such 
as the 'Christian fundamentalists'. While there is no doubt that 
these forms of politics have been historically associated with 
fundamentalist politics, the link is not a necessary one. There is 
nothing, logically speaking, that should stop us conceiving of a 
rational/bureaucratic/democratic politics as being animated by a 
fundamentalist ideology. 
John Howard and the essence of being Australian 
Looking at the political speeches made by parliamentarians of both 
sides in the last decade, none has used the notion of 'Australian 
values' as much as Howard, and none has been as systematic as he 
is in deploying it. No one positions it as the cornerstone of a holistic 
political vision of Australia in the way he does. Though such a 
belief is not in itself sufficient to turn someone into a fun-
damentalist, it is a necessary beginning. The most basic feature of 
all fundamentalist ideologies is the belief in the existence of a social 
essence ('fundamental' values and beliefs), of which a national 
society is but an expression. 
Whether addressing schoolchildren or elderly Australians, 
business groups or immigrant associations, whether speaking on 
reconciliation or on Australia's relations with Asia, John Howard's 
political discourse is always woven around an explicit notion of 
Australian values. These values are Australian in a 'strong' sense: 
they differentiate Australians from other people in the world. They 
trace what Howard considers a unique 'Australian way'. 
What are these Australian values? There are some values that 
are constant in the Prime Ministerial discourse, and some that come 
and go. Just looking at the speeches of 1998 offers us an incredible 
·array of 'values'. In his Australia Day speech for that year Howard 
informed us that 'the ethnic diversity and tolerance of our com-
munity gives Australia a unique standing in the world. This status 
is underpinned by the traditional Australian values of persistence, 
mateship, voluntary effort and optimism.' 1 In an address to the 
Jewish community in Sydney we heard another set of values: 
A great strength of the Jewish community has been the promotion 
of genuine Australian values common to all of us: 
• the primacy of family life and its importance in building strong 
and enduring communities; 
• the value of enterprise, the work ethic and reward for effort; 
and 
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the active recognition of the obligation to give back where 
benefit has been received (10 March 1998, Israel's 50th 
birthday celebration dinner, Sydney). 
At his speech for the reconciliation summit a couple more 
values were added: 'the values of decency, tolerance, fairness and 
down-to-earth common sense' (26 May 1997, The Australian 
Reconciliation Convention, Melbourne). When he was talking to 
high school students these values were perceived to be 'the traditions 
of mateship, the tradition of treating people fairly on the basis of 
their contribution to society' (10 July 1998, St Paul's School, 
Queensland). In a speech to the Federation of Indian Associations 
Howard stressed 'the importance within the Australian community 
of ... those enduring Australian values of tolerance and harmony' 
(15 August 1998, Federation of Indian Associations Dinner, 
Melbourne). In addressing a group of Australian businesses, he 
urged his audience 'to hang on to those Australian values of fairness 
and tolerance and equality and mateship' (8 October 1998, 
Australian Business Limited Annual Dinner, Sydney). 
While, as already argued, the belief in 'national values' does not, 
in itself, set someone on the road to fundamentalism, the belief that 
these values constitute a causal essence firmly points them in that 
direction. This is the belief that these values are a trans-historical 
unchanging core which is almost automatically espoused by good 
nationals and is responsible for giving society its enduring character 
amidst all the changes it can experience. There is little doubt that 
for John Howard, 'Australian values' are such a trans-historical 
essence. This theme is most fully developed in his address to the 
students of St Paul's School: 
I remember when I left school ... the Australia that I lived in in 1956 
was a wonderful country ... it's important to understand that there 
are some things about our country that don't change, and shouldn't 
change, and we should fight hard to stop changing . 
. . . There are certain enduring Australian values that I still identify 
and are still as strong and as worthy and as valuable to us as 
Australians as they were when I left Canterbury Boys High School 
in Sydney in 1956 . 
.. . There is that continuity, that golden thread of Australian 
values that hasn't changed. 
And in turn, the Australia that your children will inherit when 
they leave school will also be different. But there will be a continuity, 
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there will be a golden thread of basic Australian values that will be 
there (10 July 1998, St Paul's School, Queensland). 
'Australian values' existed considerably further back in history, 
it seems. Howard sees Australia as a country that has managed to 
'preserve a core set of Australian values that maintain a long 
continuity of values connecting us now, in the last years of the 20th 
century, with the early beginnings of the Australian Federation 
almost 100 years ago' (24 July 1998, Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce, Perth). In fact some of the values go back even further 
than that: 'We are, as all of you know, a projection of Western 
civilisation in this part of the world. We have inherited the great 
European values of liberal democracy.' These 'enduring Australian 
values' are not only 'important today' but 'will continue to be 
important into the future' (8 October 1998, Australian Business 
Limited, Sydney). 
'Values' for Howard constitute an 'essence' in two ways: this 
essence is a trans-historical reality and, as it is in all fundamental-
ist ideologies, a causal force. Fundamentalism always offers a 
classically idealist conception of national society, in the useful 
Marxist meaning of the term. Forget about economic relations, 
forget about power relations and forget about history; a nation is 
merely an expression of the set of trans-historical v-alues and beliefs 
upheld by its individual nationals. The values are never imagined 
to be contradictory. Consequently, the nation which expresses its 
values well is always 'united' by those values. Fundamentalism 
offers a normative conception of society as a coherent projection 
of its values. Any opposing values are by definition opposed to the 
national interest. Howard refers to 'the great Australian values that 
bind us together' and about being 'united' by 'a common love of 
Australian values'. 
It is easy to give an intellectualised critique of this discourse of 
values. Its incoherence and illogical assumptions are reasonably 
obvious. This is the case in regard to specific values - what does it 
mean to say that 'ethnic diversity' is a value, for instance - and in 
regard to the whole notion of a national people having and sharing 
distinguishing trans-historical values. The point is not, of course, 
that there are no such things as distinct and recognisable Australian 
cultural traditions. To say that democracy and tolerance or even 
decency have flourished particularly well in Australia because 
of the way Australia has evolved historically, and because of 
the resources it has managed to control, is one thing. But to 
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transform these values into distinguishing values, something 
Australians are more committed to than other people are, is 
not tenable. 
The thing to note about Howard's values is their current 
universality. Everyone in the world today would like to share such 
values. What does it mean to say that decency, or commitment to 
democracy, or tolerance, are specifically Australian values? It 
means making the ludicrous claim that other people in the world 
are less committed to them or actually committed to opposing 
values: that there are people who actually value intolerance, who 
are committed to being indecent and who, when faced with 
democracy, freak out and try very hard to change it because it does 
not fit with their values! Or better still, that there are Prime 
Ministers who go to Parliament and say 'My fellow non-citizens, 
we have had yet another great year of living up to our principles of 
being totally off the air (as opposed to Howard's 'Australian value' 
of 'being down to earth'), and we have successfully lived up to the 
principles of intolerance, disharmony, despotism and indecency 
that we have valued so much throughout the ages and that we hope 
to continue to value in the future.' One has to be a lunatic fringe 
racist to believe that groups of people who live in non-democratic, 
or war-torn, societies do so because it corresponds to their cultural 
values. I am not saying, of course, that Howard is a member of a 
lunatic racist fringe. I am simply saying that he has not caught up 
with the intellectual implications of his discourse of value. Any 
member of the intellectual elite could tell Howard this, but we 
know that he does not like or keep such company. 
But here we also come to the limits of an intellectualist critique. 
Howard is making these statements not as an intellectual, but as a 
politician. A critique of his politics of values has to move beyond a 
critique of their internal logic to a critique of the specific political 
effects and ramifications of his pronouncements. 
Essence War: on the archaeological fundamentalism of 
John Howard 
A fundamentalist belief in causal trans-historical core values need 
two crucial supplements to transform it into a political ideology-
that is, for it to be the basis of a political project: first, there needs 
to be a belief that society and its people are drifting or have drifted 
away from the core and that there is a need to bring them 'back'. 
Like all nationalists, fundamentalists who believe that their society 
is unproblematically living according to the fundamentals simply 
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eradicate their very reason to exist as political subjects. There is 1 
fundamentalist politics without fundamentalist whingeing abou 
some corruption of the core values. o 
Second, there needs to be a conviction that these fundamentall' 
are Good. This might sound like stating the obvious, but it is 
necessary to state it clearly. For fundamentalist politics is always 
morally driven. The fundamentals are not pursued just because 
they are 'fundamental'; they are also pursued because they are 
worthy of being pursued. To recover them is to recover a good 
moral society. And since society is but the expression of the beliefs 
of its people, fundamentalist politics is always about recovering 
the Good people who are, or the Goodness within people that is, 
silenced/oppressed/repressed by the Bad people. 
In most fundamentalisms, the Good fundamentals are lost in the 
past, so the political aim is to recover them from the past and re-
inject them into the present. Such fundamentalism can be described 
as historical in that it looks to the past for inspiration. Unlike what 
some commentators have intimated, Howard's fundamentalism 
does not include such a nostalgic seeking for the past. This is not 
because he does not believe that the past embodied Australian 
values more than the present; it is because he believes that the 
present embodies Australian values as well. What is the problem 
then, as he sees it? The problem is that this 'truth/reality' has 
been covered up. It is no longer as apparent as it used to be, 
because of the politics of armies of negative intellectuals and Labor 
party politicians and the anti-Australian values they choose to 
emphasise. 
This is where Howard's Bad people, the 'black armband' 
intellectuals and the politicians inspired by them, come into the 
picture. They are the people who, he claims, concentrate on the 
Bad things that Australians have done and try to imply that 
Australians are essentially Bad rather than Good: 
This 'black armband' view of our past reflects a belief that most 
Australian history since 1788 has been little more than a disgraceful 
story of imperialism, exploitation, racism, sexism and other forms 
of discrimination. 
I take a different view. I believe that the balance sheet of our 
history is one of heroic achievement and that we have achieved much 
more as a nation of which we can be proud than of which we should 
be ashamed (18 November 1996, Sir Robert Menzies Lecture). 
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,Furthermore, there are people out there living the Australian 
1 ay - as it has been initially projected by Western civilisation, 
f course - but their important presence has been buried by 
· ie emphasis on multiculturalism, Asia and Aboriginal land 
1ghts. Howard wants to bring back to light - not back from the 
past - these core values and the people living by them. Unlike the 
classical historical fundamentalism, Howard's is an archaeological 
fundamentalism. It is a fundamentalism of recovery and res-
toration, and it is both social and psychological restoration. For 
it is not just the reality of the enduring presence of Australian 
values that has been threatened by the negative politicians and 
intellectuals. The latter are also propagators of guilt, and one of 
the important things that needs to be restored is the pride that 
people ought to feel when they reflect on Australia's essential 
goodness. 
We are right to be proud of having built one of the most prosperous, 
most egalitarian and fairest societies in the world. 
We are right to be proud of our tradition of mateship in both 
peace and war. 
We are right to be proud of living in one of the world's oldest 
continuous democracies (Sir Robert Menzies Lecture). 
Howard therefore sees himself as engaged in an Essence War 
with those intellectuals (particularly historians) and politicians who 
are always concentrating on the Bad aspects of Australian history 
and society. They pick up on Bad deeds and then pronounce 
Australians essentially Bad. He picks up on Good deeds and 
pronounces Australians essentially Good. But this does not lead 
Howard into relativism. He believes that his claim that the essence 
is Good is a superior claim, and that his vision of Australia is a 
more objective one: 
The attempted re-writing of Australian political history over recent 
years by our political opponents should not be countered by an 
equally politicised re-writing to redress the balance. What is needed 
is a sense of balance, objectivity and honesty in drawing lessons from 
our past (Sir Robert Menzies Lecture). 
Constructing the 'essentially good Australian' from such past 
lessons reveals some of the more comic elements of Howard's 
fundamentalism. But it also points to some of its more detrimental 
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effects so far. It signals the rise of an unprecedented political 
narcissism: a numb and dumb sense of self-satisfaction with the 
national self and a refusal to hear any voice other than one's own. 
Fundamentalism and the rise of political narcissism 
In a somewhat famous 1995 speech on 'Politics and Patriotism: A 
reflection on the national identity debate', Howard, while still 
opposition leader, argued: 
Inclusion rather than exclusion is also an essential part of the 
Australian identity. It is a value which featured prominently in 
pioneering days, although tragically it didn't extend to [the] 
Aboriginal. Nor was it much in evidence during the gold rushes. 
The logic of detecting the essential goodness of Australians here 
is unbeatable. It goes something like this. Essentially we are Good 
(we like inclusion). It is true that when we were Good we weren't 
Good towards everyone (we didn't include Aboriginal people). It 
is also true that sometimes we were Bad rather than Good (we 
weren't very inclusive during the goldrushes). But this shouldn't 
detract from the fact that we are essentially Good (we are 
essentially inclusive). 
This has been the general structure of Howard's argument 
throughout: we are realists. We recognise that we Australians have 
done good things and bad things. But the bad things we have done 
are conjunctural; we need not forget that we are essentially Good. 
Detecting the Good essence becomes an exercise in emphasising 
the Good deeds of Australians and silencing those who want to 
emphasise the Bad deeds. Howard's fundamentalism encourages a 
discourse of confirmation rather than a reflexive critical discourse. 
This has developed into a pathological inability to isten to any 
voice other than one's own. 
Generally speaking, fundamentalist politics, while spending 
considerable effort on asserting the enduring nature of identity, do 
not encourage a critical reflexivity concerning such an identity. 
Since the self knows its essence, the point is more how to exercise 
and practise such an essence. As Howard has forcefully put it: 'You 
don't indulge in some kind of intellectual exercise in trying to 
enumerate Australian qualities and Australian values, you practise 
them' (Chinese Chamber of Commerce). 
Reflexive critique is a priori negative, for it implies a question-
ing of the self and, thus, the possibility of changing the self. 
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Fundamentalism is more concerned with the never-changing nature 
of the Good self. Indeed, why change such a good thing? We simply 
need to remember the Good self we are and act accordingly. Critical 
reflexivity is explicitly dismissed by Howard as 'navel-gazing': 
We spend an enormous amount of time in this country navel-gazing 
about what kind of society we are. It seems that, on some occasions, 
that (sic) we engage in a form of public fretting about what it really 
means to be an Australian. It always strikes me as rather unnecessary 
and rather odd and rather unproductive ... You don't write down 
what it means to be an Australian. You feel what it means to be an 
Australian (Chinese Chamber of Commerce). 
While anti-navel-gazing is common to all fundamentalist 
ideologies, and commonly leads to forms of political narcissism, 
Howard's variety has been particularly virulent because of its 
combination with the pseudo-realism of the 'we have been Bad but 
we are essentially Good' theme analysed above. In this political 
vision, the self 'courageously' admits the wrongs of the past only 
to then reassert its fundamental Goodness; the self is something of 
a know-all, but a know-all which has already submitted itself to 
self-criticism. It thus manages to immunise itself against any critical 
voice other than itself: 'I don't need someone else to tell me about 
my wrongs. I've already admitted them, but you're making too 
much of them.' Thus any voice that attempts to insist that the 
misdeeds committed in Australia's past and present cannot be so 
easily dismissed is immediately considered a Bad voice. This is the 
voice of the Bad other, the one hell-bent on undermining the 
essential Goodness of Australia and the pride of its people. 
If someone emphasises racism, the response is that we have 
been essentially non-racist. If someone emphasises poverty, our 
response is that we have been essentially a 'class-free' society. And 
as happened lately, if someone emphasises our bad treatment of 
refugee claimants, our response is that we have been essentially a 
welcoming country. Anyone who tries to emphasise otherwise is 
on the side of the Bad other. This was to be the fate of the United 
Nations in this pathetic display of narcissism: don't tell us we are 
bad - we are essentially good. Go and find someone really bad and 
tell them they are bad. 
Perhaps one of the most extraordinary exemplifications of this 
pathology has been Phillip Ruddock's response to a government-
funded organisation speaking on behalf of the refugees and 
• 
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criticising the government's handling of the detained asylum 
seekers. Threatening to withdraw their funding, Ruddock's in-
credible statement was: 'We pay them to know better.' 
One has to notice that if one is paying someone to know better, 
this assumes one does not know everything oneself. But Ruddock's 
statement assumes that 'we' Australians already know better, since 
we are capable of judging whether 'better' really is better. If that is 
the case, why pay them at all? Ruddock here exhibits the classical 
symptoms of this narcissistic pathology: a delusional sense of 
knowing all one needs to know and a complete inability to tolerate 
anything other than a discourse of confirmation of one's point 
of view. 
Of course the question in relation to the refugee organisation is 
not one of 'knowing better' - it is one of knowing differently. The 
organisation is not paid to 'know better', but to put the position 
from the refugee claimants' point of view. Our capacity to finance 
and listen to such organisations is linked to our capacity to hear a 
view other than our own. It is precisely this narcissistic failing, 
characteristic of our current political culture, that was confirmed 
in Ruddock's discourse. 
> ' 
CHAPTER 6 
Polluting memories: migration and 
colonial responsibility in Australia1 
Introduction 
The public recognition of the atroc1t1es committed against 
Australia's Indigenous people has led to political debates regarding 
how to act towards healing the wounds inflicted on them. The 
various calls to take responsibility for acts that took place in the 
past, acts which today's citizens were not directly involved in, 
invariably advocate forms of national participation and belonging 
that go beyond the more instrumental conceptions of citizenship 
that are usual in the public arena. This becomes fertile ground in 
which political philosophers can consider the deeper meanings of 
citizenship, national identity, and belonging. 
In this chapter, I review some of the issues concerning national 
memory and national responsibility that have arisen in this debate 
and examine the way notions of participation and national 
belonging implicitly or explicitly underlie them. I then move to 
examine the way postwar migrant participation and responsibility 
have been conceived within this debate, particularly the question 
of whether or not, and how, migrants from non-English speaking 
backgrounds should shoulder some responsibility for what hap-
pened at a time when neither they nor their ancestors lived in 
Australia. I will critically examine the answers given to this 
question and the way they can help us reformulate our conceptions 
of the meaning and significance of participatory belonging. 
79 
80 AGAINST PARANOID NATIONALISM 
A brief introduction to the history of a 'memory war' 
In 1992 the High Court of Australia decided in favour of a group 
of Indigenous people claiming to be the original owners of land 
formally under the control of the state of Queensland in the 
northeast of Australia.2 The group was led by a man called Eddie 
Mabo, and the decision became popularly known as 'the Mabo 
decision' or simply 'Mabo'. 
The Mabo decision was the first Australian official/judicial 
acknowledgement of a lawful ownership of land by Indigenous 
people before the British colonisation of Australia. In a historical 
precursor of the famous Zionist slogan that accompanied the 
settlement of Palestine - 'A land without people for a people 
without a land' - the colonisation of Australia occurred under the 
legal aegis of what was known as terra nullius. This was the claim 
that at the time of the early settlement of Australia British eyes 
could not discern any traces of an appropriation of the land by 
Aboriginal people (for example, there were no recognisable 
housing or agricultural activities). 3 As such, the land was 
considered 'up for grabs' and was made legally so - a land without 
people for a people with plenty of land, on that particular 
occasion.4 
In what remains a legally controversial finding, the High Court 
judges did not·only rule that the land in the particular claim being 
considered was not terra nullius. They asserted that their ruling 
had implications for the relationship of Indigenous people to the 
land throughout the nation. Furthermore, some of the judges 
(Justices Deane and Gaudron), in later comments, moved into 
moral territory, arguing that the practices of dispossession that 
emanated from the terra nullius principle 'constitute the darkest 
aspect in the history of this nation'. And, they added, 'The nation 
as a whole must remain diminished unless and until there is an 
acknowledgment of, and a retreat from, those past injustices.'5 
In this sense, 'Mabo' aimed at fostering a new sense of caring 
about the nation, of participatory belonging, grounded in the 
willingness of today's citizens and their national representatives 
to acknowledge and address injustices that occurred during 
Australia's colonial past and that were now being recognised as 
particularly shameful. 
It must be stressed that these calls, and the creation of this 'new' 
memory, were also, if not primarily, inspired by the growing 
political strength and the local and international activism of the 
Indigenous people themselves. Of equal importance was some 
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brilliant, straightforwardly empirical work by some Australian 
historians. Such works helped to make common knowledge among 
the non-Indigenous population what had so far been hidden and 
contested. They emphasised to a wider public that Australia 's 
settlement was far from being the kind of settlement portrayed in 
the majority of the school history books produced in the 1950s and 
1960s. The only significant hardships discussed in those texts were 
the hardships of the penal system and of the settlers' confrontation 
with an undomesticated natural environment. Instead, the newer 
critical historiography demonstrated the degree to which that 
settlement of Australia involved the violent appropriation of the 
land and the subjugation of a whole people. It also showed that 
those people whose land was being appropriated countered this 
violent colonisation with an equally violent resistance, including 
forms of guerilla warfare (see, in particular, Reynolds 19 81). 6 
Indigenous struggles, the diffusion of the new critical histori-
ography, and 'Mabo' all worked together to create an important 
cultural transformation within Australia. For the first time, talking 
about 'the British invasion of Australia' no longer positioned the 
speaker on the radical fringe .. The histories of this invasion were 
being slowly transformed from marginal, radical or academic 
topics to a quasi-official discourse competing for the prized status 
of 'public truth'. 
The newly acquired status of this version of colonial history, rea-
sonably encouraged by the then sympathetic Labor government of 
Paul Keating (1992-96), led to a culturally conservative backlash 
against what was described as a 'black armband' view of history. 
This was a history, the conservative critics argued, that focused on 
denigrating the achievements of the early colonists. Yet it was those 
achievements that led to the building of the prosperous democratic 
nation that Australia has become. As such, these achievements of 
early colonists should not be downplayed in favour of a history of 
violence that was at best marginal, and was now being highly 
exaggerated. Australia's history, according to conservative critics, 
should inspire pride in Australians rather than shame. 
By the mid-1990s Australia was witnessing a full-blown 
'memory war' over its violent colonial past. The election of a 
Liberal Party/National Party government in 1996, led by what 
(even by Liberal Party standards) was an unusually culturally 
conservative politician, John Howard, gave an important boost to 
the forces of cultural restoration.7 
It was in such a climate that the Human Rights and Equal 
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Opportunity Commission report, Bringing Them Home: Report 
of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, appeared. 
The report detailed one of the most inhumane practices that 
accompanied colonisation, a practice that epitomised the colo-
nisers' racist/genocidal behaviour towards Indigenous people and 
Indigenous culture. This was the practice of taking Indigenous 
children, particularly those categorised as 'half-caste,' away8 from 
their parents, often forcibly removing them from the arms of their 
mothers, and placing them under the foster care of white parents 
or white institutions in order to 'assimilate' them. The children 
became known as 'the stolen generation' . The report was based on 
testimonies from members of this stolen generation. 9 
Like the discourse surrounding the Mabo High Court decision 
before it, the report did not call only for reparations for the par-
ticular Indigenous individuals concerned; it saw the issue as 
something diminishing the nation as a whole. Thus it called for 
more nationally encompassing symbolic measures, such as a 
national 'Sorry Day'. It also recommended that State and Federal 
parliaments, along with other institutions such as churches and the 
police forces, acknowledge the responsibility of their predecessors 
for these practices of forcible removal. It urged such institutions to 
consult with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(the official body representing Indigenous people) on the best way 
to offer a formal apology. 10 
This led to a considerable shift in the significance and intensity 
of the memory war that was now well under way. For if Mabo 
triggered a debate about historical responsibility for events that 
occurred more than 200 years ago, here was a report that brought 
home the fact that colonial history was still being lived in the 
1960s. For many Australians, this was the first time they 
understood that brutal forms of colonial racism had still been in 
existence in their own lifetime. And while there were no Indigenous 
people left to tell stories of how they felt when their land was 
directly taken away, there were still quite a few who could publicly 
remember what it was like to be taken away in a truck with your 
mother running and wailing after you, or what it was like to have 
'the man of the house' where you've been sent to work come and 
'visit' you in the middle of the night. Listening to people speaking 
their memories of these lived events could not but have a more 
urgent moral intensity than reading tales of atrocity from a more 
distant past. 
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Consequently, the Bringing Them Home report added a further 
dimension and a greater intensity to the debate about the signifi-
cance of colonial memory in Australia's history and its present.11 
Of particular importance was the report's significance in defining 
the kind of citizenship and participatory belonging required 
from non-Indigenous Australians if they were to address and rectify 
the injustices of the past. For while the occurrence of colonial 
violence was no longer seriously contested, it was its significance, 
particularly the extent to which today's Australians ought to be 
considered responsible and accountable for it, that became the 
object of an important struggle. 
The complexity of the debate on participatory belonging and 
responsibility for the past lies in the way it intimately links issues 
of national identity with the highly abstract issues of commitment 
to justice for deeds one does not necessarily feel personally 
responsible for. Different ways of thinking about the significance 
of the colonial past translate into different ways of conceiving 
one's own intimate national identity. Different ways of conceiving 
what constitutes justice in the present for Australia's Indigenous 
people lead to different ways of conceiving who ought to be 
affectively and practically implicated in the delivery of such justice. 
The question of the migrant's relationship to such processes only 
complicates matters further. Is there a difference between the mi-
grant saying 'these events do not concern me' and the established 
Australian citizen saying the same thing, but on different grounds? 
Can a migrant relate affectively to a past that is not his or her own? 
Can a migrant ever genuinely care for the nation without such an 
identification with its past? Can he or she ever experience the same 
intense sense of participatory belonging that people who are 
assumed to identify more fully with the past feel? 
Philosophy, national memory and national responsibility 
One of the interesting features of the Australian political scene has 
been the way the memory war described above has constituted a 
fertile ground for the Australian chapter of the international revival 
of the debate on moral and political philosophy. This debate began 
with the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice12 and was 
continued by the critical responses it generated in the following 
decades. 13 In an attempt to untangle the complexities of the 
situation, Australia has recently witnessed the production of a 
relatively large body of philosophical writing asking questions such 
as: how do liberal conceptions of justice relate to issues of past 
I 
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injustices, cultural difference and colonialism? What respon-
sibilities do citizens have towards the past? What constitutes justice 
in relation to Australia's Indigenous population? 
Paul Patton has presented one of the clearest accounts of how 
the concept of justice has fared in relation to the Mabo judgement, 
from a philosophical standpoint. He argues that the popular 
reactions to the Mabo judgement are an expression of three 
competing intuitions about justice: equal treatment, reparation, 
and recognition of the other. He suggests that the tensions around 
the judgement are a reflection of a tension among these ideas of 
justice as they are present within it. 14 
Insofar as equal treatment is concerned, the liberal defenders of 
Mabo (including some of the judges who delivered the judgement) 
have argued that the recognition of Aboriginal land rights is merely 
a recognition that they have an equal right to property, something 
that has been previously denied them. But the conservative 
interpretation of this law and the attack on Mabo's claim to pro-
vide justice in the form of equal treatment is not an ungrounded 
one. It is equally based on an intuition about justice. What 
conservatives argue is that Mabo clearly invites a situation where 
common law recognises a form of property right that is not 
available to all citizens, since Indigenous people, alone among 
Australia's citizens, can lay claim to native title. This, Patton points 
out, challenges Rawls' liberal notion of justice based on an identity 
of rights for all citizens. 15 
As to reparation, Patton points out that: 'it is common place to 
assert that the past cannot be changed and that what is done is 
done. But there is still an important strand of thinking about justice 
which says that it should involve reparation for past injustices.'16 
Agreeing with an article by Jeremy Waldron, 17 Patton stresses that 
'the aim of such reparation is not to undo past wrongs but to go 
some way towards removing their consequences and re-
establishing what would have been the case if those injustices had 
not been perpetrated'. 18 
Finally, as far as the recognition of the other is concerned, Patton 
explains that: 
Here, the underlying intuition is that justice requires the recognition 
of the other as other, that it requires giving what is due to others in 
accordance with their conceptions of right and not simply in the 
terms of the one giving or in those of a supposedly neutral third 
party.19 
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These intuitions, as Patton shows and as we shall see later, are 
fraught with contradictions. Suffice it to say at this point that they 
form the implicit background for the most disputed issue of all, 
the issue of responsibility. 
The differences around this issue are epitomised by the different 
positions taken by Paul Keating, the Prime Minister and leader of 
the Labor Party until 1996, and John Howard, the conservative 
leader of the Liberal Party who followed him as Prime Minister. 
Keating was a strong supporter of the Mabo decision and ad-
vocated a full acknowledgement of the current generations' 
responsibility for the past as part and parcel of a process of 
reconciliation with the Indigenous people. For Keating: 
... the starting point might be to recognise that the problem starts 
with us non-Aboriginal Australians. It begins, I think, with that act 
of recognition. Recognition that it was we who did the 
dispossessing. We took the traditional lands and smashed the 
traditional way of life. We brought the diseases. The alcohol. We 
committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers. 
We practised discrimination and exclusion.20 
John Howard, on the other hand, believes that the best way to 
deal with such a past is to forget it and concentrate on present 
socioeconomic injustices. When asked to apologise in the name of 
the nation for the kind of actions described in Bringing Them 
Home, John Howard stated that he could not apologise in his 
capacity as Prime Minister. Instead, he offered his personal apology. 
As one of his ministers explained: 'The government does not 
support an official national apology. Such an apology could imply 
that present generations are in some way responsible and ac-
countable for the actions of earlier generations.'21 
Generally speaking, it would be fair to say that Paul Keating 
was far more inclined to help foster the climate of reconciliation 
advocated by the High Court judges and, later, the writers of the 
Bringing Them Home report. And, not surprisingly, given their 
general liberal disposition, philosophers and other academics have 
also tended to support the Keating position and see in John 
Howard's reluctance to apologise a regressive step, if not an 
outright continuation of colonial racism. 
My moral position does not differ much from such academics 
on this question. I will, however, argue that the Keating position 
raises many more difficulties than have been acknowledged by the 
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advocates of a 'national apology'. These difficulties remain largely 
unnoticed and unexamined in the attempts to provide philosophi-
cal groundings for this position. In what follows, I look at two 
recent philosophical works that have tackled this question and see 
how they are weakened by their inability to notice, let alone deal 
with, these difficulties. I will then show that these difficulties are 
important enough to make it impossible to think through migrant 
participatory belonging without attempting to confront them. 
Ross Poole, in a recent work that is commendable for the clarity 
and thoroughness with which it tackles the issues of nationalism 
and identity in general and then brings them to bear on the 
issues arising in the Australian situation, has strongly argued the 
case for linking national memory with national identity and na-
tional responsibility. This is how he formulates the question of 
responsibility: 
If in virtue of their history and current position, Aboriginal people 
have certain rights, it is important to ask: Who do they have rights 
against? The usual and I think the correct answer to this question 
is: non-Aboriginal Australians. But it is important to ask why this 
should be so. After all, most contemporary Australians will never 
themselves have acted with the intention of harming Aborigines, and 
most of the worst atrocities were committed in the past. By what 
line of inheritance do contemporary Australians inherit the sins of 
the predecessors? And which contemporary Australians? Is it only 
those of us of Anglo-Celtic stock whose ancestors came to Australia 
in the nineteenth century? Should we exclude those recent 
immigrants, especially those whose background is free from the 
taints of European colonialism and imperialism? And what of those 
Australians wh.ose ancestors had no choice in the decision to 
migrate, but were brought over as convicts?22 
Poole develops his argument through an interpretation of the 
relation between identity and memory that is based on the work of 
John Locke and Friedrich Nietzsche. He emphasises Locke's idea 
that responsibility for the past does not result from a mere 
remembering of the past, but from an identification with the subject 
performing the remembered act. It is because of this identification, 
a kind of appropriation of past actions, that 'present feelings of 
pride, shame, guilt, remorse, pleasure, obligation are usually 
present and appropriate' and that people can be held responsible 
for the past. 23 
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Poole further develops the notion of an identity formed through 
the appropriation of the past through Nietzsche's well-known 
proposition that 'to breed an animal with the right to make 
promises - is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself 
in the case of man?'24 He argues that for Nietzsche (and in this he 
interprets him as being very similar to Locke), 'we learn to 
remember what we have done, not merely in the sense that certain 
acts remain present to consciousness, but because we identify 
ourselves with the self that performed those acts' .25 
But for Nietzsche, memory is not somehow there to appropriate. 
A memory has to be made, as he put it. With Nietzsche a new 
dimension emerges when we learn to appropriate the past as our 
particular past. For it also means that we recognise our promises 
and develop what we come to call our conscience. As Poole 
explains, 'We were that self which promised, its will is our will, 
and the suffering it would endure with the failure of its projects is 
our suffering. '26 Thus for Poole, 'memory and anticipation are not 
merely modes of cognitive access to what we did in the past and 
will do in the future, but are the very forms through which our 
identity is constructed' .27 
It is with the help of this construct that he reaches his concep-
tion of how national identity, national memory and responsibility 
relate. It is worth quoting from his argument at length: 
A national identity involves, not just a sense of place, but a sense of 
history. The history constitutes the national memory, and it provides 
a way of locating those who share that identity within a historical 
community. The history is not given, but subject to debate and 
reinterpretation. For example, Australians of earlier generations 
grew up with a history of British achievements, the European 
'discovery' and 'exploration' of Australia, the trials and triumphs 
of the early settlers, and so on. It was a history in which Aboriginals 
were marginal or absent. But this history has been and is being 
rewritten. It is now recognised that Australia did not come into 
existence with European discovery; that Aboriginal cultures and 
ways of life had existed for millennia; that Aboriginal practices had 
formed the land which was to be appropriated and exploited by the 
European immigrants; and that Aborigines had with flair and 
courage resisted White advances into their country. Australian 
history is now coming to terms with the suffering, destruction and 
human tragedy consequent upon the European settlement of 
Australia. The details of this history may be debated, but it cannot 
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be disavowed. Acquiring a national identity is a way of acquiring 
that history and the rights and the responsibilities which go with it. 
The responsibility to come to terms with the Australian past is a 
morally inescapable component of what it is to be Australian.28 
The second philosophical work I want to consider here is Moira 
Ga tens and Genevieve Lloyd's Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past 
and Present. 29 Despite Ross Poole's materialist disposition, his 
conceptualisation of appropriative memory seems to make re-
membering and responsibility the result of an act of free will by a 
subject who chooses to take responsibility for the past. Gatens and 
Lloyd's Spinoza allows for a somewhat more materialist analysis, 
where the communal imagining of the past is a necessity, produced 
through the material interconnection between the past and 
the present. 
Most important for them are the ramifications of Spinoza's 
conception of the individual as the product of social relations rather 
than an a priori starting point. As they put it: 
Our understanding of responsibility is restrained by thinking of 
individuals as bordered territories, firmly separated from others in 
such a way that the issue of where the responsibility lies is always in 
principle determinable. Spinoza's treatment of individuality -
especially that aspect of it which Balibar terms 'transindividuality' 
- gives us insight into the nexus between individual and collective 
identity ... It can help us understand something which otherwise ... 
can seem puzzling and inappropriate: that individuals can take 
responsibility for what they have not themselves done.30 
This is a remarkable work in its capacity, like previous works 
by these two philosophers, to make Spinoza appear a highly rel-
evant avant-garde contemporary. More specifically, here, Spinoza's 
idea is convincingly presented as a complement to Hannah 
Arendt's version of collective responsibility. For Arendt, Gatens 
and Lloyd point out, 'we are appropriately held responsible for 
things we have not ourselves done where the reason for our 
responsibility is our membership in a group which no voluntary 
act of ours can dissolve .. .'31 In The Human Condition,32 Arendt 
conceptualises this involuntary membership with the help of the 
Augustinian concept of 'natality'. Gatens and Lloyd observe that 
in the case of Arendt, the 'beginning of an individual self as a 
bearer of responsibility is here construed in terms of entry into a 
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community rather than in terms of the physical fact of birth - an 
initiation into language and socially meaningful action'.33 It is here 
that Spinoza's work is most useful: 
Spinoza's treatment of individuality can offer here a way of thinking 
of individual selfhood which will complement the strength and 
clarify the limitations of Arendt's political version of collective 
responsibility . 
... [For Spinoza] The modification of our own bodies by others 
is constitutive of our determinate individuality, as well as causally 
determining what we do in the here and now. The implication of 
memory and imagination in these determining processes means that 
our past is not a shadowy unreal being of thought which we can 
conjure up or away at will. It is here in our present - in the 
modifications which stay with us in the ongoing bodily awareness 
which makes us what we are. 34 
This bodily awareness is part of what Spinoza calls 'the imagi-
nary', and it is through it that 'we' come to terms with ourselves as 
members of historical communities materially linked to a past for 
which we assume responsibility. This Spinozist conception of the 
imaginary informs Gatens and Lloyd's commentary on the Mabo 
case. 
The Mabo judgement disturbed not only mining, farming and other 
financial interests of present-day non-Indigenous Australians, it also 
severely disturbed the social imaginary which grounds the 'we' of 
contemporary Australian identity. This imaginary is the site and 
cause of direct and indirect harms experienced by Indigenou~ 
Australians. No amount of redistribution of goods, compensatory 
financial arrangements, or even the return to the land will cancel or 
alleviate the past and present effects of the European imaginary on 
Indigenous peoples. This is not an argument against redistribution, 
compensation or the return of land. Rather, these measures, though 
necessary, are far from sufficient. It is here that the 'we' of Keating's 
speech is crucial. Who - if not we - possesses the capacity to accept 
responsibility for the harmful effects on others of the social 
imaginaries which we inhabit and which have formed us as the types 
of persons we are? Responsibility for our social imaginary can only 
be a collective responsibility that 'we' take up toward the past.35 
The affinity between Spinoza and Nietzsche translates into an 
affinity between the positions of Poole and of Gatens and Lloyd. 
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Both arguments provide excellent groundings for the idea that 
those who relate materially and imaginatively to the history of 
the appropriation of Australia from the Indigenous population 
ought to feel responsible for the injustices caused by this appro-
priation. I would like to argue, however, that they both suffer, very 
directly in the case of Gatens and Lloyd, from what I will call the 
undeconstructed colonial effect of Keating's 'we'. 
As I will now argue, both theorisations of national responsibility 
are considerably weakened because despite their awareness of 
national multiplicity, at the point of conceiving the 'apologising 
national subject', they implicitly assume a non-contradictory 
national imaginary from which 'we' ought to relate to the past. It 
is that point which also weakens the position of all those who take 
Keating's 'We took the lands .. . We committed the murders .. . We 
took the children' speech, quoted above, as the example of what a 
national apology should entail. 
Australia's impossible national memory 
Let us begin by noticing that when Keating makes his statement, it 
is not clear whether or not he is using a national 'we', and thus 
making a national apology. What he says very explicitly is that 
'the problem starts with us non-Aboriginal Australians'. But this 
phrase can be interpreted in two ways. If Keating, and those 
who take him to be making a national apology, suppose the 
national 'we' to exclude Indigenous people, his 'us non-Aboriginal 
Australians' is a national 'we' which considers the Indigenous 
people to be another national 'we'. Or he sees a national 'we' as 
including Indigenous people, in which case a national apology is a 
very difficult acrobatic act indeed. It would have to involve the 
Indigenous people as part of their new 'Australian' communal 
selves apologising to their past Indigenous communal selves: 'We 
took the lands ... we committed the murders'! Not even Nietzsche 
and Spinoza could make them do this! 
It seems to me that this is the fissure from which conservative 
thought in Australia gains its moral legitimacy. When John 
Howard is saying that he cannot apologise in the name of the 
nation he is saying just that. In this sense, he is more faithfully 
reflecting the hegemonic wish of the state of Australia to represent 
all the people of the nation and to thwart any possibility of 
Aboriginal sovereignty. This is why an apology becomes perceived 
as 'divisive'. Unlike Keating, Howard does not want to use his role 
as a representative of the nation - one nation which includes 
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Indigenous people - to speak in the name of one part of the nation, 
be they Anglos, Europeans, or non-Indigenous population. But 
John Howard here faces a contradiction of his own. If he is to 
be really consistent in only using the national 'we' to include 
'everyone', and does not want to speak of national shame when 
only one part of Australia can relate to it, then he also has to refrain 
from using it when expressing national pride and remembering 
rosier 'national memories'. Australia's national day itself, Australia 
Day, commemorates the British landing. It cannot be plausibly 
~upported as a genuinely national day. Indeed, this is something 
that many Indigenous people, who remember the day as a day of 
sorrow, have pointed out. 
But of course John Howard is not interested in being consistent; 
he is interested only in achieving his political goals. The same could 
be said about Paul Keating, for that matter. This is why neither 
Howard nor Keating can face the reality pointed to by the above: 
a national memory or a non-contradictory plurality of memories 
of colonisation in Australia is impossible. This is the all-important 
reality whose ramifications are left out of the analyses of Poole and 
Gatens and Lloyd. 
Obvious as this fact may be when stated explicitly, it is often 
forgotten in discussions concerning responsibility: Indigenous 
people do not relate to and cannot appropriate 'Australian history', 
even in its morally and empirically corrected version, because what 
is posited as Australian history is simply not history from their 
perspective. In this sense, they have their own history - or, more 
exactly, their own pool of histories, with its own agreements and 
disagreements - to appropriate memory from. This does not mean 
that they cannot share anything with other people living in 
Australia, but it does mean that what they share cannot be taken 
for granted at all. 
Gatens and Lloyd's Spinoza appears at first sight ready to 
encompass such a multiplicity of histories and imaginaries. 
Selves are born into a future in which they will make individual 
decisions, in which they will be held responsible, praised or blamed. 
But they are also born into the past of communal life which both 
precedes and awaits them - a communal life which, under modern 
conditions, is not the life of one culture alone, but, in Tully's terms, 
'inter-cultural'. Such selves have not just one but a multiplicity of 
pasts - pasts of collective memory and imagination which must be 
reckoned with in the present; and not just one 'identity', but as many 
92 AGAINST PARANOID NATIONALISM 
as can be constructed, and carried into the future, out of this inner 
multiplicity. Our responsibilities, no less than our freedom, come 
from understanding what in this rich profusion of 'finite modes' we 
are - in all senses - determined to be.36 
Unfortunately, when they invoke Keating's 'we' as a national 
imaginary within which we are all positioned, Gatens and Lloyd 
leave this Spinozist potential for dealing with a multiplicity of 
memories unexploited. Instead, they end up reducing the multi-
plicity of pasts to a non-contradictory multiplicity in which all 
communities have the possibility to 'strive to persevere in their own 
being'. What they see as 'conflicting imaginaries' are two White 
imaginaries of colonisation: a bad one (represented by the idea of 
terra nullius) and a good one (represented by the Mabo decision). 
The fundamental contradiction between the settlers' and the 
Indigenous peoples' imaginaries, a contradiction which means that 
the striving of one communal formation is at the expense of the 
striving of the other, is left off the field. 
The impossibility of a single Australian national memory or a 
smoothly plural set of national memories is not the result of there 
having been a war between two sides, a winning and a losing side. 
National memories have been forged out of such wars; they are 
later constructed as 'fratricidal'. As Benedict Anderson argues in 
the second edition of Imagined Communities, 37 there is such a thing 
as a nationally reassuring memory of fratricide. But this is not 
possible in Australia today, because the very sides which fought 
this colonial war have not melded together into one. Despite the 
hegemonically inspired symbolic gymnastics of some, there remain 
two separate communal identities, with two separate memories, 
trying to live together in one state. 
Reflecting on the preoccupation with the need for forgetting in 
Qu'est ce qu'une nation? by Ernest Renan, and in particular 
Renan's statement that 'tout citoyen fran<;ais doit avoir oublie la 
Saint Barthelemy,' Anderson comments 'in effect, Renan's readers 
were being told to "have already forgotten" what Renan's own 
words assumed that they naturally remembered!' And he asks, 
'How are we to make sense of this paradox?'38 
In fact there is not much of a paradox to make sense of here. 
Any person who has ever used the exclamation 'let's forget about 
it' will know very well what Renan means by this 'forgetful 
remembering'. 'Let's forget about this argument', for instance, will 
often mean that since we cannot but remember this event, let us at 
POLLUTING MEMORIES 93 
least do so without the passion that led us into it in the first place. 
It is an invitation to a remembering that is no longer one-sided and 
affective. Anderson himself points out, 'It is instructive that Renan 
does not say that each French citizen is obliged to "have already 
forgotten" the Paris Commune. In 1882 its memory was still real 
rather than mythic, and sufficiently painful to make it difficult to 
read under the sign of "reassuring fratricide" .'39 
It is then a difference between a 'neutral' and an affective 
remembering that Anderson is partly aiming for in differentiating 
between real and mythic memory. When two parties to a conflict 
remember it affectively, each or at least one of them has still an 
investment in remembering the conflict as a two-sided affair, and 
in continuing to remember it from the particular side he or she 
belongs to. Thus remembering affectively is not just about getting 
worked up about a particular memory. More importantly, it means 
that parties remember the conflict from 'their own' perspective. 
Here, at least one of the two sides is refusing to share a neutralised 
memory of the event, so each side will still have its own particular 
memory of it. This is why when we speak of memory we need to 
analyse its relation to the imaginary gaze of the remembering 
subject as a way of understanding its social significance for that 
subject. 'I remember fighting you' is a language that would more 
often emphasise a 'lived memory', a memory of the event as 
experienced from the specific and therefore necessarily one-sided 
perspective of the one remembering. This is why Anderson is right 
in calling it 'real' memory. Such a memory does not lend itself to a 
'we' language. A memory has to lose the investment of both parties 
in it as a real memory before it can become a memory of a distant 
mythic event. Only then can a sentence such as 'we remember our 
fight' become possible and credible. 
This is why it is not an exaggeration to say that the possibility 
of a non-contradictory set of national memories of Australia's 
history is still very remote. We are far from reaching a stage where 
'we', Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, can remember the 
acts of dispossession and murder within that history without 
partisan affective intensity. 
This is the contemporary reality of Australia: two contra-
dictorily located fields of memories and identification. But this is 
not the end of the story. For these two sets of memories and 
identities also mean two communal subjects with two wills over 
one land; two sovereignties of unequal strength.40 The first is a 
dominant one, deriving its legitimacy from the force and the history 
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of its occupation. This is not only the brute force of numbers and 
technological superiority; it is also the moral force behind a history 
of inhabiting, transforming and defending the land as it has grown 
to be. The second is a dominated will, deriving its legitimacy from 
its historical status as the resisting will of the original inhabitants. 
One can turn this whichever way one likes, but it is as good a 
definition as any of a colonial situation; a colonial situation that is 
still with us today. If we are fishing for injustice and responsibility, 
there is no need to appropriate the past; there is still plenty to 
appropriate in the present. 
The Australian situation is not a 'post-colonisation' situation (in 
the unlikely sense of a state where the process of colonisation has 
reached its goal of fully neutralising the colonised) because the will 
of the colonised has not been completely neutralised by the will of 
the colonisers. But it is not Algeria or South Africa either, where 
the will of the colonised can challenge the coloniser for a 
recapturing of the land. The colonial project has eradicated enough 
of the strength of the colonised will to make this impossible. 
This is what constitutes the objective difficulty of the Australian 
situation. For a long time to come, Australia is destined to become 
an unfinished Western colonial project as well as a land in a 
permanent state of decolonisation. A nation inhabited by both the 
will of the coloniser and the will of the colonised, each with their 
identity based on their specific understanding, and memory, of the 
colonial encounter: what was before it and what is after it. Any 
national project of reconciliation that fails to fully accept the 
existence of a distinct Indigenous will, a distinct Indigenous 
conatus, whose striving is bound to make the settlers experience 
'sadness', is destined to be a momentary cover-up of the reality of 
the forces that made Australia what it is. 
It should be remembered that it is always the dominant who have 
an interest in the dominated forgetting that there ever were sides in 
a conflict. Consequently, to speak of an Australian memory is not 
politically innocent. It is part of a hegemonic disposition on the part 
of the coloniser to complete the integration of the colonised into the 
reality of the coloniser. One can call for justice and hold oneself 
responsible by identifying with the history of the coloniser. One can 
call for justice and put oneself in an accusatory position by 
identifying with the history of the colonised. The very idea 
of 'recognising' injustice, and assuming responsibility for it, admir-
able as it is, is still a coloniser's take on Australia's history, 
even when it is a repentant coloniser's take. This is not to make 
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such recognition less necessary, but to clearly spell out its limits. 
What I have tried to argue in this section is that as far as its 
colonial past is concerned, Australia continues to have antagonistic 
histories with antagonistically positioned historical subjects 
produced by those histories. To recognise that the coloniser's 
history involves a history of land appropriation, massacre and 
'stolen children', and to want to take some form of responsibility 
for such acts, is of course, ethically superior to trying to retreat from 
them. Nevertheless, responsibility for a shameful act is an answer 
to a coloniser's trauma - not to the trauma of the colonised. The 
colonised have an equally Australian history, and traumas specific 
to them as colonised. The shame of the colonised is the shame of 
defeat, and its relation to injustice is one not of 'recognition', but 
of endurance and resistance. To take the traumas of the coloniser 
as the only 'Australian' history someone assuming an Australian 
identity ought to face is to continue the process of marginalising 
the history of the colonised - that is, it is to continue the process of 
colonisation itself. This is so even at the very moment of expressing 
shame for colonisation. This is what is of utmost importance when 
thinking of migrant participation in Australia's colonial history. 
Because he neglected to analyse the ramifications of this colo-
nial antagonism, Ross Poole, though showing himself well aware 
of it throughout his book, ends up approaching the questions of 
migration and responsibility from a coloniser's angle. Thus he 
rightly argues that 'Where the immigrant desires permanent 
settlement ... they (sic) should be treated as potential citizens. 
They should be expected to participate in the public culture of their 
new country, and provided the means and the opportunity to do 
so.'41 And he, equally rightly, goes on to call for the importance of 
the migrants' 'commitment to participate in the public culture 
of the nation which will be [their] new home'. Applying his 
Nietzschean/Lockian perspective, he argues that 'Migration ... 
should also carry with it a commitment to ... acquire a new 
national identity, and also ... to accept the responsibilities which 
go with this.'42 
One can only agree with the above. But when it comes to 
specifying what these responsibilities are, we are left in no doubt 
as to whose history the migrant is being asked to relate to: 
The responsibility to come to terms with the Australian past is a 
morally inescapable component of what is to be Australian. 
It is in this context that we must understand one of the dangers 
-96 AGAINST PARANOID NATIONALISM 
of multiculturalism. In so far as it involves a diminished sense of 
Australian historical identity and a strengthened sense of the 
affiliations which migrant Australians have to the countries of their 
origins, it also carries with it a weakened sense of the responsibilities 
which are written into Australian history. Many recent migrants do 
not feel implicated in it. It is not just that they personally have not 
been involved with or had direct dealings with Aboriginal people; 
this is true of most Anglo-Celtic Australians. It is because their 
cultural identity implicates them in a different history and, perhaps, 
with a different set of responsibilities. It is only if they have a sense 
that coming to be an Australian involves coming to share the history 
that they will recognise that they have acquired the responsibilities 
which go with that history.43 
I have argued elsewhere that migration is, in an important sense, 
a continuation of the colonisation process, so in this sense I can 
see why Poole can instinctively position the migrant 'on the side' 
of the 'Anglo-Celtic Australians'. But migrants have shared some 
important realities with Indigenous people too. Enduring the racist 
'White Australia Policy', for example.44 To use a somewhat old but 
useful language, let us say that migrants are in a contradictory 
colonial location, and as such, they are quite capable of relating to 
Australia's history from within the imaginary 'we' of the colonised. 
Here, 'becoming responsible' is no longer guaranteed to mean 
contributing to the coloniser's postcolonial trauma-therapy that is 
oozing out of the 'coming to terms with the Australian past' 
discourse; it might just as well mean contributing to a struggle for 
Aboriginal sovereignty. 
An important issue that emerges here is the very mechanism 
through which migrants come to care about Australian history -
whoever's history it is they are relating to. How does one come to 
relate to the memory of another as if it is one's own? Poole sug-
gests that this is what 'ought' to happen, but he does not tell us 
either how or why it happens. Gatens and Lloyd's Spinoza, in its 
refinement of Arendt's 'natality' concept, is more explanatory in 
this regard: 
Thinking through the implications of Spinoza's philosophy we can 
see that human bodies are not born into a single community, but 
into complex criss-crossing structures of reciprocal affinity -
constantly formed and re-formed under the impact of rival conarus. 
It is a version of what Arendt calls 'natality' which lends itself better 
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to the complexities of identity under contemporary conditions of 
cultural diversity than more unitary conceptions of contemporary 
community.45 
But it remains to be seen how these crisscrossing structures of 
reciprocal affinity lead to the transmission of affect from the 
perspective of the body itself. It is to this issue of participatory 
belonging, with which I began this chapter, that we now need to 
return in order to explain the process of 'caring' for the memory of 
the other. 
Polluting memories: on the transmission of affect 
Explaining the nature of the affect involved in the process of 
recognition, Raimond Gaita argues that it is mainly a variety of 
shame. As he put it: 
... shame is as necessary for the lucid acknowledgment by 
Australians of the wrongs the Aborigines suffered at the hands of 
their political ancestors, and to the wrongs they continue to suffer, 
as pain is to mourning. It is not an optional emotional addition to 
the recognition of the meaning of their dispossession. It is, I believe, 
the form of that recognition.46 
He further reiterates that: 
The attachment that makes shame appropriate and sometimes called 
for is inseparable from the desire to celebrate achievements which 
shape an historically deep sense of communal identity. The pained, 
humbled acknowledgment of the wrongs committed by the 
ancestors, of those who are rooted and nourished by their country, 
who feel as do Justices Deane and Gaudron, that those wrongs 
constitute a stain on their country, and whose joy in its achievements 
is thereby sometimes blighted - that acknowledgment I take to be 
one of the forms of shame. If it is not, then I do not know what to 
call it. 47 
Gaita's powerful and subtle moral analysis of what I have called 
above the relation to the coloniser's 'we' is not accompanied by an 
equivalently powerful sociological analysis of the mode of 
transmission of affect. In the above, we somehow learn that to 
be afflicted by this 'healthy' sense of shame, those who have 
committed the wrongs need to be our ancestors. However, he also 
sees that: 
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There are borderline cases as, of course, there are with any concept. 
More importantly, there is a condition which is neither guilt nor 
shame and which is not a state borderline between them. Ron 
Castan, a QC who played a prominent part in securing native title 
legislation, alerted me to it in discussion when he described the 
response of Adolf Eichmann's son to the fact that he was the child 
of one of the architects of the genocide of the Jews and the gipsies. 
The oppressive and ineradicable gloom of that condition was neither 
shame nor guilt, but more like the condition the ancient Greeks 
described in their tragedies as 'pollution'.48 
I understand the historical basis for Gaita's use of such a re-
stricted conception of 'pollution' . However, I would like to suggest 
that, at least for my own purposes, it is more suitable as a general 
category, capable of encompassing all the affective states analysed 
by Gaita, be they shame, guilt, or that 'other' state that is neither. 
To think of shame and guilt as specific forms of pollution helps us 
think of affect in a more materialist way - as circulating particles 
of guilt or shame, for example. 
More importantly for our analytical purposes in this section, 
it gives us more space within which to think of the modes 
of transmission of affect than the generally idealist categories of 
shame or guilt do. We can now ask such questions as how do such 
particles of affect circulate? How do people get 'tainted'? 
Memories of genocide are polluting memories. They taint those 
who relate to them. But how does one become polluted if one is 
not the originator of the polluting act? Gaita's source for the idea 
of pollution, the story about Eichmann's son, sees it as acquired 
through kinship. The son is polluted by the deeds of the father. But 
how does this happen? After all, shame does not circulate in the 
blood. What does one receive from one's father - or, more generally, 
one's parents - other than blood? 
I would like to suggest that the answer to the above question is 
simply 'family life' itself, one's first collective imaginary. The family, 
as Bourdieu has pointed out, is not only the social space where the 
first 'I' is formed but also the space of the first 'we', and it has an 
enduring effect on how later, more encompassing, 'we's are 
formed.49 This is not an incidental subjectivity - one that I might 
or might not have. The 'we' I manage to be 'interpellated' to forms 
the core of what I am as much as does any 'I'. In that sense, the 
family remains a good microcosm for the study of the circulation 
of affect within communally imagined subjects. 
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By living within a family {or whatever other communal form 
helps us develop and grow), we receive from our parents (or 
whoever is positioned as such), our first sense of communal life: 
we see ourselves protected and cared for, and we perceive ourselves 
as part of a historical subject that originates well before us. It 
is within this imaginary collectivity that we also learn that for 
what we have received we are expected to give back. We have 
responsibilities. Indeed, if what we have received is reasonably 
positive, we don't feel the weight of such an expectation, we see 
it as a natural moral obligation. We receive the gift of family life, 
and insofar as this gift is well given, insofar as we have internalised 
it well enough, we feel in return responsible for its maintenance: 
we care for it and for the people within it. That is what motivates 
and shapes our participation in such a family life and forms the 
basis of our family identification, or our identification with 
whatever we grow up to perceive as our 'community/family' 
entourage. This is what I called in the introduction to this chapter 
'participatory belonging'. 
This collective identity is as much my individual identity as it 
is an expression of my social viability. If my parents have known 
how to offer me the gift of a communal family life, I cannot refuse 
it short of committing social suicide. And I have to accept it 
whichever way it comes. It might carry with it stories of family 
greatness of which the family (and I) are and will be proud. It might 
carry with it stories of evil deeds (which I might learn about from 
others) of which the family (and I) are ashamed. 
I cannot possibly relate to a social milieu to which I feel I 
owe nothing, or only negativity. This seems to me the importance 
of Eichmann's son's story. If Eichmann's son had only experienced 
evil and violence from his father, he could have easily had no 
affective ties to him at all. He could have experienced a sense 
of having received nothing but bare biological life from his 
father. Eichmann's son would not have had such an experience 
of 'pollution' if this were the case, for pride and shame are 
not transmitted biologically. Paradoxically, but more probably, 
it is because he inherited his father's evil through the love 
and protection that the latter gave him that he experienced such 
a form of oppressive pollution. It came with the gift of 
social life itself. The pollution defined one of the 'we's that 
constituted his social viability, and he was forced to relate to it. 
What I am suggesting, then, is that like family life, all social 
communal life is communicated to us as a gift, and like all gifts, it 
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creates obligations when it is well given. Participating in, and 
'caring for', whatever community we belong to is the common, 
though not necessary, mode of returning such a gift.50 It is through 
this process of gift-ex~hange that communal affects such as pride 
and shame circulate. 
I believe that it is from this perspective that we can best capture 
the nature of migrant participatory belonging in the host society. 
It explains why, to begin with, migration is often a guilt-inducing 
process. To leave the communal setting that has given us the gift 
of social life is precisely to refrain from paying the debt. 51 But 
migration also involves receiving a new gift of social life. Whether 
such a gift is well given is part of what determines whether or not 
it will create an obligation. Another important aspect, however, is 
whether or not the migrant is psychologically and socially 
equipped to receive a well-given gift. It is when (and if) migrants 
experience a sense of communal solidarity, of being cared for, and 
so forth, and when and if they become capable of appreciating such 
care, that they will begin to 'care for' the host society themselves. 
And it is at this point that they will start identifying with all or 
some of its we or we's and all the affective luggage they carry 
with them. 
I will now conclude by briefly narrating, in a somewhat more 
anthropological, but also more literary manner, through a 
condensation of subjectivities encountered in my research, the way 
such an approach can lead us into the complexity of the Australian 
situation, with whose philosophers I have critically inter-
acted above. 
On receiving the gift of social life in a land taken without being 
offered ... by someone I don't like ... because he reminds me 
of my guilt 
It is the Australian Arabic Communities Council's annual dinner. I 
am having a drink listening to a couple of Arab-Australian youths 
discussing Mabo when a piece of absolute wisdom is jokingly 
delivered by one of them in response to a long liberal tirade 
defending the Mabo decision: 
What are you going on about anyway? If the Anglos didn't do 
the killing you wouldn't have been able to emigrate here. You owe 
'em, mate. They cleared the land ... ESPECIALLY FOR YOU! 
(imitating a TV product promotion) 
Is this a moment of Spinozist lucidity about those 'complex 
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crisscrossing structures' making us into what we are? ... The migrant 
'owes' the colonisers ... No spears waiting at the harbour or the 
airport. Maybe there would have been no airport! All thanks to the 
coloniser. 
But doesn't everyone owe the coloniser (in some cases even the 
colonised, depending on what social inheritance they choose to 
value)? The migrant's voice elucidates what the discourse of 
'recognition' does not want to recognise: colonial violence is but the 
condition of possibility of the attempt to transcend it through 
'recognition'. If my ancestors had not broken their spears and their 
will, they would be still spearing and I would have to be as much of 
an 'ethnic cleanser' as my ancestors. 
But they've done a reasonably good job, my ancestors, and I can 
now say how sorry I am for their doing such a good job. I can 
comfortably engage in my postcolonial trauma therapy ... Don't let 
guilt run you down. Special treatment for First Fleet descendants: 
modes of apology and recognition of injustice guaranteed to soothe. 
But doesn't the discourse of apology produce the very guilt it is 
supposed to soothe? A soothe-able guilt rather than that non-
soothe-able colonial one? 
They've done a good job, my ancestors, but they could have done 
a better job. They could have put me in a position where the 
Indigenous people would have been grateful for my 'recognition' . 
The Prime Minister, John Howard, waited so long to offer his 
'personal apologies' that he was clearly expecting the recipients to 
be grateful. He's come a long way. The postcolonial art of apology 
as gift: thank you for expressing your regrets ... we owe you, mate! 
In the meantime the migrant is also grateful ... 'We owe you, 
mate. A beautiful gift to be allowed to live in Australia. We would 
be happy to reciprocate ... if only you learn to give this gift a bit 
more gracefully!' 
This is where we come to yet another complex crisscrossing 
structure determining us. A gift of social life will create an obligation 
to reciprocate if it is well offered ... offered gracefully. Many 
migrants to Australia are offered the gift of a new social life: visa, 
work, social security. Not many are offered it gracefully. 
'They finally gave us the visa. They made us feel like beggars,' a 
Lebanese woman says. Australian embassies are the last bastions of 
the White Australia Policy. The gracefulness with which you 
are offered the gift of an Australian life is strictly proportional 
to your Whiteness . .. or your capital. We are very instrumentalist in 
choosing our migrants, but we don't want our migrants to relate 
instrumentally to us. 
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Nevertheless, I felt like saying, 'Beggars? But isn't that what we 
are?' Begging on the international market for a more economically 
sustaining 'we'. It would have complicated the interview. 
Come to think of it, it would have been easier than saying it here. 
Now I am complicating the analysis. More crisscrossing structures. 
A well-offered gift of social life will create an obligation if it is well 
received. But is the migrant always ready to receive well even what 
is most generously and ethically offered? What of the shame of 
belonging to a country that cannot give you a decent enough gift of 
social life to keep you in it, and then the added shame of migration 
... everyone has to know that I belong to a sick 'we' animated by 
centrifugal forces! The bad breast of my motherland exposed ... 52 
Excuse me, sir, my motherland's breast cannot feed me, can I have a 
suck of yours? Who would want to relate to his or her mother while 
envying someone else's? 
And so the man is apparently treating the migrant like a beggar. 
He is a racist: a good object of transference of repressed centrifugally 
induced shame if there ever was one. It's all your fault if I don't feel 
at home in your country! I was all geared up to do it! I CHOSE to 
stay here, you know! 
Ressentiment: I don't like my hosts to begin with. Everything 
about them reminds me of the person I should have been. The 
person who stayed put! The person whose mother(land) knew how 
to keep her. I envy your centripetal force ... 
Even before that man in the shopping centre spat on me and said, 
'Why don't you go home where you belong, you son of a bitch', I 
hated him. Yes, I am hurting, of course I am. He called my mother 
bitch. How dare he lay bare what I am escaping from most: the 
thought of my mother as that bitch who did not manage to feed me 
and keep me. But at the same time, thank god he said it. Now I can 
hate him a little bit more comfortably. I hate him because he is a 
bloody racist. And he IS. 
Finding a rational reason to hate those we hate already for no 
good reason: how soothing! 
And now I learn that they've killed all these Aboriginal people 
when their ancestors invaded Australia. So it wasn't your mother's 
breast after all: you stole it. You're worse than me! 
Sophisticated psychoanalysts might call this longitudinally 
maintained transference of repressed centrifugally induced shame. 
We might recognise this little convenience by the name of 'being 
onto a good thing'.53 Why should I be grateful to you anyway for 
letting me have a suck? It is not your mother's breast anyway. You 
haven't offered me anything. Stolen goods: that's what you have 
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offered me. I don't owe you anything. You thought you didn 't offer 
me hospitality. In fact, you couldn't. It 's not your land. I am 
liberated. NO OBLIGATIONS. 
I ought to thank the Aboriginal people for letting me in ... Except 
they didn't give me a visa either ... I ought to apologise ... to each 
her therapy ... 
I might be onto another 'good thing' here: the struggle for the 
equal right to apologise and recognise injustice! That must go far ... 
Actually, maybe I can belong here. That guy Noel Pearson said that 
Australia is made out of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. I 
like that. Finally a category that puts me and John Howard in the 
same position. Maybe I can belong here ... Who says I don't 
care ... ? 
This is how the sea of subjectivity around Mabo can present 
itself on a stormy day. As Spinoza understood, 'man's strivings, 
impulses, appetites, and volitions ... are not infrequently so 
opposed to one another that the man is pulled in different 
directions and knows not where to turn'. 54 No neat relation to 
Australian history here, and too many vacillating conatus ... a very 
postcolonial colonial situation. 
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Appendix to Chapter 6: In defence of critical intellectuals 
In the aftermath of September 11, in some of the deprived suburbs 
of many Arab cities inhabited by poor and uneducated people, you 
could enter a little mosque and hear some pretentious and mediocre 
sheikh (religious preacher), supported by some morally bankrupt 
politician, explain to the worshippers that September 11 was a 
Jewish plot; that in fact - and the little sheikh would know, of 
course - most of the Jewish people who worked in the World Trade 
Centre were contacted, on a special Jews-only phone presumably, 
and asked not to enter the building on that day. 
If an Arab intellectual had entered the mosque at that time and 
disturbed the gathering by saying, 'Hey, this is idiotic, how can you 
believe such a silly thing, those responsible for this are clearly 
Muslims', he or she would have been thoroughly rubbished for 
being a negative elitist intellectual, who is too disconnected from 
the real world to know what is really going on, and who is, of 
course, always out to criticise his or her own people. 
But it is much easier to mock other people's prejudices than 
face our own. The same Australians who will find the sheikh's 
pronouncements ridiculous can come out with prejudiced views 
that have a similar logical consistency, whether about Indigenous 
people, about refugees plotting to come here or about Muslims 
being all little closet Osama bin Ladens unable to appreciate 
Western civilisation and its democratic values. 
For thinking with one's prejudices is easy and common. It is 
more economical in that it takes less time. Not everyone has time 
or training to subject everything they think about to critical 
scrutiny. It is also more economical emotionally. People who think 
with their prejudices often reach unshakeable certainties, and it is 
more demanding psychologically and intellectually to live with 
uncertainties. 
But there are always some people who will try to inject uncer-
tainties and question marks into the general culture; people who 
force others to confront their comfortable prejudiced knowledge. 
These are the critical intellectuals. 
They are certainly an elite, precisely because they can 'take 
their time'. Since Ancient Greece, this has been the basis for the 
existence of the intellectual class: the liberation from material 
needs provides the luxury of time for reflexivity, time to develop 
the art of thinking about our ways of thinking. 
Unfortunately, both for the people and for the 
0
critical 
intellectuals, not everyone who has time is interested in making 
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people think about how they are thinking. There are some, like our 
little sheikhs above, who feed on people's prejudiced knowledge. 
They derive their authority from reinforcing people's belief in the 
truth those people are most 'relaxed and comfortable' with. They 
can easily portray critical intellectuals competing with them for the 
people's attention as a nuisance and as overwhelmingly negative, 
for they certainly are. Instead, they celebrate with the people their 
prejudiced views by pretending to be 'of the people' and by 
encouraging the people to 'continue to think for themselves'.55 
Intellectual and political logic are not often compatible. 
Politicians need certainties. That is, they need pieces of knowledge 
that are no longer subjected to critical questioning. People are 
defined as friends or enemies according to how they relate to 
these certainties. Critical intellectuals do not know what certainty 
is. They judge each other according to how thoroughly, ethically 
and interestingly they can keep questioning everything. This is 
why intellectuals, more often than not, are hopelessly unpractical 
in this sense. They perform, at best, a general function of keeping 
a culture democratically alive, forward looking and open to 
transformations. The knowledge they roduce is as complex and 
subtle as they are good at being i e11ectual . 
Despite this l erence etween mte ectual and political logic, 
politicians and intellectuals are not necessarily enemies. 
Throughout history we have many examples of politicians who feel 
enriched by the complex and challenging knowledge intellectuals 
produce, even if it is not a knowledge they can easily peddle for 
political purposes. But clearly, there are many more examples of 
politicians who simply ignore intellectuals because of this 
difference in logic. The era and the society we live in is rather un-
usual in the history of Western democratic societies in that many 
politicians neither like nor ignore intellectuals but actually attack 
them systematically. Complexity and subtlety are among the first 
casualties, though the list is a long one. 
Take Australia's early history of colonising the Indigenous 
population, for example. For the anti-intellectual politicians such 
as John Howard and Tony Abbott, as well as the people supporting 
them, such as Roger Sandall, it is very simple. If you are shamed 
by Australia's colonial past, you must therefore be unwilling and 
unable to appreciate all the good things that Australia has given 
you: democracy, freedom of speech, high standard of living, etc. It 
1s either one or the other: you are a friend and a positive thinker if 
you believe that Australia's history leaves you with a past you can 
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be proud of; or you are an enemy and a negative thinker if you feel 
that what you have inherited shames you. 
Intellectuals who have spent time reflecting on this supposed 
opposition are bound to reach a more complex understanding of 
how people come to feel, or not feel, shame about their national 
past. See, for example, the intellectuals referred to above in this 
chapter. 
Gaita's reference to the story of Adolf Eichmann's son, who felt 
'polluted', as he put it, by the fact that he was the child of one of 
the architects of the genocide of the ews and the gypsies, raised ) 
the question: how does a son et pollute b the deeds of his father? "' 
As I argued, if Eichmann's son a only experienced evil and 
violence from his father, if he was simply shamed by all of his 
father's history, he could have easily felt no affective ties to him at 
all and therefore no ~ollution'. What is more likely is that he 
? inherited his father's~long with a relatively satisfying relation 
~what he has inherited from his father must make 
him proud and grateful to be his son, which is why he feels polluted 
by his father's bad deeds. 
To come back to Australia, what I am suggesting, then, is that 
people who are shamed by Australia's past could not possibly be 
shamed unless they feel that Australia has offered them something 
so valuable that they feel strong affective ties towards it. If some 
Australians feel that Australia has offered them nothing at all, and 
there are some who feel that way, they will be indifferent to both 
the good and the bad in its history. Shame can only come from 
caring and caring can only come if one feels pride in what one has 
[
inherited. It is because I amJ:wo prouC1]of what Australia has offered 
me democrac freedom of speech, the good life, etc) that I care 
~about it. And it"'IS on y because I care that I am ll)hamt>,d' by the 
negative parts of history: at have come wit~~e. This is 
enough to show how implis ·c the political ppos1ti 's position 
of 'either you feel _pride or you feel you shame 1s. 
As an intellectual, I am not interested in classifying people as 
friends or enemies according to how they relate to this explanation. 
I see it as offering me a way to further reflect on the complexity of 
what it means to belong to Australia. I want to refine it and use it 
to help me work out why it is that some people have such a fragile 
and insecure relation to the good things they have inherited that 
they cannot assume responsibility for the bad things as well. I also 
want to know what kind of political party is so dependent on 
encouraging and fostering a paranoid relation to Australia's history 
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that it is willing to tta one of the most important ~ 
stones of the Western society it purports to want to preserve: 




The class aesthetics of 
global multiculturalism 
Global multiculturalism - Take 1 (Beirut) 
On 26 January 2001, the Lebanese English newspaper published 
in Beirut, the Daily Star, offered a special feature supplement 
celebrating Australia Day and the centenary of Federation. In 
keeping with the spirit of globalisation, the supplement was 
sponsored by Malaysia Airlines. Being one of the few airlines with 
a direct Sydney-Beirut flight, it was one of the global corporations 
most interested in the celebration of Australian nationalism in 
Beirut. In the era of globalisation, it is the nationalists, not the 
workers, who 'have no country'. 
This, however, was not the most notable aspect of the 
supplement. Nor was the fact that in his brief celebration of the 
history of Australia the Australian ambassador did not feel the need 
to burden the Lebanese reader with any account of the British-
Indigenous encounter. What was most notable was that the entire 
eight pages devoted to the Lebanese in Australia and to Lebanese-
Australians in Lebanon made it sound as if the history of Lebanese 
migration to Australia was purely a history of business migration, 
and of joint Australian-Lebanese companies operating either in 
Australia or in Lebanon. Except for a brief reference to the high 
unemployment rate among the Lebanese in Trevor Batrouney's 
historical article, one wouldn't have guessed that there is such a 
thing as a Lebanese working class, let alone a Lebanese under-
class, in Australia. Insofar as an Australian multiculturalism was 
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intimated to exist, it was a business multiculturalism linking 
cultural pluralism and business opportunities. A good 95 per cent 
of Australia's Lebanese were left out of it. 
Global multiculturalism - Take 2 (Canberra) 
The conference I was attending in Canberra had been going for 
two days. It centred on the representations of Asianness in 
multicultural Australia. Academics and students, of all political 
leanings, of all kind of sexual orientations, masterfully using all 
kinds of psychoanalytic, semiotic and other theories of discourse 
and ideology, theorised and over-theorised 'Asian identity' and 
the 'orientalist representations' still embedded in Australian 
multiculturalism. 
Two days into the conference, after lunch was served, three 
cleaning ladies working for the university started clearing up the 
mess created by the anti-orientalist representation academics. I 
noted that the cleaning ladies were all Asian, and it struck me that 
after two days of papers on 'representation', that for all the talk 
about Asians, Asian cleaning ladies and whatever problems they 
might have in Australia were not really what we were talking about 
here. It was a middle-class multiculturalism that everyone was 
imagining, even though no one was saying it explicitly. A good 70 
per cent of Australia's Asian population were again being left out 
of the conversation. 
The reason the above accounts of multiculturalism need to be 
problematised is not that they are middle-class-centred conceptions 
of multiculturalism; the problematic of cultural diversity, and the 
struggle against racist representations, is equally important for the 
middle class and the working class. The problem is that working 
class-centred multiculturalism has been eclipsed from Australian 
society and it seems that middle-class multiculturalism has been 
used to eclipse it. 
Global multiculturalism - Take 3 (Paris) 
I was giving a lecture - at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences 
Sociales in Paris - on Australian multiculturalism. A sociologist 
from the Ecole asked me: 'Why do you take it for granted that an 
American concept such as multiculturalism is suitable to transpose 
to Australia?' 
I started to explain that Australian multiculturalism predates 
the latest academic interest in the issues raised by American 
multiculturalism. But deep down, I was disturbed. Multicultural 
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discourse was clearly now a global phenomenon that people 
associated with 'American multiculturalism'. There was a need to 
emphasise the social and historical specificity of the Australian 
variety. But what was that specificity? Going through the history 
of Australian multiculturalism, the answer is quite clear: American 
multiculturalism is solely concerned with issues of representation 
and the incorporation of the perspective of the 'other'. Australian 
multiculturalism, from the beginning, incorporated both this 
cultural pluralism perspective and, most importantly, the more 
worker-oriented, welfare state-related issues of access and equity 
(see Chapter 4). The history of the retreat of the welfare state 
in Australia is also the history of the retreat of access and 
equity multiculturalism and the growing emphasis on identity 
multiculturalism. 
Consequently, the globalisation of American multicultural 
discourse, rather than replacing existing Australian multi-
culturalism, seems to have accentuated the already existing 
tendency to make 'cultural diversity' a substitute for ' migrant 
workers' rights' instead of its complementary element. But these 
two tendencies are not just 'cultural options', devoid of political 
and economic significance. American multiculturalism is, after all, 
as many commentators have pointed out, the very ideology of 
transnational capitalism, and its rise- and the concomitant decline 
of 'workers' rights multiculturalism' -has accompanied the rise of 
neo-liberal globalisation. 
Here we come face to face with the global importance of the 
middle-class nature of identity multiculturalism. One of the most 
important cultural changes that has accompanying globalisation 
has been the increased cultural diversity of the professional and 
managerial class of capitalist corporations. Once upon a time, this 
professional and managerial class was almost exclusively white. 
Today this has changed dramatically, particularly in the pro-
fessional area. This class, though diverse in origins and 'roots', is 
unified by similar tastes and aspirations. And those managers and 
professionals from non-European backgrounds do not need 
'workers' rights' or interpreting services. They need a cultural 
recognition of the equal worthiness of their cultural roots. This is 
why their interests have been well represented in the multicultural 
struggles for 'cultural recognition' initiated on American campuses. 
When, as I argued in Chapter 1, in the face of transcendental 
capitalism, every government around the world can be heard 
begging, 'Please come here Mr Transcendental Capital, please 
... 
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invest here in my very multicultural zoo-like city, where all kinds 
of safe and domesticated otherness is available for consumption', 
governments also have this multicultural professional and 
managerial class in mind. That is why, while inviting transcendental 
capitalism to land in their aestheticised cities, they also make sure 
to say: 'I can provide your multicultural workers with the tallest 
buildings which offer unbeatable views, I can provide them with 
the grooviest coffee shops you can imagine, equipped with the latest 
Italian coffee-making machines, the best baristas and the best 
macchiatos. I will offer them the most culturally diverse culinary 
scene possible. All of this is guaranteed if you come and invest here, 
Mr. Transcendental Capital.' 
It is as part of this process that we see the decline of 'workers 
rights multiculturalism' and the rise of a neat, middle-class, 
aestheticised multiculturalism whose boundaries often do not go 
beyond the urban spheres that are of interest to the managers and 
professionals of the investing global corporation - leisure, 
entertainment and consumption. Interestingly, this aestheticisation 
does not only actively marginalise working-class concerns from 
the multicultural-zoo society. Paradoxically, or maybe not so 
paradoxically, it also reanimates some of the middle-class aesthetic 
fantasies that were, and still are, part and parcel of traditional 
colonial racism. This aesthetic class dimension of racism has 
never been made clear, to my knowledge, in the sociology and 
anthropology of racism. Analysing it is crucial today, given its 
similarity to the aesthetics of global multiculturalism. 
To be clear, I am referring here to colonial racism as the 
particular form of racism that emerged with the rise of capitalism 
in Western Europe and became part and parcel of the European 
colonial project. Its main characteristics were its relationship to 
'scientific racism' and its developmental nature. It is its nature as a 
developmental form of racism that interests me here. But to 
understand the feature I want to emphasise, we need to go through 
some of the basics first. 
As is well known, what characterises developmental racism is 
its essentialising of the presence or absence of European Whiteness 
and other popular racial markers as an explanation of the different 
levels of economic and cultural development that came to existence 
with the rise of European capitalism. Why did European society 
develop and become advanced, leaving all other societies 'behind'? 
Well, simply because European societies are inhabited by White 
Europeans who, by their very nature as White, are imbued with 
I 
I 
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superior values and superior capacities. Essentialising, to be clear, 
is a mental operation associated with classical racist thinking: if 
Jews are calculating and manipulative, this is because it is part of 
their character; they just can't help it. You are what your racial or 
cultural identity is. Your cultural or racial identity is your essence. 
So if blacks in Africa or Arabs in the Middle East have not created 
societies that are advanced (in a capitalist sense), this has more to 
do with their essential character as black people or Arab people 
(they are lazy, or slow, for example) than with the socio-historical 
and ecological conditions of social development. On the face of it, 
this doesn't have much to do with class. Yet the fact that class, and 
particularly the aesthetics of class, is an intrinsic component of this 
racism becomes very clear if we go a bit deeper into the mental 
operations that occur when people think in developmental racist 
terms. As we shall see, developmental racism works primarily by 
aestheticising the self, which is itself achieved through a middle-
class image-based aestheticisation of the 'group' one claims to 
belong to. This group/self-aesthetisisation happens when we 
make an image in our mind of 'our' people as aesthetically nice 
and pleasing. 
Let me give an example. Imagine the most traditional and basic 
racist encounter: a White European racist thinking that Indigenous 
people are lowly underdeveloped types. Let's go in a slightly more 
microscopic way into the way the racist's mind works here. What 
does s/he think? Roughly something like: 'I belong to the White 
race, made out of developed and thus superior people. The 
Aboriginal people belong to the black race, made out of under-
developed and thus inferior people.' Now when racists make such 
a statement, when they think 'I belong to the race of developed 
superior people', who exactly do they imagine in their mind as their 
'superior people'? I would think that the White people who are 
most likely to be invoked in the mind of the White racist will not 
be a group of White bikies having a shootout, or a drunken White 
guy sleeping on the bench in the park. The racists immediately 
think of what they conceive as superior beautiful people: that is, 
classy people. It is here that we reach the class-dominated 
imaginary of this kind of racism. When the racists think of 'my 
superior White people', the images that dominate their imaginary 
are of middle-class White people: clean people, spunky people, 
people who move and groove ever so well, etc, all selected 
according to the way each particular racist imagines 'classiness'. 
So this is the first step in developmental racism: the person 
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assuming superiority selects images of aesthetically pleasing groups 
of people among the 'race' that he or she is constructing and decides 
that he or she is a member of these groups. But with this process of 
selection comes another necessary process: repression. The person 
represses precisely those class images that undermine the 
aestheticised image invoked by thinking 'My people are superior 
people.' That is, racist thinking requires the suppression of the 
unpleasing images of 'underdeveloped' members of one's own 
group, a classification that has class at its very core. In Chapter 1 
I examined how, before the rise of the nation-state, the working 
classes of Europe were racialised and inferiorised as intrinsically 
unable to access a 'civilised state'. It can be argued that although 
colonial racism tried to undo this class racism in favour of other 
biological or cultural forms of racism, it is still haunted by the 
imaginary of the underdeveloped, smelly, brute working classes, 
and therefore constantly works at repressing such images. 
But this is not enough to understand the class imaginary of 
colonial racism, a racism that is still very alive and well today. For 
along with the class aestheticisation of the self comes the process 
of de-aestheticising the other, the one who is being racialised 
negatively. That is, our White colonial racists will engage in exactly 
the opposite process where Indigenous people are concerned. When 
they say that Indigenous people are a race of inferior people, they 
do not start thinking immediately of middle-class Indigenous 
people, such as Ernie Dingo and Cathy Freeman; they start thinking 
of wretched people, people sleeping on a bench in the park, etc. 
That is, they invoke and collapse the other into the very class 
images that they have banished from their definition of themselves 
and their White people. We can see now how the aesthetic im-
aginary of class is part and parcel of the way racism manages to 
create a sense of absolute racialised developmental difference. 
It is often the case that migrant communities internalise the 
principles of such a class-based imaginary. This can be clearly seen 
in Australia when an 'ethnic community' perceives itself to be on 
the defensive. For example, I have recently witnessed a number of 
Lebanese community meetings when certain 'community members' 
or 'leaders' begin invoking images of class in reaction to what they 
perceive as demeaning racist practices or pronouncements by the 
media and the politicians. Inevitably someone from the audience 
emerges to say, 'Don't they know how many Lebanese-Australians 
are doctors, lawyers, academics' This valorisation of middle 
classness is performed before an audience of largely working-class 
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people who all seem to be in agreement about the need to devalorise 
their own life experiences in Australia. Their unity as a community 
becomes constructed around collective petit-bourgeois dreams of 
upward social mobility rather than around a valorisation of the 
labour and the struggles they have endured - and continue to 
endure - as working-class Australians. 
This 'class imaginary' of the ethnic community is hardly new, 
of course. It is part and parcel of the make-up of 'migrant 
communities' as a class construction in the postwar history of 
Australia. 1 This is why, paradoxically, the very same 'migrant 
communities' that struggled for the emergence of a 'workers' rights 
multiculturalism' also provided a solid basis for its ideological 
eradication in the era of transcendental capitalism. This process is 
perhaps most advanced today within the Asian community. 
As with every other 'ethnic community', global multicultur-
alism's promotion of a highly racialised and class-aestheticised 
image of the Asian has led to an increased repression of the image 
of working-class Asians, who remain a majority of Asians in 
Australia. What is different for 'Asians', however, is that a 
developmental racism similar to the White colonial racism of the 
past is emerging within the regions of rapidly developing Asian 
capitalism. This racism is expressing itself within the discourse on 
'Asian values'. Although it is not synonymous with it, there is no 
doubt that within this discourse some are beginning to see Asian 
development as caused by 'Asian values'. Once again, we have the 
same essentialised logic that is specific to developmental racism: if 
Asians have developed economically it is because there is something 
about Asians and the Asian character that is lacking in other people 
(such as Africans or Arabs). This is further racialised when only 
people from Asian background are perceived as able to possess and 
understand 'Asian values'. This kind of racist thinking is not only 
used to distinguish between 'Asians' and others; it is also used to 
mark out various people in Asia who are seen - on the basis of 
religious affiliation, for example - as more or less inclined towards 
having and sticking to 'Asian values'. 
I don't think, of course, that the very idea of 'Asian values' is 
useless. Societies set values for themselves, and even if 'Asian 
values' or 'Australian values' often have a somewhat unrealistic 
and mythical character, they nevertheless play an important role 
in creating an ethico-political climate within society. It is when such 
values are essentialised and used to discriminate against people 
who are seen to be naturally unable to be committed to them that 
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such values become the ground of racist thinking, racist practices 
and racist institutions. It is because of this that there has been an 
increasing complicity between Asian developmental racism and 
global multiculturalism in highlighting images of the Asian as a 
spunky mediatic ideal,2 a classy investor, hardworking and clean-
cut, and repressing the image of the working-class or the underclass 
Asian. Interestingly, anti-Asian racism in Australia directed at 
both the middle class and the working class is complicit with 
developmental racism in its denigration of working-class ethnicity. 
The difference is that anti-Asian racism makes working-class 
ethnicity visible, while global multiculturalism wants to render 
it invisible. 
Nasty things that migrants do 
It is perhaps ironic that postcolonial theorisations of migration 
seem to inadvertently encourage the very 'neatness' of migrants 
encountered in this class-aestheticised realm. Can migrants do 
anything wrong? Are there such things as nasty migrants? You 
wouldn't think so if you read a certain type of postcolonial 
literature. I am hoping to publish a little booklet one day (maybe 
even a big one), with the title: Nasty Things that Migrants Do (even 
when they are hybrid and in between). For the time being I'll just 
conclude with a little section dealing with a simple question that 
brings to the fore one little nasty thing that migrants can do: Can 
migrants be racist? 
Such a question sometimes appears provocative (within the 
dominant literature of neat 'anti-racism'), even though asking it is 
like asking, 'Are migrants human?' Of course there are political 
ramifications to asking such a question at a time when some 
migrants in Australia are subjected to various forms of exclu-
sionary discourses and practices. Inquiring about whether Arabs, 
Muslims or Asians or Indigenous people are racist can easily lead 
others to think that one has joined those White racists who try to 
minimise the importance of their own racism through that 
wonderful 'competitive racism'-type discourse that we often 
encounter in the Australian public sphere: the 'they are more racist 
than, or just as racist as, we are and therefore we can be as racist 
as we like' variety. 
But let us take this question seriously and try and reflect on the 
very reasons that make it 'provocative' or even unpleasant to our 
ears. To bring out what is at stake here, let us first ask the ultimate 
in this form of questioning: 'Are Australia's Indigenous people 
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racist? ' The reason why such a question appears distasteful, even 
immoral, is quite obvious. What are we to make of a situation when 
- knowing about the horrific colonial genocidal acts perpetrated 
against Australia's Indigenous people, knowing about the 
continuing structural racism they are still subjected to, knowing 
the effect this continues to have on their lifestyles and knowing 
about the racist behaviour, subtle and unsubtle, which they still face 
in their daily lives - our mind wanders into a question such as 'Are 
Aboriginal people racist?' It is like asking 'Were the Jews living 
inside Auschwitz racists?' It is not just that the question's timing 
would be immoral; a 'yes' answer to it would also feel immoral. A 
'yes' to these two questions is, for any reasonably sensitive and 
sensible person, unthinkable. An 'unthinkability' of the same kind, 
but not of the same degree, accompanies the questions 'Are 
Asians racist?' or 'Are Muslims racists?' in Australia.3 It is this 
'unthinkability', and the assumptions that underlie it about what 
racism is, that I want to examine here. 
The usage of binary oppositions in the process of categorising 
and classifying our experience is something well known to 
anthropologists. Of these binaries, no pair has been as prominent 
as the moral categories good and evil. Our minds work in such a 
way as to make these categories clearly demarcated, mutually 
exclusive, and always in a state of confrontation. When evil is at 
work, its opposite is always good. Something quite similar occurs 
when we are confronted with the experience of those who are 
subjected to racism. For those of us who see racism as evil, our 
impulse is to immediately locate the good in whoever is being 
subjected to it. The poor black man is subjected to the evil racist 
white man. The poor black man immediately becomes the reposi-
tory of innocence, passivity and goodness. This is the basis of a 
form of moralising anti-racist discourse in Australia. The one that 
makes us unable to think the 'yes' when confronted with the 
question, 'Are Afghani asylum seekers racists?' Such asylum 
seekers, like Aboriginal people and other Muslim or Asian 
migrants, are 'subjected' to racism, are subjected to evil, so of 
course they cannot be, at the same time, the perpetrators of racism, 
the perpetrators of evil. That is why we are often invited to think 
that evil, when it comes to racism, is White. 
This kind of reasoning is clearly illogical, and yet we find 
ourselves attracted to it sometimes, despite ourselves. Why should 
the victims of racism be any more or less racist than the 
perpetrators? Why should they be seen as the repository of higher 
r 
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moral values? Indeed, both logic and history, as well as present 
events in the world, clearly show that this simply cannot be the 
case. There is no reason why those subjected to racism of the worst 
kind cannot be racist themselves. Being subjected to the Holocaust 
did not stop some Jews from exterminating Palestinians, and one 
has to be quite disingenuous to locate 'the good' in the Palestinian 
people because of their current colonial experience. It is well known 
that when the UN forces arrived in Kosovo in the aftermath of the 
Serbian wars of ethnic cleansing, many Muslim Kosovars who had 
been the victims of Serbian ethnic exterminators were immediately 
transformed into ethnic exterminators themselves. There is no 
reason to think that at the very time when they were being 
subjected to ethnic cleansing by the Serbs they weren't harbouring 
fantasies of ethnic cleansing against those very Serbs, and maybe 
against others as well. The fact that some Serb groups engaged in 
ethnic cleansing does not in itself make the Serbs more or less 
morally bankrupt than the Muslim Kosovars, nor does it make the 
latter morally superior. The question of who had the power to 
activate their racist fantasies of extermination is what is crucial. 
Of course fantasies of extermination are very specific forms of 
racism that are not necessarily implied by every form of racist 
behaviour. But the above example does lead us to consider the role 
of power and how it becomes marginalised in the moralistic 
confrontation I have just described. For it is precisely here, in a 
confusion between racism as a morally reprehensible attitude and 
racism as a power to discriminate, that we can find the roots of the 
unease that we experience with a question such as 'Can migrants 
be racists?' 
Racism as an attitude, as a way of thinking about, conceiving 
and relating to people that we define negatively as a cultural group 
(blacks, Anglos, Asians, Muslims, Americans, for example), is 
hardly the monopoly of one group or another. It can be safely said 
that ethnic or national groups with similar social and historical 
backgrounds will have a similar range of racist views within their 
populations. Different historical experiences will lead to different 
modes of exhibiting such racism, but one can be sure that it will 
exist. In my research I have encountered many instances of racism 
towards Anglo-Australians by Lebanese-, Greek-, Vietnamese-
and Chinese-background Australians and visitors: 'Australians 
(meaning Anglo-Australians) are dirty', 'Australians do not open 
their houses to let fresh air in', 'Australians leave their children on 
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though!), and even the always-useful-for-an-insult 'convict stock' 
bit. I have also witnessed among these very communities some of 
the ugliest colonial forms of racial stereotyping of Indigenous 
people. I can confidently say, and I am sure this will not come as a 
major surprise for most people, that Asian migrants and Muslim 
migrants in Australia, like everyone else, are racists in this 
important sense. The question that then emerges is: why do we 
always concentrate on White racism, and is it fair to do so? 
Clearly, White racism is the most important form of racism 
in Australia exactly because of the power dimension we have 
raised above. Greek people can be racist, Aboriginal people can be 
racist, but their power to activate their racism and use it for 
discriminatory purposes is not the same as the power that some 
Anglo-Australians have. Furthermore, White racism is entrenched 
in the very make-up of Australian institutions - other racisms 
remain individualised and scattered. But let us be clear about this. 
This does not mean that migrant and other forms of racisms exist 
in a power vacuum. Asian business owners have power within the 
spaces of their businesses, and can use this power to discriminate 
against their employees if they are so inclined. I know of several 
cases of Lebanese small-businessmen who have reportedly 
discriminated against Anglo-Australians by refusing to consider 
them for a job and preferring Lebanese employees. Migrant 
working-class kids can also develop a micro spatial power within 
their neighbourhoods or their schools and can use this to dis-
criminate against other people. However, regardless of these micro-
s paces, the salient point is that the macro Australian public/ 
national space remains a space where Whiteness gives one most 
power to discriminate. 
As I hope I have shown here, raising a question such as 'Can 
migrants be racist?', even if it initially appears anti-migrant, allows 
us some important political and analytical insights into the nature 
of racism in Australia. First, it makes us realise that the primacy of 
White racism is based on a political critique, not a moral critique, 
of White people. This is an important message to carry to a White 
Australian population suffering from neo-liberal policy-inflicted 
paranoia. White Australians are not the repository of evil while all 
of us who are non-Whites are wonderfully virtuous. Although this 
might be logically obvious when speaking about it calmly, it is also 
a fact that the accusations of racism and the reactions to such 
accusations are often made with such moralistic assumptions in 
mind. Secondly, such a question is useful because it forces us to 
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recognise the importance of directing anti-racist campaigns 
towards non-White communities just as much as towards White 
communities. Often some very vile racism flourishes in spaces that 
are seen not to be in need of an anti-racist ethos because they are 
subjected to White racism. 
In today's claustrophobic national culture it would be easy for 
'ethnic communities' who perceive themselves as 'under attack' to 
duplicate the paranoid communalism prevalent within the nation 
and retreat into a defensive multiculturalism which sees any 
critique of 'one's ethnic community' as a threat. To counteract such 
an impulse, which might seem a natural one, I would suggest that 
a reflexive critical attitude towards sub-national communal 
formations can play an important role in combating the dominant 
paranoia. It maintains the possibility of a community open to inter-
cultural interaction despite the bunkered mentality propagated by 
the national state. 
CHAPTER 8 
Exighophobia/homoiophobia: 
'Comes a time we are all enthusiasm' 
Talking suicide bombers in the West, a polemic 
In the days that followed the Israeli army's reinvasion of the West 
Bank in March 2002 and the resultant destruction of the embryonic 
elements of a sovereign Palestinian society, I, like many, sat in my 
office fuming, emailing depressed friends and colleagues to express 
our helplessness and despair at the unbelievable injustice of it all. 
Besides the death and devastation, most depressing perhaps was 
the mediatic normalisation of the very idea of a nation's military 
rampaging virtually unopposed - like Genghis Khan in tanks -
through another nation's cities and towns, levelling entire streets, 
destroying houses, libraries, and so forth. It was for all of us an 
absurdly anachronistic form of violence: a medieval mode of 
warfare outfitted in modern technology. I took it upon myself to 
send Arab, Jewish and other concerned friends an email trying to 
think through the nature and ramifications of this violence. 
While addressing the Israeli government's use of Palestinian 
suicide bombers (hereafter PSBs) as an excuse for transforming 
cities into rubble, I pointed out that, to a large degree, the Israeli 
government shared with the suicide bombers a lack of concern 
with the actual humanity of the people they murdered in the course 
of the conflict. In a communal 'us' versus 'them' logic, the de-
humanising gaze that sees 'them' as a non-differentiated entity 
(Israel/the Palestinians), abstracted from the particular human 
beings that constituted it, is often accompanied by an equally self-
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dehumanising, abstracted vision of 'us'. I knew very well from my 
experience of the Lebanese civil war, as both a participant and a 
student, that when a logic of communal war prevails, neither of 
the warring sides really cares for the actual material human-being-
ness of the situation. More 'important' things, such as 'com-
munities' and 'nations' are at stake. I argued in my email that given 
the prevalence of that logic, 'the bombs of Hamas against civilians 
might outrage the humanists among us for being precisely that: 
bombs against civilians', but what was more important for the 
Israeli colonialist government was that these bombs showed the 
Israeli 'us' to be vulnerable, which was also what the suicide 
bombers were trying to demonstrate. 1 
The day after I sent my email, I was surprised to receive a long 
rebuke from a colleague on the Jewish left. In his email he informed 
me that he was 'sad to see that these days scholars speak in 
strangely brutal language. This does no credit either to them or to 
the human causes they espouse.' I thought this was a bit over the 
top, but nothing prepared me for the end of the text, where he said 
that he could not: 
join in common cause with people who endorse this horrendous 
path of voluptuously violent martyrdom. I don't really want to stand 
alongside anybody who cheers other people, young people, along 
that appalling path without being prepared to follow it themselves 
... I cannot respect the political sensibilities and moral judgment of 
people who indulge, from positions of comfortable impunity, in this 
unbecoming kind of vicarious bravery - which is really a form of 
bad faith and moral cowardice. 
The moralising nature of the reply took me aback. I could not 
believe that I had become someone who endorsed the 'horrendous 
path of voluptuously violent martyrdom', someone faced with 
either exploding himself in Palestine or acknowledging his moral 
cowardice. I imagined myself 'exploding' and smiled at the 
headline: 'After the first woman Islamic suicide bomber comes the 
first Christian Lebanese Islamic suicide bomber.' I imagined the 
faces of my parents, relatives and friends, with whom, as a good 
Maronite, I learnt how to hate all Arabs, particularly Muslims, and 
even more particularly Palestinians. I imagined my parents as they 
faced neighbours giving them the 'your Lebanese Christian son is 
really a Palestinian Islamic suicide bomber!' look, and how surreal 
it would have all been ... comic relief in sad times of war. 
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More seriously, I wondered how my matter-of-factly stated 
observation about the political imaginaries behind suicide 
bombing, regardless of whether one agreed with it, had been 
transformed into support - or lack thereof - for 'voluptuous 
martyrdom'. It was as if the moral neutrality of my statement was 
itself self-condemnatory. 
Indeed, as I was later informed by a mutual friend, my colleague 
felt that the real issue was whether or not I 'absolutely condemn' 
suicide bombers. Apparently it is crucial to 'absolutely condemn' 
suicide bombers if you are going to talk about them; otherwise you 
become a morally suspicious person. This immediately raised an 
issue for me. As I had only mentioned suicide bombing in relation 
to what I thought were the inhumane acts of violence Israel was 
perpetrating through its reoccupation of the West Bank, I won-
dered why it was that suicide bombing could not be talked about 
without being condemned first. After all, we can sit and analyse in 
a cool manner Israel's formidably violent colonial invasion with-
out feeling that 'absolute' moral condemnation should be a 
precondition of such a discussion (or a substitute for uttering an 
opinion about it). To my mind, both the Israeli invasion and the 
suicide bombings constitute a kind of warped postmodern pastiche 
of medievally violent political affects, early modern veneration of 
political entities such as 'the nation', and late modern military 
technology. The fact that my colleague decided that only 'suicide 
bombing' is necessarily a moral issue raised questions about the 
assumptions implicit in our categorisation of violence and about 
their significance in shaping our political and analytical judgement. 
The polemic also raised the issue of the political nature of the 
'condemnation imperative' and its significance for academic 
practices in the social sciences. 
It is clearly the case that in the Western public sphere the 
'condemnation imperative' operates as a mode of censoring 
attempts to provide a sociological explanation for why PSBs act 
the way they do. It is difficult to express any form of understanding 
whatsoever, even when one is indeed also condemning the practices 
of PSBs. Only unqualified condemnation will do. And if one tries 
to understand, any accompanying condemnation is deemed 
suspicious. A number of public figures have expressed some form 
of 'understanding' of suicide bombers (often linking their 
emergence to the absence of hope among Palestinian teenagers), 
only to be forced to apologise for voicing such views; the most 
publicised cases were those of Ted Turner, the former owner of 
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CNN, and Cherie Blair, the wife of the British Prime Minister. 
There is a clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings.2 
But leaving aside the political nature and the moral pros and 
cons of this censorship in the public sphere, one would think that 
a university is still a place where people make a living out of 
'understanding' as opposed to condemning. I am certainly more 
comfortable with 'absolutely condemning' the living conditions 
that make people into suicide bombers than absolutely condemning 
suicide bombers as such. And I like to think that it is the social 
scientist in me that makes me feel this way. By raising the issue of 
'absolute condemnation', my colleague seemed to be casting Ariel 
Sharon and George Bush's shadow over the university: 'nothing 
ever justifies a suicide bombing'. In this climate, how might an 
academic, located in the West, attempt to understand why suicide 
bombers do what they do? 
Initially, I tried to formulate this question by separating the 
issues of condemnation and explanation. I began by asking: Can 
one talk about suicide bombers by concentrating on explanation, 
leaving condemnation aside without this being seen as a form of 
'justification'? I soon realised that I could not ignore the specifi-
city of my location in the West. How could I, in the seclusion of 
academia, try to understand suicide bombing without taking into 
consideration the fact that such an understanding would conflict 
with certain political interests? What was needed was an attempt 
to understand both suicide bombers and the public impulse for a 
categorical condemnation of them. 
Talking suicide bombers in the West: a lecture 
As a testing ground for my initial question - Can one understand 
suicide bombers? - I used a seminar with some of my senior 
students to try to imagine what an anthropology of the practice of 
suicide bombing might be like. Primary sources consisted of a 
number of conversations I had with Palestinians in Australia; 
secondary material was the body of available literature on suicide 
bombing. I began the seminar with the following brief definition 
of the phenomenon - which made a number of my students 
visibly agitated. 
Palestinian suicide bombings are acts of violence directed against 
the Jewish colonisers of Palestine and their descendants in Israel 
and the occupied territories, who are seen as continuing the 
colonial enterprise. Anti-colonial struggles have almost always 
involved forms of violent resistance on the part of the colonised.3 
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What makes PSBs an uncommon phenomenon and an object of 
strong condemnation in the West is, above all, that their violence 
is often, though not always, directed at civilians. The PSBs disrupt 
the ability of the colonisers to consolidate a 'normal peaceful life' 
inside the colonial settler state of Israel. As such the PSBs do not 
respect the Israeli coloniser's division of labour - between the 
military, who engage in protecting and facilitating the process of 
colonisation, and the civilian population, who can peacefully enjoy 
the fruits of this process. Furthermore, the practice is condemned 
and considered socially pathological because it involves what 
anthropologists call self-sacrifice on the part of the perpetrators. 
The most obvious aspect of the PSB phenomenon is that it is 
a social fact in the Durkheimian sense of the word 'social'. It is a 
social tendency emanating from colonised Palestinian society, and 
as such it can be explained only as the product of specific social 
conditions, not as an individual psychological aberration. There 
is, of course, very little research, let alone statistical data, that can 
be obtained on the phenomenon. The Washington Post journalist 
Daniel Williams, in an article on the woman suicide bomber 
Abu Aisheh, estimates that there were 59 acts of suicide bombing 
in the first 18 months of the second Intifada. Williams also notes 
that 'the pool of potential bombers seems far from exhausted 
among despairing, hostile youths of Abu Aisheh's generation'.4 A 
Ha'aretz article reports on research conducted by Fadal Abu-Hin, 
a psychology lecturer at Al-Aqsa University in Palestine: 
In April 2001, Abu-Hin conducted a research study among 1,000 
young Gaza Strip Palestinians, aged 9 to 16. According to the results 
he published, over 40 percent of the respondents said that they were 
actively involved in the Intifada. Over 70 percent said that they 
wanted to be martyrs. 'If I were to carry out the same study today,' 
says Abu-Hin, 'I am sure the figures would be even higher,' adding 
that he believes that similar figures would be found on the 
West Bank.'5 
This notion of a 'pool of potential bombers' reminds us of the 
need to differentiate between the presence of a social disposition 
towards sacrificing the self {the pool) and the actual practice of 
sacrificing the self. These are just two of many strands that an 
anthropology of PSBs would need to untangle. 
An anthropology of the practice of suicide bombing is of course 
a highly unlikely endeavour. It would require the anthropologist 
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to go into the technical and institutional processes of the practice 
and would involve fieldwork within such organisations as Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad. Nevertheless, theorising about what this 
anthropology might involve can provide us with a more complete 
sense of the phenomenon and what it entails. 
Understanding suicide bombing as a social practice requires first 
of all an examination of the processes of recruitment, including 
the structure of the organisations and their recruiting and selec-
tion methods. As was made clear in press reports following the 
emergence of women suicide bombers, and then of 'under-age' 
uicide bombers, these organisations do not always agree about the 
social prerequisites of membership. They do agree, however, in 
their opposition to a laissez-faire suicide bombing, and their 
primary method of eliminating this possibility is by monopolising 
the manufacture and availability of the explosives used in these 
acts. But these organisations are also in competition over members; 
each bombing produces a form of symbolic anti-colonial capital 
that in turn attracts more members. A higher number of bombers 
and of successful bombings also invites further support from those 
behind the financing of such operations. To be sure, this is not a 
market situation where a person emerges from the pool of potential 
bombers and then proceeds to choose the organisation she or he 
wants. It is more likely that these organisations play an active role 
in the formation of the pool; they might have special relations of 
care, kinship, friendship or patronage with potential bombers, 
perhaps even before they become potential bombers. 
An anthropology of PSBs would also examine the technology 
of violence used in suicide bombings: manufacturing, distribution, 
and modes of training; the art of handling, wearing and detonat-
ing explosives; how to infiltrate Israeli territory, what networks of 
infiltration exist, and the art of passing as a Jew; how to target and 
approach one's target; the art of staying cool as the time for 
detonating the explosives approaches; and so on. It is likely that 
this whole process is grounded in an exceptionally masculine 
culture, and this too needs to be examined. 
As mentioned above, the anthropologist is unlikely to have 
access to this kind of information; it is the reserve of the recruiting 
organisations themselves and the various secret service agencies 
that might have succeeded in infiltrating them. Yet we have already 
begun to confront the nature of the violence perpetrated by the 
PSBs. Is it terrorism? What does 'terrorism' mean? This is an 
issue that the anthropologist needs to clarify before he or she 
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can understand the nature of the phenomenon being analysed. 
What is meant by 'terrorism' has never been very clear. Through 
its intensive strategic usage on the political market by the media 
and politicians, it has become further loaded with ideological 
assumptions. From what I have read so far, it seems, unfortunately, 
that many analysts have added more confusion to the concept 
as they have struggled with a definition. No author, for instance, 
has made it clear whether he or she is undertaking an analysis 
of terrorism as such or of terrorist organisations. To my mind, 
terrorism is clearly a form of political violence. Terrorist organi-
sations, on the other hand, are groups for whom terrorism is a core 
political practice. Thus it is unsatisfactory when analysts who claim 
to be studying terrorism (a form of violence) concentrate solely on 
terrorist organisations, as if they have a monopoly over this form 
of violence.6 But the terrorists and their intellectual sympathisers' 
claims that the state (whether it is a colonial state or not) is a 
'terrorist' organisation are also analytically unhelpful.7 
Two clarifying remarks have to be made. First, if a state uses 
terrorism, that does not make it a terrorist organisation. Terrorist 
organisations are groups that rely solely, or mostly, on violence to 
attain their political objectives. States might use terrorism as an 
element that helps them maintain power, but it is unlikely that they 
would rely on it exclusively or mainly. Second, some go as far as 
describing any coercive aspect of the state as terrorism. Accusa-
tions of that sort used to be commonly made against capitalist 
states by such groups as the Red Brigade and the Baader-Meinhof 
gang.8 It should be made clear that although the coercive aspect of 
the capitalist state is by no means unimportant and might include 
terrorism in certain cases, it is incorrect to equate any form of 
coerciveness with terrorism. Terrorism is a violence that directly 
aims to kill and destroy, even when its ultimate aim is to exert a 
form of 'psychological violence'. 
So I think it is somewhat pretentious (not to mention insensitive) 
to deny that someone who blows himself up in the middle of a 
teenage disco, murdering young people and wreaking havoc, is a 
terrorist. On the other hand, we need to question the way we are 
invited to uncritically think of a particular form of violence as being 
'the worst possible kind of violence' just by merely classifying it as 
'terrorist'. Mark Twain's description of postrevolutionary France 
in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court holds true for 
many political ·realities throughout history: 
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There were two 'Reigns of Terror,' if we would but remember and 
consider it; the one wrought murder in hot passions, the other in 
heartless cold blood ... the one inflicted death upon a thousand 
persons, the other upon a hundred million; but our shudders are all 
for the 'horrors' of minor Terror .. . A city cemetery could contain 
the coffins filled by that brief Terror ... but all France could hardly 
contain the coffins filled by that older and real Terror ... which none 
of us has been taught to see in its vastness or pity as it deserved.9 
Twain's 'none of us have been taught to see' points to perhaps 
the most important aspect of the classification 'terrorist': it involves 
a form of symbolic violence that forces us to normalise certain 
forms of violence and pathologise others.10 This is an invitation to 
the social analyst to think of terrorism as part of the struggle 
between states and opposing groups: first, over the distribution of 
means of violence, and second, and more importantly, over the 
classification of the forms of violence in the world, particularly of 
what constitutes legitimate violence. 
Terrorism is not the worst kind of violence that humans are 
capable of. The 59 suicide bombings of the first 18 months of the 
second Intifada have killed 125 Israelis. Compared with the 
violence the Israelis have inflicted on the Palestinians before the 
recent murderous invasion of the West Bank, let alone after, suicide 
bombings represent a minimal form of violence in Israel and 
Palestine today in terms of the number of deaths they cause, the 
psychological damage they inflict on people, and the damage to 
property they bring about. The fact that we approach suicide 
bombing with such trepidation - as opposed to the way we 
approach the violence of colonial domination, for example - is an 
indication of the symbolic violence that continues to shape our 
understanding of what constitutes ethically and politically 
illegitimate violence. Indeed, the fact that terrorist groups never 
classify themselves as terrorists, instead calling themselves revo-
1 utionaries, martyrs, nationalists or freedom fighters, is an 
indication of the depth of this symbolic violence. If we accept a 
less morally outraged and more empirical conception of terrorism 
- as a form of violence specific to a mode of distribution of the 
means of violence - there is no necessary contradiction between 
martyr or freedom fighter and terrorist. This does not make 
terrorist violence less condemnable for those who want to condemn 
violence; it does, however, make us question why it is terrorist 
violence that is always at the centre of a condemnation/non-
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condemnation problematic and not other, relatively more lethal 
forms of violence. This is especially so when terrorist violence is 
considered affectively 'theirs' by a majority of the population from 
which the terrorists emerge. This is different from the violence of 
the self-styled radical groups of the 1960s, such as the Japanese 
Red Brigade or the American Weathermen, who were affectively 
almost on their own when they engaged in violence. 
For the many Arabs who invest a lot of political affect into the 
Palestinian struggle, terrorist violence is a violence of last resort. 
As a Palestinian Australian put it to me: 'Let the Americans give us 
the monopoly over nuclear power in the region and the strongest 
army there is and we are happy to do "incursions" and hunt down 
wanted Israeli terrorists by demolishing their houses and 
"accidentally" killing civilians. Who would want to be a suicide 
bomber if such a luxurious mode of fighting is available to us. 
You can kill more Israelis and the world will think you are 
more civilised!' Suicide bombings are seen here as a marriage 
between the necessity for resistance and a state of quantitative and 
qualitative military hardware deprivation. 
It is this logic of necessity that is also emphasised by Michael 
Neuman, a professor of philosophy at Trent University in Ontario. 
In a piece widely circulated on the Internet, he argues that he sees 
no moral problem in the Palestinians' deliberate killing of civilians. 
Using as an example the Native Americans' deliberate killing of 
white children during their resistance to colonisation, he argues 
that sometimes, even certain acts that are terrible and cruel can 
be justified. The American Indians, he points out, had their 
very existence as people threatened, and in such a situation, 
'every single white person, down to the children, was an enemy'. 
They were 'doomed without resistance' and therefore, 'they 
had no alternative'. For Neuman, the Palestinians are facing a 
similar situation: 
Like the Indians, the Palestinians have nowhere to go ... Like the 
Indians, the Palestinians have not the slightest chance of injuring, 
let alone defeating Israel through conventional military tactics. Like 
the whites, every single Israeli Jew, down to and including the 
children are instruments wielded against the Palestinian people. 
The Palestinians don't set out to massacre children, that is, they 
don't target daycare centers. They merely hit soft targets, and this 
sometimes involves the death of children. But, like anyone, they will 
kill children to prevent the destruction of their society ... And if the 
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only effective way of stopping their mortal enemies involved 
targeting daycare centers, that would be justified too. No people 
would do anything less to see they did not vanish from the face of 
the earth. 11 
This text clearly speaks to the logic embedded in the way Israelis 
and Palestinians approach each other today. Many consider the 
imbalance of power - Israeli might and strength versus the 
Palestinians' struggle to survive - as a sufficient explanation of 
the suicide bombers' actions. This is definitely how many people 
in the Arab world, sitting in their lounge rooms watching the 
news, see it: a real gladiator show featuring the Israeli Goliath 
and the Palestinian David, inspiring, of course, a total affective 
identification with the latter. In this unequal struggle, the 
Palestinians are always imagined on the verge of being squashed, 
and with them all the Arab masses' aspirations of a dignified life. 
The suicide bombers become a sign that the Palestinians have not 
been broken. They are a sign of life. For what better sign of life is 
there, in such violent conditions, than the capacity to hurt despite 
the greater capacity of the other to hurt you? 
Violence here has no other function than to symbolise the 
survival of a Palestinian will. There is no room for Fanon's lyrical 
'Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence 
organised and educated by the people's leaders, makes it possible 
for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to 
them.' 12 Indeed it could be argued that suicide bombings are 
inherently antidemocratic practices in that they elevate the 
militancy of the few and encourage the passivity of the majority, 
rather than their participation. As such they reflect the absence of 
democratic institutions within Palestinian society (whether or not 
they are possible in a colonial situation is another question). There 
are echoes here of the great Marxist debates between the 
Trotskyites and others about the role of violence and terrorism in 
bringing about revolutionary change. 13 Unfortunately, again 
because of the absence of democratic institutions, no such debates 
have emerged within Palestinian society. 14 
From an explanatory point of view, however, Neuman's 
Hobbesian, state-of-nature analysis falls short. It risks normalising 
the situation rather than recognising it as the product of a non-
via ble political framework, one in which Palestinians have 
continued to experience a sense of being assaulted (the continued 
expansion of settlements, people arrested or humiliated, etc). It 
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is only because of the failure of the political that such a 'state of 
nature' becomes the cultural norm, and violence emerges as a 
genuine and apparently reasonable possibility. As David Held 
lucidly wrote in an article that appeared just after the attacks of 
11 September: 
The news (in October 2001) of an increasingly intense pattern of 
extra-judicial, outlaw killings (organized, targeted murders) on both 
sides of the Israeli-Palestine conflict compounds anxieties of the 
breakdown of the rule of law, nationally and internationally. This 
way only leads one way; that is toward Hobbes's state of nature: 
the 'warre of every one against every one' - life as 'solitary, poore, 
brutish, and short.' 15 
That one can come to consider such a 'brutish' state of affairs a 
norm is a sad indication of how far the situation has moved from 
the logic of political negotiations and solutions. 
The PSBs' 11/usio 
It is possible from what has been examined so far, and from an 
understanding of the daily horrors, humiliations and degradations 
that constitute colonised Palestinian society, to present an 
explanation of how some Palestinians develop, in turn, a 'brutish', 
dehumanised abstract conception of Israeli human beings, a 
conception that facilitates the task of committing mass murder 
without any sense of guilt. 16 More difficult to explain, however, is 
the suicide component of Palestinian suicide bombing. Why have 
young people embraced the culture of 'martyrdom'? To begin to 
answer this question, we need to try to understand what kind of 
suicide suicide bombing involves. Starting with Emile Durkheim's 
conceptions of egoistic and altruistic suicide, we would note that 
PSBs do not really fit either of these categories, though they have a 
stronger likeness to the latter. 17 
In a forward to a study initiated in the late 1990s, focusing on 
suicide and attempted suicide among Palestinians living on the 
West Bank, Rita Giacaman, a professor of public health at Bir Zeit 
University, noted the existence of 'chronic protracted stress, 
emanating out of poverty, oppression and a sense of powerlessness 
brought about by war'. She adds, however: 'Despite these 
seemingly harsh conditions, the author found surprisingly low 
levels of suicide and attempted suicide, even when taking into 
account undocumented cases, and certainly much lower than the 
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levels in industrialised societies ... Although this study focused on 
those who are unable to cope, in fact, it spoke forcefully of the 
resilience and internal strength of the rest of the population.'18 
Clearly, the conditions of occupation lead to strong forms of 
communal solidarity and interdependence, and thus make egoistic 
suicide unlikely. Giacaman points out that during the first 18 
months of the second Intifada (before the Israeli invasion): 
[The] escalation of army violence, excessive use of force, siege 
conditions, destruction of infrastructure and economy and the 
shelling and bombardment of civilian areas, including partial 
periodic re-occupation by the Israeli army, the loss of lives - over 
1000 martyrs to date, mostly young men - and the serious 
disabilities resulting from injury are only some of the characteristics 
of daily life. Yet ... communal support is at its peak and is provided 
in every way: families house other families whose homes are 
destroyed; houses damaged by shelling and bombing are fixed with 
the speed of light compared to the normal local standards; and 
resources, although very scarce, are shared in unprecedented 
proportions. 
This does not make clear, though, whether or not the suicidal 
tendencies of the PSBs are the result of too much communal 
solidarity in a warring situation, which leads to a lessening of the 
sense of individuality among Palestinian youth. These are the 
conditions of what Durkheim calls altruistic suicide. This term may 
partially describe the Palestinian case, but it misses a crucial aspect: 
the youth culture from which the PSBs emerge, particularly in the 
Palestinian refugee camps, is not only conducive to solidarity; it is 
also highly masculine and highly competitive. That is, even when 
struggling 'in the name of the community', Palestinian youth do 
not lose their sense of individuality. They engage in a form of 
competition for symbolic capital: the surreal practice of throwing 
stones at the coloniser's tanks in the streets. In this field, the courage 
to face the tank, cop the rubber bullet and risk death gives an 
individual youth the highest cultural capital possible, and ends in 
a heroic consecration of the youth, whether he is alive or dead. 
There is already a suicidal tendency at work in this practice, well 
before its 'flowering' in the form of suicide bombing. But this is 
not all. Such practices also point to one of the core paradoxes that 
constitute suicide bombings. They are at the same time acts that 
aim to put the self in danger of annihilation and acts that seek to 
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accumulate personal status and boost self-esteem. A traditional 
conception of suicide as a desire to self-destruct and a lack of 
interest in living a meaningful life is particularly unsuited to explain 
such a phenomenon. 
In an astonishingly ethnocentric piece analysing the relationship 
between globalisation and terrorism, driven by its final punchline 
- 'one of the most ancient rituals of our species, human sacrifice, 
has also succumbed to globalisation' - leading German intellectual 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger constructs a kind of McDonald's 
Terrorism Burger, with the same ingredients and taste around the 
globe. According to Enzensberger, 'practically all terrorist activities 
have one characteristic in common that is hard to overlook: the 
protagonists' self-destructive tendencies'. Yet, he argues, 
the West has persistently underestimated the power of this collective 
craving for self-mutilation, not to say suicide. As it is apparently 
not sufficient for us to reflect on our own recent past in order to 
throw a little more light on the seemingly incomprehensible, it is 
perhaps necessary to risk a heuristic comparison with phenomena 
closer to home. A consideration of some aspects of our so-called 
highly developed societies quickly reveals how widespread is the 
desire for a personal Armageddon: drug addicts and skinheads 
deliberately deprive themselves of any opportunity to make 
something of their lives, and daily we hear reports of 'family 
tragedies' and gunmen going on the rampage ... In all such cases 
the motives for self-destruction are secondary, and often the 
perpetrators themselves cannot articulate them.19 
It is somewhat ironic to speak simultaneously of PSBs and talk 
about people 'deliberately depriv[ing] themselves any opportunity 
to make something of their lives', since one of the key features of 
Palestinian society today is precisely the social unavailability of any 
opportunity to make something of one's life. This is particularly 
the case in the refugee camps from which most of the suicide 
bombers emerge. This is one of the most important factors that we 
need to consider when trying to understand the emergence of the 
PSBs. It is also a key factor in explaining the paradox referred to 
above: of a self aiming to abolish itself and seek self-esteem in the 
same act. 
Pierre Bourdieu's idea that society is primarily a mechanism 
for the generation of meanings for life, which I examined in 
Chapter 1, is of immense importance here. Bourdieu sees society 
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as distributing opportunities for people to 'make a life for them-
selves', to invest themselves in life, what he calls illusio:20 the 
deep belief in the importance of our life pursuits. In the popular 
conception of suicide reproduced by Enzensberger, life is full of 
meaningful offerings, and suicide is the rejection of all such social 
offerings. But for Bourdieu, meaningfulness is not always offered 
by society. Indeed, society is characterised by a deep inequality in 
the distribution of meaningfulness. As we have already quoted him 
as saying, 'One of the most unequal of all distributions, and 
probably, in any case, the most cruel, is the distribution of ... social 
importance and of reasons for living. ' 21 When people face a 
shrinking of their opportunities to realise their selves they suffer 
from 'social ageing'. 22 
In this sense, we can argue that colonised Palestinian society 
produces a generalised form of premature social ageing, even of 
social death: a situation where there is felt to be an almost complete 
absence of the possibility of a worthy life. This tragicomic summing 
up of the situation by a Palestinian man I interviewed in Sydney 
conveys at least the subjective experience of this social impasse: 
What we end up having [in Palestine] is the most unusual situation. 
The Israelis monopolize everything. They monopolize nuclear 
weapons, they monopolize tanks, planes, what else ... They 
monopolize the land, they monopolize the water ... what else ... 
They even monopolize moral virtue ... you know, democracy and 
freedom of speech, and they monopolize the capacity to write the 
history of our land ... But they are not only content with this; after 
monopolizing all this and colonizing us to the bones, they also 
monopolize victimhood! To my knowledge, no colonizer has ever 
succeeded in monopolizing even victimhood ... just our luck! We 
say: 'Hey, you're hurting us', and they say, 'Don't you know how 
hurt we are? Haven't you heard of the Holocaust!' They are 
suffocating us, and when we try to push them away a little bit so we 
can breathe, they say: 'We're being victimized. You don't recognize 
we exist.' How on earth you can not recognize the existence of 
someone as fat as Sharon sitting on top of you suffocating you, I 
don't know! 
An investigation by the Institute of Community and Public 
Health at Bir Zeit University conducted during the first period of 
the second Intifada (2000-2001) and focusing on Bir Zeit 
University undergraduates notes: 'Our students generally have an 
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inability to dream, an inability to visualize a better future than their 
hopelessly miserable current life offers.'23 Nothing symbolises 
social death as clearly or as forcefully as this inability to dream a 
meaningful life. But this generalised state of social death does not 
in itself directly cause suicide bombers. Indeed, such a state can as 
likely cause the emergence of the classical alcoholic postcolonial 
culture of despair and resignation. The difference in this particular 
bleak social landscape is the development of a martyr culture. It 
seems to me that it is here that the suicide bombing as a meaningful 
activity - as an illusio - emerges. 
The development of the culture of martyrdom in Palestinian 
society is an object of historical examination. The obvious point 
of departure is the perceived military success of the Hizb'allah 
suicide bombers in south Lebanon and the willingness of other 
Islamicist organisations in the West Bank and Gaza to copy them. 
But from an anthropological point of view, what is important is 
that once the first act of suicide bombing occurred, it was 
immediately followed by a culture of glorification of self-sacrifice, 
which became further reproduced as more suicide bombings 
occurred, until this culture of glorification became an entrenched 
part of Palestinian colonised society. The culture of martyrdom, 
with the high social esteem (symbolic capital) it bestows on the 
'martyrs' themselves (the funeral processions, the speeches, the 
photos filling the streets and so forth, plus the relative wealth and 
social support their families receive), stands against the back-
ground of social death described above. It reveals itself for many 
Palestinian young people as a path of social meaningfulness and 
self-fulfilment in an otherwise meaningless life. The culture of 
martyrdom is an astonishing manifestation of the capacity of the 
human imagination - individuals commit themselves to a path that 
leads to an imagined enjoyable symbolic life following the cessation 
of their physical life. It is a swapping of physical existence for 
symbolic existence. 
Let us be reminded once more of Bourdieu 's conception of social 
life: 'Through the social games it offers, the social world provides 
something more and other than the apparent stakes: the chase, 
Pascal reminds us, counts as much as, if not more than, the quarry, 
and there is a happiness in activity which exceeds the visible 
profits - wage, prize or reward - and which consists in the fact of 
emerging from indifference (or depression), being occupied, 
projected towards goals, and feeling oneself objectively, and 
therefore subjectively, endowed with a social mission.'24 This is 
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how Bourdieu defines the way society invites us to live. In the case 
of Palestinian colonised society, it is also how it can invite us to 
die. The struggle to accumulate symbolic capital ('the chase') 
defines for Bourdieu the essence of how we make our lives worthy 
of living. But here we are faced with a peculiar 'chase': the ac-
cumulation of death as a mode of seeking a meaningful life. There 
emerges a paradoxical social category: suicidal capital. 
In his analysis of boxers and the way they come to invest 
themselves in the sport, Loic Wacquant points out that the violence 
and pain that people are confronted with in the streets of the ghetto 
play an important role in shaping the boxer's disposition and his 
inclination to take up boxing as a means for making a viable life.25 
In the case of the suicide bomber it is likewise not enough to say 
that suicide bombing is a way to create a meaningful life; a person 
must be predisposed to take such an action. It is here that the stone 
throwing fields mentioned above play an essential role. They 
become almost an institutional preparatory ground for the 
formation of suicide bombers. But these fields are themselves the 
culmination of a history of violence structured by the particularities 
of Israeli colonialism. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the 
disposition towards self-sacrifice without understanding the 
unusually suffocating nature of Israeli colonialism. Talking about 
suicide bombers, Giacaman also argues: 'Their stressful and 
desperate life events do not only relate to what is taking place in 
their lives now, but more importantly, to the fact that they have 
chronically been violated, have been cumulatively disadvantaged, 
beginning in early life, and have undergone series of subsequent 
experiences that accumulated over time to produce in youth the 
disadvantages, inclinations, and behaviour that we see today.' 26 
Perhaps what characterises Israeli colonialism most is that it is 
driven by an unusually consuming search for a point of 'zero 
vulnerability'. The popular support for such a political path is 
clearly shaped by the sense of insecurity that many Israeli Jews 
have acquired through their deep internalisation of centuries of 
anti-Semitism and 50-odd years of Arab anti-colonial enmity. 
Usually, the expectation of achieving something as extraordinary 
as 'zero vulnerability' is very hard to sustain. In Israel, however, 
the euphoric military victories of the 1967 war, the entrenched 
images of smashed retreating Arab armies that accompanied it, and 
the continuing overwhelming superiority of the Israeli military 
combine to make such expectations more sustainable. 
This search for zero vulnerability produces a gaze that sees 
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threats everywhere and ends up reproducing the very vulnerability 
it is supposedly trying to overcome. It is reminiscent of the gaze of 
'order' well captured by Elias Canetti in The Human Province and 
referred to by Zygmut Bauman: 'The paradox of order ('the 
ludicrous thing about order', in Canetti' expression) is that it 
wants to be so total and all-embracing while it "depend on so 
little. A hair, literally a hair, lying where it shouldn't, can separate 
order from disorder. Everything that does not belong where it is, i 
hostile. Even the tiniest thing is disturbing: a man of total order 
would have to scour his realm with a microscope, and even then a 
remnant of potential nervousness will remain in him" .'27 
Indeed, this is how Soraya Asmar, a Palestinian Australian, 
describes life in Palestine: 'The very existence of anything or anyone 
Palestinian is perceived a a potential threat to the security of Israel. 
Be it an office, a farm, a bank, a bakery, a fruit tall, a family home 
- if you are born Palestinian, anything to do with you is branded 
"security risk" and is therefore vulnerable to elimination.'28 
It is this relentless search for anything that might cause 
'vulnerability' that characterises Israeli colonialism most from the 
perspective of the Palestinians, for any aspect of life where there is 
a hint of independent political Palestinian will is considered a 
threat. These attempts to eliminate Palestinian political will have 
led Baruch Kimmerling, professor of sociology at the Hebrew 
Univer ity of Jerusalem, to speak of 'politicide', arguing that it 
should be considered a crime against humanity on a par with 
genocide.29 
Interestingly, even many on the left, in Israel, prefer their 
Palestinians without a political will. Anti-colonial resistance by 
the Pale tinians is perceived as undermining the efforts of the left 
to reform the dominant Israeli mentality. As the chorus of 
'disappointed' so-called peace supporters that follows any form 
of Palestinian anti-colonial violence indicates, uch leftists 
prefer their Palestinians to be passive so that they can be safely 'left' 
about them. They see their leftism and radicalism as part of the 
story of 'Israel, the American-style democracy'. After all, what's 
an American-style democracy if it doesn't have its radicals and its 
decimated indigenous people for the radicals to be radical about? 
For such leftists, the violent resistance of the Palestinian people 
stands in the way, between them and their radicalism. The sooner 
the Palestinians swap the bombs for bottles of whisky or gin the 
better. Then the radical leftists could become truly radical and 
outraged about the conditions of the Palestinian people - without 
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anyone violently disrupting their leftism. They could thus follow 
in the footsteps of their successful American and Australian 
brothers and sisters, where it's nice, and certainly very safe, to be 
radically pro-Indigenous or pro-Indian, since any organised anti-
colonia l resistance has been broken and there is no longer a 
practical anti-colonial will capable of disrupting the process of 
colonial settlement. 
More importantly for us, however, this 'politicidal' drive, as it 
is implemented on a daily basis by the Israeli colonisers, generates 
the affective condition many Palestinians consider as one of the 
main factors behind the rise of suicide bombings: colonial 
humiliation. Humiliation is the experience of being psychologically 
demeaned - treated like less than a human being by someone more 
powerful than you, without having any capacity to redress the 
situation. This is experienced not only at a national level - though 
the experience of having another nation enter your territory at will, 
arrest your leaders and talk about them as if they are disposable 
entities is clearly and significantly humiliating. It is also experienced 
at a personal level: being shouted at, abused, searched, stopped, 
ordered around, checked, asked to wait, 'allowed to pass', and 
so on.30 
In a piece with Deleuzian and Spinozan resonances, the 
philosopher Alphonso Lingis provides an excellent description of 
how mundane slights are internalised by an individual and how 
the resulting affect gnaws at his or her very being: 
In a social gathering, you find yourself exposed to a caustic or 
demeaning remark cast your way. Had you been strong in social 
skills, you would have met the blow with a repartee that would have 
ended in laughter. Had you been very strong, you would have 
surprised the aggressor with a put-down so witty he would have 
found himself unable not to laugh at himself. But you could only 
mumble something witless, and the fencer turned away to a worthier 
opponent. You feel wounded, mortified. The blow was delivered 
and the aggressor turned away; the feeling does not pass. You find 
yourself unable to be fully present to the sallies and rebounds of the 
crackling banter about you. Back in your room, unable to sleep, you 
go over the wound, probing it, feeling it, verifying the pain. In the 
trace of the aggression you secrete the image of the aggressor. 
Having been unable to parry the blow at the time or answer it with 
a counter-blow, you strike out at that image: you disparage, 
denigrate, vituperate the other, not in his presence, but in his image. 
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It goes on for hours, for days. How much longer and how much 
stronger resentment is than was the pain felt in the encounter itself! 
Your impotence to engage the aggressive force and discharge the 
pain prolongs itself in this stoked violence.31 
One can only imagine how much more powerful this affect, this 
stoked violence, is when the situation described by Lingis is a 
structured, enduring, and daily encounter with a colonial aggressor 
whom you cannot ever hope to have 'the strength' to be witty 
against. Alphonso Lingis allows us an insight into the colonial 
circulation of affect, without which an understanding of the social 
conditions of the emergence of suicide bombers cannot be 
complete.32 And it is also here that we reconnect with the terrorist 
organisations responsible for the recruitment and formation of 
suicide bombers. Perhaps their primary function and the secret of 
their success is that they are mechanisms for the channelling of this 
colonial affect, transforming the stoked violence born out of 
colonial impotence into anti-colonial potency. 
End of the seminar: are suicide bombers human beings like us? 
A student came up to me after the seminar. 'I wasn't very comfort-
able during some parts of this talk,' she said. 'You've made it seem 
as if suicide bombers are ordinary human beings.' This struck me 
as true. But isn't that what is always at stake in social explanations? 
This is why it is not surprising that it is often Arabs or Arab 
sympathisers who, in the political market of condemnation of 
suicide bombers, counter these populist condemnations with 
equally populist attempts at social explanation. In demanding or 
proposing a social explanation, regardless of whether or not the 
explanation is satisfactory, Arabs are demanding to be included as 
part of humanity. They're claiming: 'We are not as weird as you 
think.' Thus, in an open letter to President George W. Bush, the 
ex-Lebanese Prime Minister Selim el-Hoss asks: 'Those deplorable 
suicidal operations which you brand as terrorism, have they not 
ever for a moment prompted you to ask yourself the question: why 
would a young boy or girl be willing to sacrifice himself or herself 
with utter peace of mind and full determination? ... How do you 
label the phenomenon of a whole people standing ready to sacri-
fice half its numbers in a struggle and martyrdom so that the 
other half will regain dignity on its own land?'33 
While on field work (working on the unrelated issue of 
transnational migration) in a Shi'a village in south Lebanon, a 
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village studded with photos of young men who died fighting the 
Israeli occupation of Lebanon, I heard the same argument -
expressed in stronger terms - from one of my informants, an 
educated man and a member of Hizb'allah:-
Ali: The Americans pretend not to understand the suicide bombers 
and consider them evil. But I am sure they do. As usual, they are 
hypocrites. What is so strange about saying: 'I am not going to let 
you rob me of all my humanity and all my will?' What is so strange 
about saying: 'I'd rather kill you on my own terms and kill myself 
with you than be led to my death like a sheep on your own terms?'34 
I know that the Americans fully understand this because this is 
exactly what they were celebrating about the guy who downed the 
Philadelphia flight on September 11, the one where the hijackers 
failed to hit their target. Isn't that exactly what he must have said 
when he decided to kill himself and everyone else by bringing the 
plane down? Didn't he say to those hijacking him: 'I'd rather kill 
you on my own terms and kill myself with you than be led to my 
death like a sheep on your own terms?' They made a hero out of 
him ... the only hero of September 11. They are hypocrites, the 
Americans. They know as much as we do that as a human being we 
all have the capacity to rush enthusiastically to our death if it means 
dying as a dignified being. 
Me (laughing): We are all enthusiasm! (kulluna hamas, which also 
translates as 'We are all Hamas') 
Ali (smiling): That's right, comes a time we are all enthusiasm! 
Despite its convenient 'forgetting' of the more unsavoury aspects 
of suicide bombing that were not part of the 'suicide crashing' of 
the Philadelphia plane, this explanatory attempt can be seen as 
driven by an attempt to establish a 'common humanity'.35 This 
view stands in opposition to the condemning attitude that wants 
to deny such a common humanity. From a kind of warring 
disposition towards the suicide bombers, those who can only 
condemn the PSBs end up sharing with them, at a very general level, 
the same warring logic. After all, the negation of a common 
humanity - in its more dramatic form a vision of an abstract 
dehumanised other where children are not perceived in their 
children-ness, mothers in their motherliness - is of course inherent 
to the practice of the Palestinian suicide bomber. Rather than 
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losing that sense of common humanity ourselves in the rush 
to condemnation, those of us driven by the ethics of social 
explanation will always want to ask, 'What kind of social con-
ditions must prevail and what kind of history must a people have 
internalised to make them lose this capacity of seeing the other in 
his or her humanness?' This is not an easy question to ask in the 
West today because the West itself is rapidly losing whatever 
capacity it had to see the other in his or her humanness. 
Exighophobia/homoiophobia: social explanation and the 
humanity of the other 
The rise and dominance of neo-liberal economic policy and its 
replacement of the welfare state with the penal state is a well-
documented and researched phenomenon today, especially in the 
United States, where the penal state has become a particularly 
salient feature of the social structure.36 Less documented has been 
the accompanying backlash against social explanations of crime. 
The newspapers' letters to the editor commenting on apprehended 
criminals are often accompanied by sarcastic 'and please let's not 
hear about his or her deprived childhood'-type statements. There 
is a noticeable public division between the minority that still likes 
to hear or formulate some kind of social explanation for crime and 
a majority that sees any social explanation as a full-blown or 
creeping justification, aimed at depriving people of the right to seek 
justice through punishment. More than ever, the practice of social 
science in this domain becomes itself the object of political struggle. 
Social scientists, generally proponents of social explanations, are 
often attacked as a privileged group sheltered from the effects of 
crime and therefore unable to understand the feelings of the general 
population. 37 
It is clear that both zero tolerance towards crime and zero 
tolerance towards the social explanation of crime are grounded 
in the uncertainties created by what is called globalisation. 
Throughout this work, we have amply examined how the latest 
cycle of capitalist accumulation, the modalities of class exploitation 
it has made necessary, the resulting change in the quality of work 
and in the precariousness of people's hold on their employment 
have all led to a general climate of insecurity in the face of the 
future. We are increasingly witnessing the rise of a culture that 
combines a warring and a siege mentality; by necessity, it em-
phasises the eradication of a potentially menacing other. 
In a war/siege culture, understanding the other is a luxury that 
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cannot be afforded. War emphasises the otherness of the other, and 
divides the world into friends and enemies and good and evil. This 
war logic is negated in a social explanation that draws on an ethics 
of social determinism. By proposing that the other is fundamentally 
like us, social determinism suggests that given a similar history and 
background, we might find ourselves in the other's place.38 When 
we explain an act as the product of a particular history and 
particular social circumstances, we give its perpetrators some of 
their humanity back. The ethics of social determinism invites us to 
think that we might - indeed ought to - put someone like former 
Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and his followers on trial, 
not to emphasise how different they are from us. Social deter-
minism reminds us of how depraved we human beings can become 
under certain circumstances, and of how much we need to work 
against what is worst in ourselves. This is not a negation of 
responsibility but an affirmation of the importance of both the 
social conditions of action and the historical conditions of the 
formation of the acting self - that is, an affirmation of Marx's 
everlasting dictum that 'we all make history, but not in conditions 
of our own choosing'. 
Social explanation is driven by an inclusionary rather than an 
exclusionary ethics, and as such it embodies the negation of the 
logic of war and becomes itself perceived as a political threat in 
times of war. In the war/siege society, social explanation can disrupt 
the way both self and society are invited to define and stabilise 
themselves against an other that has to remain different and 
unknowable. Social explanation can threaten the warring self with 
disintegration, which is why it sometimes unleashes such pas-
sionate responses. Social explanation is not merely rejected. The 
threat of the humanised other it carries with it is affectively feared. 
Thus emerges the couplet of phobias I refer to in the title of this 
chapter: exighophobia (from the Greek exigho, to explain) and 
homoiophobia (from the Greek homoio, the same). 39 In this 
homoio-exighophobic culture, anyone wishing to know and to 
inquire about the social conditions that might explain a possible 
rise in criminal offences, for example, or about the social back-
ground of asylum seekers, is perceived as inherently suspect, a 
nuisance if not a traitor. Recently, it was revealed that the 
Australian government directed its bureaucrats not to issue photos 
that would 'humanise' the refugees seeking entry to Australia. Note 
that while people refer to such an attitude toward refugees as 
xenophobia, what is really feared here is not the otherness of the 
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other but their sameness - it's homoiophobia, not xenophobia. 
Consequently, given its warring imaginary, it is hardly surprising 
to see that this homoio-exighophobic cultural tendency has 
emerged even more strongly in relation to the terrorist mass 
murders of 11 September 2001, and later in relation to the PSBs. 
The monstrous criminality of the September 11 events and the war 
climate they helped create understandably made them resistant to 
social explanation at a popular level. But this very resistance was 
used by politicians to give the homoio-exighophobic attitude a 
sense of monopoly over morality. To attempt a sociopolitical 
explanation of the terrorists' actions or to explain why those acts 
were supported by large sections of the Arab population was 
considered sacrilegious and immoral in the post-September 11 
market of outrage.40 In answering the famous question 'Why do 
they hate us?', anyone who deviated from the Presidential 'They 
hate us because they hate us', they hate 'our values' and 'our way 
of life' (that is, they are not humans in the same way we are), was 
considered not outraged enough and accused of blaming the victim. 
This is why a group of American politicians referred to a number 
of critical academics as 'the weak link in America's war against 
terrorism'.41 It is this same attitude that also shapes the 'nothing 
ever justifies suicide bombing' discourse. 
Thus in taking the side of social explanation one is clearly not 
inhabiting a politically neutral position. But it should also be noted 
that in taking the side of explanation one does not necessarily stand 
in opposition to the condemnations voiced by politicians. 
Condemnations of the 'nothing ever justifies' type might well be 
considered useful when there is a fear of imitation. But clearly, if 
the aim is to stop the spread of such practices, then knowledge and 
modification of the social conditions of their emergence is far more 
effective than the assumption that they are somehow the product 
of some transposable cultural or religious 'state of mind' 
disconnected from any social situation, any social conditions, or 
any specific history, and can therefore be combated solely with 
moralistic statements of condemnation. Suicide bombings are 
undoubtedly a form of social evil, but their evil is also the evil of 
the living conditions from which they emanate. That evil (or 
sinfulness) resides more in social conditions where the possibilities 
of a meaningful life are shrinking than in the individuals trying to 
survive in such conditions. Seeing evil in the conditions rather than 
in the people is what Roy Bhaskar, following Margaret Archer, 
powerfully refers to as 'structural sin' .42 Some politicians might 
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choose to portray social scientists who detect such structural sins 
as 'on the other side', but never have these social scientists been 
more necessary. Now more than ever, we could all benefit from 
Spinoza's ethical injunction for the intellectual: 'Do not deplore, 
do not laugh, do not hate, but understand.' 
CHAPTER 9 
A concluding fable: the gift of care, 
or the ethics of pedestrian crossings 
Introduction to a pedestrian crossing 
Ali Ateeck is a Lebanese factory worker and artist who migrated 
to Australia in the late 1970s. He was from a village in South 
Lebanon but lived in Beirut from 1969 until he migrated. In 
Australia, he lived in Campsie, NSW, a Sydney suburb with a large 
Lebanese population. Ali died last year. He was fifty-three. I 
interviewed him in 1993. He told me this story about himself:1 
AA: I arrived in Sydney in 1979. I was half-mad when I arrived but 
they didn't know ... 
GH: What do you mean ... ?! 
AA: Well, I was fine when I applied ... and they gave me the visa ... 
a couple of days later our house received a direct shell. My sister 
and her daughter died ... and I was shell-shocked ... I was never the 
same. I developed a mental condition ... (he starts crying) ... I am 
still not one hundred percent ... I still take tablets ... but it was worse 
... I used to disappear for days not knowing what I was doing ... 
My brother's family here used to go looking for me ... 
GH: And immigration didn't notice? 
AA: No. It wasn't obvious to begin with, but I got worse when I 
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came here. I developed this (his right arm was unusually thin). I used 
to see my sister and niece waving to me from all sort of places. I 
once jumped from the second floor at my brother's bakery ... I don't 
do anything like this any more ... I was 'looked after' and I am on 
medication. 
CH: Lucky you weren't killed or something ... 
AA: Yes, everyone says it's a miracle I haven't been killed by a car 
while I was roaming the streets. I used to love crossing Beamish 
Street (Campsie)! 
CH: What do you mean? 
AA: Yes, I was often found crossing the street over there near the 
bank (vaguely pointing in the direction of Beamish Street). I 
developed a liking for pedestrian crossings (laughing)! I spent hours 
crossing them and crossing them again. I loved the moment the cars 
stopped for me! It made me feel important! I thought it was 
magical!! Can you imagine this happening in Beirut? 
GH (laughing): you must have received a few insults along the way, 
as well, no?! 
AA: I can't remember. I had a vague memory of myself crossing after 
doing it. Like I wasn't totally off the air! I even remember I used to 
have conversations with people from the village, inviting a few of 
them to see how the cars stopped. My brother's family returned to 
Lebanon. They asked me to return with them but I didn't want to. 
They joked that I wouldn't leave Australia because of the pedestrian 
crossings. But it's more because I'm scared that I wouldn't be well 
looked after if I have a nervous breakdown. I went to Lebanon three 
years ago and I had a breakdown. I didn't like how I was treated. 
Here, no matter what, your honour is protected, you are a human 
being ... 
I want to use Ali Ateek's account of his encounter with the 
pedestrian crossing to reflect on the nature of 'social obligations'. 
I want to do this because something strange is happening to this 
most ethical of concepts. Borrowing from the imaginary of neo-
liberal economics with which their minds are saturated, the latter-
day peddlers of 'mutual obligation' have emptied it of its ethical 
content. Equating it with trite capitalist common sense of the 'you 
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don't get something for nothing' variety, they want to leave us 
with an impoverished enterprise bargaining-like concept that 
conjures up ideas of contractual rather than ethical compulsion. It 
is the nature of this ethical compulsion at the heart of the notion 
of 'mutual obligation', as well as the social conditions of its 
prevalence, that Ali's story can help us recuperate. 
The pedestrian crossing as a social gift 
Ali experiences 'magical' time at the crossing. The magic is not only 
due to the 'unimaginable' idea of cars stopping for a pedestrian. 
Magic is also a kind of buzz generated by the moment of 
recognition Ali gets from cars stopping for him. It is what he 
experiences as being made to feel 'important'. 'Important' here is 
not linked so much to social status as to existential status: the 
recognition of one's 'importance' as a human being. The magic of 
the crossing for Ali is that it offers this moment of recognition. That 
we speak of this recognition, along with the bit of space to cross 
the road that comes with it, as 'offerings' allows us to capture their 
nature as forms of 'social gifts', gifts that society offers its members. 
There are of course a multitude of ways in which pedestrians 
and drivers negotiate a pedestrian crossing. There are drivers who 
would simply stop for the pedestrian no matter what - except 
maybe if they are taking someone who is seriously injured to a 
hospital. There are drivers who see crossings as a place to compete 
with pedestrians over who gets to cross first. There are drivers who 
stop in a matter of fact manner and drivers who expect to be 
thanked. But of course the same driver can behave at a crossing 
differently according to the mood they are in, if they are in a hurry 
or not, if they slept well or not, and maybe according to their 
previous experiences of stopping at pedestrian crossings. For, of 
course, just as drivers stop in different ways, crossings are also 
crossed in many ways by pedestrians. There are pedestrians who 
express gratitude and pedestrians who cross arrogantly. There are 
pedestrians who cross absentmindedly and those who are very 
conscious of the traffic. There are those who cross treating cars as 
enemies and those who cross trying to cause minimal disruption 
to the traffic. 
But this plurality of modes of interaction, in all its richness, 
should not conceal the underlying - and by far the most important 
- aspect of the phenomenon: a pedestrian crossing is an ethical 
structural fact. It is a space where the dominant mode of occupying 
and circulating on roads, driving, is requested by social law to yield 
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to a marginalised form of road occupancy, walking. This is what 
constitutes its ethical component and its character as a social gift. 
It is social because even when it is an individual driver who 'offers' 
the pedestrian the possibility of crossing, what the driver is offering, 
or perhaps, better still, conveying, is really society's gift to the 
pedestrian. Otherwise there would be no difference between a 
pedestrian crossing and a crossing created by a driver who chooses 
to stop for a pedestrian at an unmarked part of a road. The fact 
that a pedestrian crossing embodies a social compulsion, a social 
law, that says 'drivers must stop' is what makes it a gift offered by 
society. No conjunctural practice - short of a law abolishing it -
can change the nature of this space. What changes within it are the 
modes drivers use to 'convey' the gift and the modes people choose 
for receiving it. As we have already seen, there are drivers who offer 
the gift gracefully and those who offer it grudgingly. There are 
pedestrians who receive the gift gracefully and those who receive 
it arrogantly or nonchalantly. There are those who snatch it and 
those who are grateful for it being offered to them. But underneath 
all these possible modes of interaction remains the fact of the 
crossing as a structurally present ethical space. A space where 
people can enact a ritual of stopping and crossing, and through 
which society affirms itself as civilised (that is, ethical), as a place 
where it is understood that dominant modes of inhabitance need 
to yield, in some circumstances, to marginal modes of inhabitance. 
It is this gift which Ali became so strongly aware of in his 
madness. In Ali's narrative there are two stories in which he receives 
gifts with a similar ethical content: the story of Ali the pedestrian 
and the story of Ali the mentally ill migrant. While Ali the 
pedestrian was being made to feel important by negotiating the 
crossing, Ali the mentally ill migrant was being 'well taken care of' 
and made to feel 'like a human being', as he put it, thanks to the 
mental care he received in Australia. The latter preserved his 
'honour', he tells us. Both spaces offered gifts of recognition and 
valorisation and were contrasted with Lebanese spaces in which 
Ali felt devalorised and dishonoured. 
The social gift, the honourable society and the nature of 
'mutual obligation' 
In Ali's account, the gifts of valorisation and recognition at the 
pedestrian crossing and in the domain of mental care end up 
forming the basis of his commitment to not follow his brother 
back to Lebanon but to stay in Australia instead. Here lies the 
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importance of dwelling on the 'gift' nature of these social phe-
nomena. It is from such socio-ethical offerings of recognition that 
'mutual obligation' emerges in society. The term is the signifier of 
an ethical structure of reciprocity that can only exist and be 
reproduced in societies that valorise, or better still, in Ali's 
language, honour their members. It is when we have a society 
which, through the bodies that govern it, feels 'obligated' to offer 
spaces that 'honour' its members as 'important' human beings, and 
when these members, in turn, experience an ethical obligation 
towards it- which means nothing other than becoming practically 
and affectively committed to it, caring about it - that we have a 
structure of 'mutual obligation'. 
While it is common to see gift exchange and reciprocity as 
'horizontal' relations between groups or individuals, many of those 
who have reflected on the nature of the gift and social reciprocity 
have seen the importance of this 'vertical' relation between 
individuals and society. Marcel Mauss's classic work on the gift is 
the first to link gift exchange systematically with questions of 
honour and obligation. But he also links it to the 'vertical exchange' 
that occurs when groups make offerings to their gods in thanks 
for what the gods have made available to them. Mauss famously 
reduces gift exchange to three obligations: the obligation to give, 
the obligation to receive, and the obligation to give back.2 Gift 
exchange, he stresses, involves not only the exchange of 'things' 
but also the symbolic exchange of recognition. It reproduces our 
material relations with other people, but in so doing also 
reproduces communal living in general, which is the essence of 
our sociality. 
This aspect of Mauss has been perhaps most developed in 
Claude Levi-Strauss's analysis of reciprocity in his The Elementary 
Structures of Kinship.3 Levi-Strauss shows us that in exchanging 
recognition we are reproducing our basic humanity. Reciprocal 
obligations are not only obligations towards other people, he 
argues, but obligations towards our own sociality and our desire 
to live communally. Generally speaking, then, a society maintains 
itself as an ethical community only by continually offering to its 
people the very ethical conditions it wants them to be 'obligated' 
to reproduce. This point emerges in Georg Simmel's important 
analysis of faithfulness and gratitude. 
Simmel sees faithfulness as a 'psychic state' that comes to exist 
when people are committed not so much to each other as to the 
relation they have to each other. This idea of a relation to the 
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relation is the basis of what we have called 'vertical' reciprocity. 
As Simmel puts it: 
Faithfulness refers to the peculiar feeling which is not directed 
toward the possession of the other as the possessor's eudemonistic 
good, nor toward the other's welfare as an extrinsic, objective value, 
but towards the preservation of the relationship to the other . 
... [It is] a specific psychic state, which is directed toward the 
continuance of the relation as such, independently of any particular 
affective or volitional elements that sustain the content of this 
relation. This psychic state of the individual is one of the a priori 
conditions of society which alone makes society possible (at least as 
we know it), in spite of the extraordinary differences of degree in 
which this psychic state exists.4 
He develops a similar point concerning the importance of 
gratitude: 
Although we are often unaware of its fundamentally important 
existence, and although it is interwoven with innumerable other 
motivations, nevertheless, it gives human actions a unique 
modification and intensity: it connects them with what has gone 
before, it enriches them with the element of personality, it gives them 
the continuity of interactional life.5 
Let us go back to our pedestrian crossing and imagine occurring 
on it an exceptionally civilised encounter: a driver stops even 
though s/he could have passed, and the pedestrian says 'thank you' 
even though s/he doesn't have to. In this inter-subjective moment 
of mutual exchange and mutual recognition, two people ac-
knowledge each other. But in so doing they also acknowledge their 
common belonging to a society committed to honouring its 
members. They thank each other. But in so doing they are grateful 
to the society to which they belong and which laid the structural 
foundations for such a moment to occur. At one 'horizontal' level, 
the driver has offered, the pedestrian has received and given back. 
But at another level, a 'vertical' level, both have been offered 
something by society, both have received it, and both have given 
back precisely by living the ethical moment: by assuming 
responsibility for it and thus reproducing the ethical foundation of 
society. As an Arab saying has it: the society that honours its 
members honours itself. 
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On the obligation to rid ourselves of neo-liberal government 
The ethics of 'mutual obligation' is very far, then, from 'you don't 
get something for nothing'. In the 'mutual obligation' imagined by 
today's political class, society gives us social security and other 
quantifiable economic and material benefits and that is enough 
to ask us to give back not only equally quantifiable labour and 
productivity but also faithfulness and gratitude. This concept of 
reciprocity reduces the state's obligation to a delivery of services 
and empties it of all that is ethical: honour, recognition, community, 
sociality, humanity. The fact that we might give the unemployed 
some benefits but dishonour them in the very process of giving it 
to them, treat them as if they do not deserve what they are getting, 
as if they are a lesser breed of humanity, is immaterial to the neo-
liberal economic mind that has colonised our governmental 
institutions: we've given, we want something back. That's all that 
matters. If one gives that way, one might be entitled to ask for 
something back, but whatever it is, it does not come under the 
umbrella of mutual obligation. There is no mutual obligation 
where there is no honouring and recognition of the moral worth 
of all those others - Indigenous people, migrants, accepted 
refugees, pensioners, single mothers, etc - whom the government 
is expecting to 'give back'. 
At the heart of this suppression of the dimension of recognition 
is an even deeper misconception: an unethical belief that reciprocity 
begins the moment we benefit from living in a particular society. 
As soon as we enter social life, so to speak, we have been given 
something by society and therefore we have to return it. Society-
or, more directly, the state - gives first and we live our lives trying 
to give back; this is how social reciprocity begins and keeps 
on gomg. 
In what is perhaps an early unwitting construction of neo-liberal 
commonsense into a metapsychology, the psychologist George 
Homans argues that children are constructed as inferior and 
subordinate to their parents through receiving gifts they cannot 
reciprocate except through blind obedience to the parent-givers.6 
The thesis is reasonably seductive, and certainly contains an 
element of truth. It is particularly seductive because it appears to 
bring to the surface a dimension of gift-giving to children that is 
not merely hidden - it is actively repressed. For parents who 
lovingly shower their kids with presents it would not be easy to 
acknowledge that they are also inferiorising the children in the 
process. But like the neo-liberal economic state that sees reciprocity 
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as beginning with what the state gives its citizens, this psychology 
fails to acknowledge that people whose presence we welcome into 
this world are always already perceived as bringing an initial, 
primary, gift with them. It is the gift of their very presence. 
When I give my child a present, I feel that she has offered me 
the gift of her presence well before I have given her anything. I am 
not initiating the cycle of reciprocity; I am giving back. This is 
perhaps very obvious in the case of a loved child. But does not any 
human being we encounter carry such an a priori gift insofar as we 
recognise in them a fellow human being? In this sense, giving to 
any human being is always giving back, since we receive the gift of 
that person's presence at the very moment we first encounter him 
or her. This is why to give is an obligation for Mauss as well as for 
Levi-Strauss. Simmel captured an element of this gift of presence 
in his analysis of gratitude: 
We do not thank somebody only for what he does: the feeling with 
which we often react to the mere existence of a person must itself 
be designated as gratitude. We are grateful to him only because he 
exists, because we experience him. Often the subtlest as well as 
firmest bonds among men develop from this feeling.7 
Perhaps the foundation of all ethical practices, and certainly the 
foundation of any social ethics, is precisely this: relating to the 
presence of the other as gift. Why is the other's presence a gift? 
Because the other, through my desire to interact with him or her, 
offers me, by making it visible, my own humanity. When I interact 
with others and I fail to receive from them the gift of the common 
humanity that we share, when I fail to see them as offering such a 
gift, it means that I consider such others as less than human. Here 
we have the basic unethical foundation of all forms of racism. Less 
dramatically perhaps, but of equal importance to us, here we also 
have the unethical foundation of the policies of neo-liberal 
government. 
Today the Western world is dominated by governments that 
neglect to create the necessary pedestrian crossings that make our 
societies honourable civilised societies. They see it as unthinkable 
that the existing national cultures ought to yield before the 
marginalised forms of social inhabitance they constantly encounter. 
They treat the unemployed, the refugee, the Indigenous person as 
'getting something for nothing', and in so doing fail to perceive in 
them the very humanity their presence brings. This negation of the 
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humanity of the marginal others that come our way becomes a 
negation of our very own humanity. What is our most urgent social 
obligation in such a situation, other than the obligation to 
recapture the ethical foundations of society by dislodging those 
who have imprisoned it in the dungeons of neo-liberal economic 
profitability? 
Conclusion: black economy 
Let me go back to the Lebanese community dinner (see Chapter 6) 
and to the young man who, on hearing a Lebanese pro-Mabo rave, 
retorted: 'What are you going on about anyway? If the Anglos 
didn't do the killing you wouldn't have been able to emigrate here. 
You owe 'em, mate. They cleared the land ... Especially for you!' 
The pedestrian crossing is a social gift. It is also a piece of land; 
a piece of stolen land. This is a difficult reminder. The totality of 
the social gifts we receive in Australia make up a black economy. 
Both in the sense of an economy based on Indigenous land and in 
the sense of an economy of stolen goods. How can we have an 
ethical basis for society when what circulates as a social gift is based 
on stolen goods? What kind of obligation does the reception of 
stolen goods create? 
There is no doubt that Australia's political culture has changed 
much since Mabo reawoke in us the memory of our original theft. 
We have begun to relate to ourselves and our land in the way that 
people who were thieves in the past relate to themselves and to 
what they have stolen and kept. Perhaps this could also explain 
our newly found neurotic sensitivity to the international bodies that 
criticise us. We overreact, as if with every blame they send our way 
we are scared they might dig up the thief in us. This could also 
explain why we have become so ungenerous to the migrant and 
the refugee. Are we not scared that they might steal what we have? 
For, undoubtedly, what we have can be stolen. We know this only 
too well. And until we choose to face and deal with the 
consequences of our colonial theft, it will remain the ultimate 
source of our debilitating paranoia. We will always 'worry about 
the nation' and will never fully know the joy of care. 
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38 I have derived this idea of an ethics 
of social determinism particularly 
from the work of Pierre Bourdieu. 
This ethics is most apparent in the 
collective work directed by Pierre 
Bourdieu, The Weight of the World, 
Polity Press, Oxford, 1999. See 
especially the last chapter, 'Under-
standing', pp. 607-26. 
39 I thank Gina Rizakos for providing 
a quick lesson in Greek to help me 
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to construct the phobia terms I use 
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40 I am not implying here that the social 
explanations presented were ad-
equate. Nevertheless, it was not the 
adequacy of the explanations that 
raised people's ire. It was the mere 
fact that an explanation was 
attempted. 
41 In Jerry L. Martin and Anne D. Neal, 
'Defending Civilization: How Our 
Universities Are Failing America and 
What Can Be Done About It', a report 
produced by the American Council 
of Trustees and Alumni. This group 
was founded by Lynne Cheney, the 
Vice-President's wife, and Senator 
Joseph Lieberman. The report is 
available at www.goacta.org. 
42 Roy Bhaskar, From East to West: 
Odyssey of a Soul, Routledge, 
London and New York, 2000, 
pp. 37, 57, 91. 
Chapter 9: A concluding fable: the gift 
of care, or the ethics of pedestrian 
crossings 
1 Translated from Arabic. 
2 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: forms and 
function of exchange in archaic 
societies, Routledge, London, (1954) 
1988 reprint, p. 37. 
3 Claude Levi-Strauss, TheElementary 
Structures of Kinship (edited by 
Rodney Needham), Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1969. 
4 Georg Simmel, The Sociology of 
Georg Simmel (edited and translated 
by K.H. Wolff), The Free Press, New 
York, 1950, p. 380. 
5 ibid., p. 45. 
6 In Barry Shwartz, 'The social 
psychology of the gift', in 
Aafke E. Komter (ed.), The Gift: 
an interdisciplinary perspective, 
Amsterdam University Press, 
Amsterdam, 1996, p. 72. 
7 Georg Simmel, op. cir., p. 45. 
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